Political Ideologies and Worldviews: An Introduction
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DR. VALÉRIE VÉZINA; DR. FRANCIS ABIEW; JENNIFER ANAQUOD; DR. TYLER CHAMBERLAIN; FRÉDÉRICK GUILLAUME DUFOUR; DR. SERDAR KAYA; DR. CONRAD KING; DR. LOGAN MASILAMANI; DR. GREGORY MILLARD; DR. ROSS PINK; DAVE POITRAS; DR. ÉTIENNE SCHMITT; JACKIE F. STEELE; DR. ARJUN TREMBLAY; DR. SERBULENT TURAN; AND JOHN WRIGHT

KWANTLEN POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY
SURREY
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This open textbook is timely as the world continues to experience the effects of Covid-19, and people, more than ever, realize how interconnected the world is. Paradoxically, this linkage has also led to intense disagreements on the best way to address this pandemic. Various states have responded differently. Some state leaders have even denied there is a Covid-19 pandemic, while others, closed their borders or imposed stricter border controls that required monitoring and quarantining. These varied responses can be explained in the context of ideological differences among state leaders, whether undergirded by populism, nationalism, conservatism, or liberalism. At the same time, other ideologies come to the forefront in order to highlight how we are all connected (indigenous worldviews), the state of the planet (environmentalism), and how some groups are impacted disproportionately more than others (feminism).

Similarly, as educators, we had to adapt to online and innovative ways to teach. For years, open pedagogy at Kwantlen Polytechnic University and other institutions have been at the forefront of adaptive and innovative change. As outlined in the Open Education Strategic Plan:

Open education encompasses resources, tools and practices that employ a framework of open sharing to improve educational access and effectiveness worldwide [...] It also includes open pedagogies that involve designing architectures and using tools for learning that enable students to shape the public knowledge commons of which they are a part.

Open education at KPU encompasses diverse activities that support program areas and lead to the development of innovative global education initiatives. This includes the creation, adaptation, and adoption of open educational resources, our Zero Textbook Cost (ZTC) programs, and a diverse range of innovative open pedagogies.

As a special purpose teaching university with an open access mandate, we are committed to affordable education and to crafting new ways to enable learners to realize their ambition and career plans. We encourage and emphasize new ways our faculty engage with colleagues worldwide in innovative knowledge-practice networks to improve the learning experience. Through this approach we serve as a model for the way our graduates will engage with their own professional and practice communities.

This textbook is but one of the many ways the University is moving towards a more open pedagogy and, ultimately, a more open world. I am confident countless numbers of University students at KPU and beyond will benefit from this textbook, and will continue the conversation to make the world a better place for all.
Acknowledgments

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I would like to dedicate this book to all students, at KPU and beyond, who, through studying worldviews and political ideologies, are trying in their own ways to build their future.
PART I
INTRODUCTION: APPROACHING POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, you will be able to:

- Critically assess the various definitions of ideology;
- Situate ideologies using the political spectrum;
- Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the political spectrum;
- Assess the dynamism of ideologies.
Below are three real-life cases “torn from the headlines,” as they say. What is your reaction to these examples? And what reasons can you give for your response?

1: THE PROFITEERING DRUG COMPANY (USA)

“A couple of years before he was convicted of securities fraud, Martin Shkreli was the chief executive of a pharmaceutical company that acquired the rights to Daraprim, a lifesaving antiparasitic drug. Previously the drug cost $13.50 a pill, but in Shkreli’s hands, the price quickly increased by a factor of 56, to $750 a pill. At a health care conference, Shkreli told the audience that he should have raised the price even higher. ‘No one wants to say it, no one’s proud of it,’ he explained. But this is a capitalist society, a capitalist system, and [with] capitalist rules” (Desmond, 2019).

2: PERSISTENT GENDER INEQUALITY (CANADA)

A major investigative report by The Globe and Mail newspaper stated that it has been “fifty years since governments began enacting laws that banned discrimination in hiring, firing and promotions on the basis of sex. Forty years since the federal government made it illegal for employers to fire a woman for becoming pregnant. Thirty years since women overtook men in university graduating classes. And it’s been 10 years since the wage gap budged in any significant way, progress has stalled. By almost every metric, they continue to lag generations behind men” (Doolittle and Wang, 2021).

3: ETHNIC PERSECUTION (CHINA)

Reports from China's Xinjiang region indicate that atrocities are being systematically committed by the Chinese government against the mostly Muslim Uighur community. The BBC reports that “as well as interning Uighurs in camps, China has been forcibly mass sterilising Uighur women to suppress the population and separating Uighur children from their families. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute found evidence in 2020 of more than 380 of these ‘re-education camps’ in Xinjiang, an increase of 40% on previous estimates...People who have managed to escape the camps have reported physical, mental and sexual torture – women have spoken of mass rape and sexual abuse.... In December 2020 research seen by the BBC showed up to half a million people were being forced to pick cotton. There is evidence new factories have been built within the grounds of the re-education camps” (BBC, 2021).

Consider your response to each case. Do you find yourself reaching for ideas such as fairness, equality, freedom, justice, human rights, and nationhood in articulating your response? If so, then you are beginning to speak the language of political ideology.

As Michael Freeden has argued, a political ideology is a “configuration of concepts” (Freeden, 1996) – a set of ideas we use to make sense of our political and social world. Each political ideology interprets that world (describing it in certain ways) and either justifies or challenges the prevailing state of affairs in light of a set of ideas about how things ought to be. This will be key to our definition of political ideology. But before getting to that, let’s take a quick look at how scholars before us have approached the subject.
1.1 Ideology as a Justification for Error and Oppression

DR. GREGORY MILLARD

The origin of the term “ideology” is often traced back to Antoine Destutt De Tracy (1754–1836). De Tracy used it to denote a “science of ideas” that, he thought, would help us understand why people believe what they believe. He hoped this science could then be used to root out error and superstition – wrong beliefs, in other words. If we can figure out the causes of such errors, we might be able to eliminate those causes and build a more rational society.

Living as we do in a time of accusations of “fake news” and bizarre conspiracy theories like QAnon, De Tracy’s project might seem tempting. His use of the term “ideology” is not, however, what we typically mean by the word. The project has another problem – that of knowing what is “correct” versus a false belief. De Tracy seems to have thought this was evident, but most philosophers will tell you that it can be a challenging matter.

Instead of embracing De Tracy’s definition, many after him have focused on the “false belief” element and defined ideology as a particular category of false belief. In its more sophisticated forms, this approach sees ideology as the belief system that conditions us to accept and support a specific way of organizing society, even though it may not be in our own best interest.

Ideology, from this perspective, is what justifies the economic, political, and social order we live in. If that order is corrupt, then ideology is a key part of the rip-off – a way of deluding exploited people into thinking their exploitation is necessary, normal, or maybe even fair and reasonable. This view of ideology is most closely associated with Karl Marx (1813–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), the founders of what we now call (ironically, perhaps!) the ideology of Marxism (see chapter V in this textbook). They analyzed and critiqued the capitalist economic system that was enveloping Europe in the 19th century and, in some form, continues to dominate the globe today. For Marx and Engels, the capitalist economy is fundamentally exploitative: it privileges one class, namely those who own capital and businesses (i.e., the capitalist class, also called the bourgeoisie), and subordinates everyone else – particularly the workers, or proletariat, who have no choice but to sell their labour to the owners of the businesses. But why would anyone other than capitalists support such a system? Why would you, as an exploited worker, believe this system is acceptable, even necessary?

The answer, Marx and Engels suggest, is that you have been deluded by ideology. “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas,” they write (Marx and Engels, 1932). We have been conditioned by these “ruling ideas” to think that private property is an important freedom, even a “human right,” and that competition and money-making greed are “natural” human traits. We might even think we live in a society that is free because, say, no law stops us from doing what we want much of the time, or that people in our society are equal because all have the same rights under the law. In fact, Marx and Engels suggest our freedom is empty. As a worker, you lack the resources to live a truly fulfilling life and you spend most of your time being controlled by the bourgeoisie, who exploit your labour for their own profit. Nor are you in any meaningful way equal to the capitalists. They have far more power and wealth than you, and the law systematically favours their interests, not yours.

Ideology thus masks relations of domination and subordination, disguising those relations in languages of justice, nature, and necessity. And if ideology is a false belief that props up unjust social arrangements – the domination of the ruling groups over the rest – then there seems to be little point in studying ideology in depth. Wouldn’t we be better off focusing our attention on understanding those relationships of domination and how to change them? As Marx famously asserted: “philosophers have merely interpreted the world; the point, however, is to change it” (Marx, 1888).
Scholars of ideology who work in the Marxist tradition remain fascinated by the mechanisms our society uses to get people to accept its structures and norms such that they seem normal, necessary, and maybe even natural. However, they tend not to share Marx’s (early) view that those mechanisms are ephemera best set aside by clear-eyed analysts. The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), who was less confident than Marx and Engels that ideas are of secondary importance to economic relationships, used the term “hegemony” to describe a belief system that is so dominant that alternative ways of thinking are almost inconceivable. Capitalism becomes a truly hegemonic system when people overwhelmingly see its way of doing things as “common sense.” For Gramsci, such hegemonic beliefs are reproduced by all sorts of social mechanisms. Teachers, thinkers and journalists propagate them and influence others to believe in them; but so, we may infer, do less obvious sources such as movies, novels, music, churches, and the family. Gramsci was interested in counter-hegemony: how to get people to think and act differently? Meaningful change could be fostered, in part, by changing how people think.

Later thinkers within the rich and complex scholarly traditions known as “Western Marxism” and “Critical Theory” have explored the ways in which support for capitalism is generated through the institutions, psychology, practices, and discourses of daily life (see Leopold, 2015 and McNay, 2015), usually with an eye to the possibility of radical resistance. Common to these traditions is the conviction that capitalist market economies are faulty ways of organizing our affairs. We would do better to challenge, destabilize, and (hopefully) transcend this economic system and its cognate political and social structures, replacing them with something else. (What might that be? See chs. 5, 6, and 12 in the present book for some ideas). But writers in these traditions have become gradually less certain that ideology is something we can leave behind. Perhaps a society freed of exploitation and domination (assuming this to be possible) would still need “ideology” in the sense of a widely shared set of beliefs that help to make the society run. Those beliefs, however, would no longer be geared to propping up an unjust set of social arrangements – surely a great gain, if it could be achieved (e.g., Leopold, 2013).
1.2 A Pluralist Approach to Ideology

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So we do not have to define ideology as delusion or error. Nor, in fact, are we required to follow Marxist and “critical” scholarship in their radical or revolutionary critique of society. An alternative approach is to see each ideology as one (more or less) plausible perspective of the social world that is challenged by other plausible perspectives. Studying ideology then becomes the exploration of a range of systematic and reasonably coherent options for thinking about social and political life. That, broadly speaking, will be the approach taken in this book.

Now, this does not require us to believe that each ideology is equally plausible. Indeed, this would be impossible, since specific ideologies themselves disagree on fundamental points. But it does mean that we should be open to the idea that no one ideology necessarily tells us everything we need to know about social and political order.

We can call this approach, which is open, in principle, to various ideological perspectives, a “pluralist” approach. It does not assume there is one best answer to our social dilemmas and is willing to consider many answers, none of which may be wholly right or wholly wrong.

Most textbook definitions of political ideology proceed more or less in this vein (e.g., Heywood, 2021; Ball, Dagger, and O’Neill, 2020; Wetherly, 2017; Geoghegan and Wilford, 2014; Sargent, 2008). And they generally agree that a political ideology will contain the following elements:

1. A specific description of the social world we currently live in. The key here is not to assume that the “reality” of our world just obviously imprints itself on our brains. Rather, we need to interpret – to make sense of – the swirling mass of social phenomena confronting us, distinguishing between what is more and less important and the meaning of the important stuff. One contribution of ideology is in helping us do this (Freeden, 2003). There are different ways of making sense of our social world, and different ideologies tend to focus in on a particular unit of analysis – the key to the ideology’s story – which unlocks its preferred understanding of society. For example, liberalism tends to see society as a collection of individuals and to elevate the individual to the highest importance. Socialism, on the other hand, emphasizes that individuals are in fact organized into social and economic classes (capitalist and worker, rich and poor), that those classes are what really shape our lives, and that the social order is constructed to the advantage of one class over the others. Therefore, class is what we really need to understand if we wish to grasp how society works. Feminism (see chapter 13), meanwhile, emphasizes that we live in a gendered society and that power is distributed in a way that favours one gender (heterosexual men) over others. This is what we really need to understand, then, if we want to grasp the realities of our social world. Nationalism stresses above all that human beings are grouped into nations; this is the overarching fact we need to understand if we want to properly comprehend our social world. And so on. Thus, each ideology offers a rather different view of how we should understand the society in which we find ourselves.

2. An evaluation of the social world we currently live in. An ideology is not exhausted by its description of society; it also offers resources for assessing it. Should the world be this way? Why or why not? Continuing with an example from the previous paragraph, when feminists describe the world as marked by an imbalance of power between genders, they generally do not stop there. Rather, they go on to argue that it could be, and should be, otherwise. No gender should be advantaged over others. And every other ideology will similarly hold out the possibility of a critical assessment. Liberals will be interested in asking whether individual freedom and equality are optimally realized in our society, Marxists in criticizing class inequalities (and maybe even in condemning the existence of social class itself), nationalists in assessing whether a nation is fully realizing its identity and its autonomy, and so forth.

3. A program of action. Having described the world and evaluated it, an ideology will also typically involve some set of ideas about “what is to be done,” as the Marxist revolutionary Vladimir Lenin once put it. The program of action will seek to address problems identified by the ideology’s evaluation of the social order. If our society is full of
uneared legal privileges that discriminate between individuals, then liberals, believing that all human beings should be equal before the law, will argue for the abolition of this discrimination. Socialists, meanwhile, have argued that the exploited workers need to rise up and seize the power and wealth unjustly hoarded by capitalists – either through revolution or through the election of governments that will impose heavy taxes on wealth and redistribute those resources to the workers and the poor. Feminists have proposed a range of possible actions (from breaking down gender roles to dissolving gender itself) all with an eye to the destruction of gendered privilege. These are merely examples; each ideology covered in this book will have its own preferred prescriptions for restructuring our social world.

Political ideologies always, therefore, combine ideas about politics with an emphasis on action. We may thus define a political ideology as a configuration of concepts that describes and assesses the social world with an eye to mobilizing people for action. Every ideology explored here is a widely shared belief system containing the three ingredients sketched above.

The pluralist approach to the study of political ideology favoured here may be traced back to the work of German sociologist Karl Mannheim (1893–1947). Mannheim agreed with Marx and Engels that ideology reflects the interest of social classes and groups, but he broke with them in emphasizing that society contained a range of such groups, each of which would translate its interests into the language of ideology. This opens the door to studying a wider array of ideologies as opposed to reducing ideology to the “ideas of the ruling class.” Mannheim nonetheless retained a Marxist understanding of ideology as a mask for social interests. He also suggested that a special class of “intellectuals” could transcend ideology and arrive at a more objective understanding of society (Mannheim, 1997).

While it would be naïve to see political beliefs as utterly disconnected from social interests, a pluralist approach will not reduce ideology to specific group or class interests. People are drawn to ideology for a host of reasons, including psychological ones (e.g., Haidt, 2012). And a pluralist approach need not assume that any individual or any society can "transcend" ideology.

At a bare minimum, we cannot do without debatable views on the contested concepts that make up ideologies. Perhaps no one political ideology explored in this book will seem like a perfect fit for your own ideas and intuitions about society, but you cannot have no opinion at all on questions of justice, freedom, community, order, human nature and dignity, and so on. (To see this, ask yourself whether it is possible to see no moral difference at all between a person selling ice cream and a police officer brutally strangling a suspect to death). Political ideologies weave such key concepts together into more-or-less coherent and inspiring visions of social life. Exploring these invites each of us to inquire into what we ourselves really believe and how, or whether, our own political beliefs fit together.

What separates a political ideology from a utopian fantasy is the conviction that it is realistic to think that we can change society to make it align more closely with the ideology's preferred vision. This does not mean that a believer of a given ideology thinks such change will be easy or even that it will happen within their own lifetime; but they must believe that their preferred vision of the social world is possible for human beings to actualize and sustain. If they did not believe this, then they would hardly be willing to pour so much energy into helping that world come into being (unless they were crazy).

Indeed, ideologies have been so compelling that many thousands, indeed millions, of people have died in their name. With their emphasis on action, political ideologies always have an eye to mass mobilization, building support for their preferred vision of the world and galvanizing people to bring it to fulfillment.

This is one difference between political ideology and the more rarified domain of political theory or political philosophy. The latter are specialized scholarly pursuits committed above all to intellectual rigour, while the former require an ability to appeal to a wide range of people. Thus, Marxists have fought revolutions and wars in the hope of building a classless society. Women have marched and struggled for gender equality over generations – often, as was the case with the Suffragettes, paying a high price in health and happiness. Countless soldiers have fought and died in the name of their nation. When it comes to political ideology, then, “ought” implies “can:” to say that we should move our societies in a specific direction means that doing so is a realistic, viable possibility.

One recurring temptation, given these dramatic truths, is to see political ideology as necessarily doctrinaire, narrow-
minded, and extreme. The blinkered “ideologue” is then contrasted with the “pragmatic” person who assesses each situation without preconceived ideological biases and addresses each case on its own merit (e.g., Sartori, 1969). Our reply is that this contrast is untenable. One can’t approach social and political issues without some sort of preconceived ideas about what is more or less important and more or less valuable; otherwise, we would not know whether to focus our attention on a piece of lint on the sidewalk or massive riots in the streets. Meanwhile, “to judge something ‘on its merits’ implies preposterously that self-evident merits leap out of concrete cases for all to see” (Freeden, 1996). In fact, determining “merit” almost always involves us in debatable judgements. Someone might believe it is obvious that governments need to promote economic growth — that this is a self-evident, objectively desirable goal. The problem is, there are many thoughtful environmentalists who reject economic growth altogether as an ultimately unsustainable model. Who is right? Common sense cannot tell us. We are thus enmeshed in ideological argument. Calling ourselves “pragmatic” rather than “ideological” ultimately occludes our specific ideological commitments and convictions.

Some ideologies may indeed be more rigid, demanding, and “extreme” than others. But it would be an error to think that political ideology as such demands rigidity and fanaticism. In other words, while it may be hard to find a reasonable, moderate fascist, one can indeed be a reasonable liberal, conservative, socialist, feminist, nationalist, anarchist, or Confucian.

A pluralist approach tends to tilt us toward moderation precisely because of its openness to the possibility that more than one political ideology may contain valuable insights into our social situation. This can be true even when those insights prove irreconcilable:

Values may easily clash within the breast of a single individual; and it does not follow that, if they do, some must be true and others false. Justice, rigorous justice, is for some people an absolute value, but it is not compatible with what may be no less ultimate values for them—mercy, compassion—as arises in concrete cases...The notion of the perfect whole, the ultimate solution, in which all good things coexist, seems to me to be not merely unattainable—that is a truism—but conceptually incoherent; I do not know what is meant by a harmony of this kind. Some among the Great Goods cannot live together. That is a conceptual truth. We are doomed to choose, and every choice may entail an irreparable loss. These collisions of values are of the essence of what they are and what we are (Berlin, 1998).

An outlook of this sort tends to nourish humility and empathy even toward views with which we thoughtfully disagree. That said, a moderate, reasonable person may still be a person of conscience and conviction. Faced with social evils – despotist tyranny, say, or racist oppression – we may conclude that strong and uncompromising action is required. Reasonable people can, and often have, put their lives on their line for their deepest political beliefs.
1.3 General Ways in Which Ideologies Differ

DR. GREGORY MILLARD

Different ideologies are built on different concepts and vary in the way they organize and prioritize those concepts. It is not that there is no overlap between the concepts used by one ideology and those used by another. On the contrary, most ideologies affirm ideals such as equality, freedom, justice, order, and community. Nonetheless,

1. they often define key concepts differently. Such concepts are “contested,” meaning that there is no single, universally shared or “correct” definition of what they mean. Rather, each such concept tends to have a range of possible meanings associated with it. If we learn that nationalism, socialism, and liberalism all have a commitment to “freedom,” therefore we cannot stop there. Rather, we have to inquire into what they mean by this term, and we must be prepared for the possibility that they use the same term to mean somewhat different things.

2. different ideologies often prioritize key concepts differently. For instance, both liberalism and socialism endorse certain ideals of freedom, equality and community. But many would argue that socialism gives a degree of priority to equality and community that is not usually found in liberalism. Similarly, both socialism and liberalism recognize the value of the human individual; liberalism, however, gives this principle pride of place, while socialism tends to put greater emphasis on collective categories such as social class.

3. sometimes ideologies are completely divergent in their key concepts. For example, fascism utterly rejects the principle of human equality. In this, it is deeply different from rivals such as liberalism, socialism, or feminism. Other times, an ideology will highlight a concept not shared in any important way by its rivals. Environmentalism thus makes the flourishing of the natural world absolutely central to its vision of social and political order, while no other ideology does this to anywhere near the same degree.

These, then, are some important ways in which ideologies can vary. But ideologies have similarities as well as differences. This brings us to the problem of how to generalize about the relationships between various ideologies.
When people think about the similarities and differences between particular ideologies, they are often drawn to a spatial metaphor: the left–right "spectrum" or "continuum." This left–right spectrum – an imaginary line, in effect – is an organizing device that helps us sort out how different ideologies relate to each other. A person is "on the left" of this line if their views reflect those of left-wing ideologies, and they are "on the right" if their views reflect those of right-wing ideologies. But what do these labels mean?

The classification of ideological argument into a left-right spectrum has its origins in the French Revolution. This developed from fairly moderate beginnings in 1789 into a violent, seething cauldron of ideas for rebuilding society from the ground up before culminating in dictatorship by the late 1790s. Some regard the French Revolution as ground zero for political ideology as we know it – the moment when the intoxicating idea that we could comprehensively refashion our social world branded itself irrevocably upon the modern imagination. And in terms of the ideological spectrum, [m]ost scholars trace the origins of the words “left” and “right” to the seating arrangement of the Estates General in the years leading up to the French Revolution...In the Estates General, radical democrats and their sympathizers sat to the left of the king, supporters of the clergy and the aristocracy on the right (Cochrane, 2015).

This gives us a hint as to what the left-right distinction is driving at. Indeed, there have been many answers to this question (e.g., Cochrane, 2015; Noël and Thérien, 2008; Bobbio,1996; Laponce, 1981), but one convenient approach is to say that the two poles represent opposite views about human equality. Thinking about the ideological spectrum in this way can help capture much about how we actually use the terms “left” and “right.”

At the furthest point on the left of the spectrum, then, fall the most robustly egalitarian options available to modern political thought. To be “egalitarian” is to believe in the surpassing importance and desirability of equality in human relations. For the extreme egalitarian, human beings should have:

- equal rights under law
- equal power and standing in the community
- and approximately equal possessions (insofar as they have possessions at all, as opposed to everything being owned in common).

A society that robustly realizes equality on all three of these dimensions may be described as communist or “anarcho-communist.” Don’t worry, we will unpack what these labels mean in greater depth in later chapters. All we need to know for now is that these far-left ideologies imagine a society in which there would be no state, no government, no coercive power (such as police forces), minimal (or no) private property, and no exploitation. We might, say, all live in small communes and share resources among ourselves. That is about as far left as one can go – because it is as ambitiously egalitarian as one can go.

At the further point on the right of the spectrum would come the most adamantly inegalitarian options available to political thought. These would entail a rejection of equal rights, equal power and standing, and equal possessions. For example, to believe in dictatorship is to say that one person, or some small group of people, are entitled to rights and privileges not available to others – in this case, the right and privilege to govern and make decisions for the whole society. Power in dictatorships is not shared, but completely and (in theory) permanently concentrated in a few hands.
And the ideology of fascism (see Box 1.1) argued explicitly that the superior man – and it was always a male – must rule and wield absolute power. Fascists also argued that some groups of human beings should dominate others: stronger nations or races should subordinate the weaker. Finally, fascism rejected socialist ideas about wealth being equally distributed. Massive political inequality, and massive material inequality, were unapologetically baked into the ideology, even as its adherents spoke about a mystically unified nation. This extreme inegalitarianism means that it makes sense to position fascism as an ideology of the “far right.”

**Box 1.1 – Fascism**

Fascism emerged as an explicit ideological option following the First World War in Italy when Benito Mussolini led a movement that evolved into the National Fascist Party (founded in 1921). Fascists eventually rose to power in Italy, Germany, Hungary, Spain, and elsewhere, and by the 1930s fascism was exerting considerable influence worldwide. Historians still debate whether non-European countries such as Hirohito’s Japan prior to 1945 or the 1930s Getúlio Vargas regime in Brazil were fascist states.

Fascism upheld an extreme form of nationalism (often called ‘ultranationalism’) emphasizing the absolute duty of the individual to the nation and advocated an authoritarian, indeed totalitarian, state. The state was understood to be a vehicle for national mobilization, and the individual was understood to be properly one with the nation. For fascists, then, to limit the state’s power was ultimately to limit oneself. Further, arguing for such limits was a sign of pathology speaking to either self-loathing and cowardice (a failure of self-assertion) – or corruption: a shiftless desire to weaken the national power for one’s own selfish interests.

Fascists believed that human inequality was “immutable, fruitful and beneficial” (Mussolini, 1932). Within the nation, a superior elite headed by a charismatic leader must wield absolute power. Otherwise, fascists thought, the nation would degenerate. Similarly, stronger nations should rule and subordinate inferior ones; otherwise, humanity itself would degenerate. Fascists were accordingly militaristic and saw war as heroic and something to be enthusiastically embraced (Mussolini, 1932).

Economically, fascism presented itself as an alternative to both liberal capitalism and socialism. Unlike socialism, it left economic ownership largely in private and corporate hands; unlike liberalism, it proposed to coordinate economic production to ensure that it served the purposes of the state and to oversee a collaborative relationship between labour and capital. In practice, fascist states often promoted growth through massive military buildup and destroyed any critical labour voices (e.g., Passmore, 2002).

Nazi Germany can be argued to represent a distinct variant of fascism because of the especially heavy emphasis it placed upon race (e.g., Passmore, 2002). In Germany, the ‘nation’ was understood to be a genetically pure racial group entitled to subordinate inferior races and, indeed, eradicate them altogether. If the logic of mainstream fascism tended toward war, the result of Nazism was a colossal program of genocide – the Holocaust – in which approximately six million Jews and up to half a million Roma were herded into concentration camps, where they were enslaved, tortured, and murdered.

Fascism proved extremely short-lived as a mainstream ideology, thriving for a single generation only. Its overt influence collapsed after the total defeat of the Axis powers in the Second World War. However, it would be ill-fated to say that fascism and its values have entirely disappeared. In Europe, for example, some argue we are seeing a resurgence of fascist ideologies with the rise of neo-fascist parties and movements critical of immigrants and ethnic minorities. Fascism breeds in conditions of crisis, uncertainty and disorder; it is not...
surprising that some parties employ themes of ‘organic unity’ or ‘pure ‘blood’ in contexts where significant numbers of people fear demographic, economic, and technological changes fueled in part by globalization.

THE ABSOLUTE IDEOLOGICAL SPECTRUM

LEFT  ←  CENTRE  →  RIGHT
(Egalitarianism)  (Inegalitarianism)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communism</th>
<th>Socialism</th>
<th>Socialism</th>
<th>Liberalism</th>
<th>Liberalism</th>
<th>Conservatism</th>
<th>Libertarianism</th>
<th>Fascism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anarchocommunism</td>
<td>Marxist-Leninist, Maoist</td>
<td>Social democracy, democratic socialism</td>
<td>Reform liberalism</td>
<td>Classical liberalism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Anarcho-capitalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Between the two extremes of communism and fascism falls a group of more moderate ideological options. Democratic socialism, for example, slots “left” because it advocates for significant (not absolute) redistribution of wealth from rich to poor. This moves it closer to equal possessions, but not all the way there, even as it retains a belief in some degree of equal power and standing within the community via equal rights to political participation. Liberalism, for its part, is a very varied ideology, but by and large it is less emphatic about the redistribution of wealth and not quite so staunchly egalitarian as democratic socialism. It occupies the centre of our spectrum. Conservatism, meanwhile – at least as understood in the second half of the 20th century – tends to oppose the redistribution of wealth, favouring a higher level of economic inequality, while still (mostly) insisting on equal rights and equal rights of participation. It also tends to defend traditional social hierarchies, for instance, in the realm of gender relations and cultural identities. And so it falls to the right of liberalism. Libertarianism and anarcho-capitalism would unleash vastly higher levels of material inequality by reducing the state to a bare minimum or abolishing it altogether and organizing human affairs largely by market mechanisms. They can thus be placed further right still. Nevertheless, these configurations retain a commitment to equal legal rights. At the furthest point – fascism – this commitment drops entirely away, as we saw.
1.3.2 Complicating the Spectrum: Ideologies that do not quite fit?

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Some ideological options do seem to be awkward fits for the left-right binary. Nevertheless, we can use the contrast between egalitarianism and inequalitarianism to help categorize them. Feminism, for example, seeks to break down gender hierarchies; this concern for equality is reflected in the tendency to see it as broadly of the left, even if not every self-defined feminist can be so classified. Religious fundamentalism tends to heavily favour traditional identity hierarchies (particularly in relation to gender and sexual orientation), and so it is not surprising to find it typically classified as belonging on the right. Environmentalism is especially difficult to classify because its primary concern is less focused on human-to-human relations than human relationships with the natural world. Environmentalism is thus an unusually open-ended ideology in terms of how it envisions social organization. If an optimal human-natural relationship can be best achieved via hierarchical social arrangements, then in principle some environmentalists might endorse those arrangements, which would put them on the right. On the other hand, the environmentalist desire to give nature and animals greater standing in human affairs pushes them toward a kind of egalitarianism – one that places human beings and the natural world on a more equal moral and political footing. In practice, most environmentalists support egalitarian measures for human beings as well, which is why they tend to be classified as on the left.

Some ideologies encompass both strongly left- and right-wing variants. Nationalism and populism are cases in point, as we will see. Anarchism offers a particularly interesting case of this. One of its major variants, anarcho-communism, falls on the extreme left, while the other, anarcho-capitalism, lands on the far right. This is because the former imagines a radical material equality (shared possessions, communally organized) and the latter a radical material inequality (completely unregulated capitalism). What qualifies both as anarchist is their rejection of all forms of coercive, non-voluntary social coordination and government. All forms of anarchism therefore have a strong bedrock commitment to human equality: no one should be able to compel anyone else to do anything. But anarcho-capitalism leaves room for massive inequalities of wealth and real-world hierarchies – e.g., hierarchical chains of command within corporations – while anarcho-communism insists on equality in all spheres of life and in all senses of the word.
1.3.3 Left and Right on the Ground: Local Ideological Spectrums

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The preceding has explored what we might call an absolute ideological spectrum. It encompasses all the major ideological options of modern politics. However, since the Second World War, the day-to-day politics of most liberal democracies has tended to work within a much narrower band of possibilities. For example, communism and fascism exist only at the very fringes of Canadian political life. Canada’s Marxist-Leninist Party received a paltry 4,124 votes out of 18,350,359 votes cast in the 2019 federal election (Elections Canada). This is fewer than half the votes received by the satirical Rhinoceros Party, and only a fraction of the total number of spoiled ballots! Meanwhile, there is no self-defined fascist party in Canada at all. Instead, political debate in Canada clusters very heavily around the centre of the absolute ideological continuum. Liberal ideology is thus at the core of Canadian politics, with support shading off toward the left in the form of very moderate social-democratic beliefs on the one hand and a largely moderate conservatism on the right. Indeed, seen from the perspective of the absolute ideological continuum, most of the heated debates within Canadian life – e.g., should Canada adopt a national Pharmacare program? A carbon tax? A pipeline? A higher or lower level of government deficit? – concern minor policy disagreements within a broadly shared allegiance to liberal-democratic capitalism and a global order defined by sovereign states or nations. So when we talk about left and right in Canadian politics, we refer to something much more confined than the absolute ideological spectrum. And something similar holds for politics in most contemporary liberal democracies, most of the time.

At this local level, the political centre – meaning the median point between the most relevant political polarizations within a particular society – does tend to shift leftwards or rightwards as time passes. The political mainstream in Canada in the 1990s hewed further to the right in its commitment to balanced budgets and high tolerance for material inequalities than did the political mainstream of the 1960s, or, arguably, that of the 2020s. And Canada is usually thought to lean further left, on the whole, than the United States; yet many European countries, especially the Scandinavian ones, show much stronger commitments to the redistribution of wealth and material equality than Canada. What exactly counts as the “centre” of mainstream politics, then, varies from society to society, even as each of those societies leans further left or right, and back again, as it moves through time.
1.3.4 Limits of the Left-Right Spectrum

So the left-right spectrum can be thought of as a meaningful, if very general, way of categorizing ideologies. It may be unwise to insist that all ideological disagreement can be crammed into the left-right binary or, at the very least, we should concede that this is challenging to do.

One example of an issue that is tricky to slot into the left-right continuum is what is sometimes called the debate between “Anywheres” and “Somewheres” (Goodhart, 2017) – also referred to as “Open” versus “Closed” (e.g., Economist, 2016). Those who focus on this debate argue that a major fault-line exists between people who are fiercely loyal to particular communities and traditions and those who are more mobile, comfortable with diversity, and “global” in outlook. The former tend to back projects like Brexit and politicians like Donald Trump who want to strengthen borders, while the latter tend to support globalization and are more “multicultural” in orientation. On its surface, anyway, this debate seems to have little to do with equality in any sense, and so fails to fit into the left-right framework as we sketched it out above.

That said, one could argue that, in subtler ways, it does fit. For example, the politics of the “Somewheres” is often laced with worries about immigrants, “outsiders,” and concerns that historically dominant identities are losing ground to others. In this sense, their politics may represent an attempt to privilege traditionally dominant cultural identities over other identities – a move in the “inegalitarian” right-wing direction. Meanwhile, the politics of the “Anywheres” often entails a rejection of traditional cultural, gender, and sexual hierarchies and can even extend to support for completely open borders and a view that it is unjust to treat citizens and non-citizens differently – a move in an “egalitarian” left-wing direction.

All the same, rather than doing a lot of heavy lifting in order to make every last issue fit within the left-right continuum, we may prefer to simply accept that the left-right structure does not perfectly capture everything about politics. And that’s perfectly fine: it’s not necessary to assume that any single belief system or conceptual structure must tell us the totality of what we need to know or understand about the world. Note, however, that those who find a single left-right binary too limiting have developed other options, such as the Political Compass, which posits a four-quadrant grid as a better way of categorizing ideological disagreements. Try clicking on this link to take a test and see where you fall on the Compass.
1.4 Ideologies: Dynamic Traditions

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Ideological debate is never static. Any given ideology will enjoy historical periods of greater or lesser popular impact. Fascism may have had progenitors in late 19th-century and early 20th-century conservatism, but it is not much of a simplification to say that it exploded onto the European scene after the First World War and utterly evaporated as a mainstream option following the crushing defeat of the Axis Powers in World War Two. Its heyday barely lasted 20 years. To take a more durable example, socialism was seen as a primary – often the primary – challenger to liberalism for most of the 20th century. Many people believed that the forces of history were on the side of socialism and that its triumph was inevitable. Yet, by the 1990s socialism had become widely seen as passé, with liberalism standing triumphant (Schwartmantel, 2008). Only in the 2010s did socialism resurface as a respectable option in many countries, with influential politicians such as Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez explicitly defining themselves as “democratic socialist.” So socialism went from being pegged as the likely historical victor in an ideological battle with liberalism to spending a generation in the political wilderness.

Similarly, anarchism went from being a popular option in radical circles in the late 19th century to almost completely marginal after the Second World War. Meanwhile, liberalism, perceived as utterly dominant and practically unchallengeable from 1990–2010, is now thought by some to be losing influence, perhaps corroded from the left by a loose semi-ideology of “social justice,” and on the right by illiberal populism.

Thus, specific ideologies wax and wane in terms of their influence over mainstream politics. Equally important – though sometimes harder to grasp – is that ideologies themselves are dynamic and changing phenomena. What counts as mainstream thinking within any given ideology shifts over time. Yes, it is possible to speak about a core set of concepts and beliefs that make a given ideology what it is; each chapter of this book will include a list of such core beliefs. Nevertheless, certain concepts give way before others within an ideology as it develops.

An example may help. The ideology of liberalism (as we will discuss in the next chapter) is associated with many concepts, including individualism and individual liberty. But for 19th-century liberals, human progress was an equally fundamental principle, and for these liberals it seemed obvious that some societies and cultures were further down the path of progress than others. In fact, they believed that some cultures were so hopelessly “backward” that

(a) it was entirely justifiable for those societies to be ruled by more advanced ones so that they may be lifted out of backwardness; and that

(b) it would be a good thing if some backward cultures ceased to exist altogether, and instead be assimilated into the norms, beliefs, languages, and practices of more advanced societies.

John Stuart Mill, probably the most influential liberal thinker of the 19th century, believed precisely these things. This sort of thinking played a tragic role in shaping Canada’s policy toward indigenous peoples. These peoples were perceived to be in need of “civilizing” and thus were denied equal civil and human rights; ultimately, they were subjected to brutal policies of forced assimilation – which we now regard as genocide.

Today’s liberals tend to be appalled by such views and embarrassed that earlier generations of liberals subscribed to them. This particular understanding of progress, then, was once a key component of liberalism but is no longer. Its influence has receded dramatically since the end of the Second World War, when the horrors of Nazism revealed the ultimate terminus to which such thinking leads. In short, what counts as mainstream liberal thinking has changed over time, even if important ingredients in the liberal recipe remain in place (which is why we can plausibly categorize people from different eras as “liberals”).

Similar historical shifts can be observed in other ideologies. Ideologies, then, are mutable – best conceived as dynamic, living, evolving traditions, which each generation alters and redefines in light of its needs rather than as completely fixed and unchanging sets of ideas.
1.5 Ideologies: Not Just about Government, let alone Political Parties

DR. GREGORY MILLARD

You may have noticed that many of the ideas attributed to ideologies so far go well beyond the kinds of questions of government policy we might see discussed in our news feed. Political ideology generally takes a much broader approach to ‘politics’ than just the question of what governments should do (although it is usually interested in that too). Political ideologies harbour views on such sweeping matters as what form of economic organization is best; how genders should relate, and whether gender is a useful category at all; how human societies should deal with the natural world; and whether social change should be resisted, adopted only gradually, or embraced with revolutionary fervour. Ultimately, indeed, all important questions about social power can be dealt with under the banner of political ideology (e.g., Eagleton, 1991; Schumaker, 2008).

That said, most ideologies focus on a limited range of core concepts and build their vision around them. But none are constrained by a need to focus only on the actions of governments.

A final point. You may have noticed that political parties often use labels that align with the names given to political ideologies. Canada’s two largest national parties, the Liberal and Conservative parties, are great examples of this. This can lay a trap for the student of political ideology. We should not assume a tidy correlation between the beliefs and values expressed by a political party and those associated with a political ideology.

Think about it this way. Political parties are organizations that seek to contest and win elections. Doing this means advocating for principles and policies that appeal to large numbers of voters. And this in turn means a party may or may not align itself neatly with a given set of ideological principles at any given time. If ideological conservatism is not especially popular at a given moment, a Conservative Party may, therefore, find it convenient to deviate from conservative principles in order to get elected. And it would be a mistake to look at such a party for guidance as to what the ideology of conservatism means.

Of course, analysts cannot define “conservatism” (or any other ideology) without any reference to what people who call themselves conservative actually believe. As we saw above, ideologies are not static. They evolve over time, as the beliefs of real people change over generations. But the point here is that, at any given moment, we should not assume that any particular political party aligns perfectly – or at all, really – with any particular political ideology. The extent to which a party (or person) aligns with the descriptions of ideologies provided in this book should be seen as a matter for investigation, not a given.

Discussion Questions

1. In section 1.3.1, it is suggested that “for the extreme egalitarian, human beings should have equal rights under law, equal power and standing in the community, and approximately equal possessions (insofar as they have possessions at all, as opposed to everything being owned in common).” Which, if any, of these goals do you agree with? How close is our society to realizing the goal(s) you do agree with? What measures should we take to realize them?

2. How confident are you that we can overturn our social, economic, and political structures and replace them with better ones? In other words: is radical change something to be feared, or something to be
embraced?

3. Do you subscribe to a political ideology? If so, what is it? If not, why not?
References


Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter, you will be able to:

- Assess the importance of hiSTORIES in Indigenous worldviews;
- Discuss the concept of interconnectedness;
- Distinguish between linear and circular learnings.
What I learned from Coyote

JENNIFER ANAQUOD

It is dark, and I am sitting on a rock in the forest. The moonlight breaks through the trees and offers just enough light. The smell of the damp forest wraps its arms around me and welcomes me like an old friend. I am waiting for Coyote, and as usual I am not sure if this is a dream or a vision. Coyote has become my friend and writing partner, and our relationship means a lot to me. He is usually here by now, and I begin to wonder if perhaps this was not a visit from Coyote but something else altogether.

I hear a rustling in the trees, and Coyote appears wearing a top hat and looking at an iPhone and chuckling.

“Your Aunty is so funny,” Coyote laughs and taps away at his iPhone in what can only be a response to a text message.

“My Aunty??” My voice is a little shriller than I intend.

“Don’t worry, I don’t tell her your secrets, but we do make fun of… I mean laugh… She reminded me. I was supposed to meet you,” Coyote nods his head in reassurance.

“I want to ask you if you will help me write about my worldview?”

“What would I tell people? I guess I could tell them how wonderful I am and how I am the centre of everything…. Oh… and maybe how my wonderful mentoring centres you and connects story to place and (dis)place and how story is weaved together to create a place that just is, a place that is neither people’s home territories but is their home territories at the same time. I should also tell them that of course I would support you in making sure you do your work in a good way … I mean you still need a lot of help …and that you should put people’s voices at the heart of everything you do. OH OH… I would tell them how I know a story for everything and that stories live forever, and there isn’t anything that isn’t tied to me and my stories. I mean, I am the centre of everything, and everything is the centre of me. Indeed! I think this is an excellent idea I had in helping you write my worldview and making sure you understand the importance of listening. After all, who else would you ask to help you with understanding the world?” Coyote stops to catch his breath and looks excited.

“Coyote, thank you, but my worldview needs to focus on the teachings of who I am and what I know as an Anishnaabe/Nehiyaw woman from Muscowpetung and what guides me and the stories that have been passed down. Your voice is important, and you do know a lot about telling a good story….” My voice trails off as I look over and realize that Coyote is no longer listening to me and is admiring himself in a hand mirror as he wanders off into the forest.

“Thank you, Coyote,” I yell.

“See you soon. You will need me,” he chuckles in response.

As always, my meeting with Coyote leaves me baffled and enlightened. As the way of all good storytellers, he has left me with answers and questions. Coyote is correct, and I go back to what I learned at 9 years old in my Kookum’s kitchen, that story is always at the beginning, middle, end and centre of what we do and not necessarily in that order. Indigenous worldview is complicated, but I know that the best place to start is always with a story.
As I had shared with Coyote, I struggled with putting together my own worldview. Writing it in a linear way felt wrong and did not seem to encompass all the knowledge I have been gifted. I worried about the fact that I have been displaced due to forced migration and how this has affected my worldview. This is just one of the intergenerational effects of the residential schools that plague my family. Connection to place is an immense part of Indigenous ways of knowing. How can I represent this without being physically connected to my home? How do I present an Indigenous worldview that is culturally relevant yet my own? I think about my relationship with my mentors, Elders and Coyote as well as the researchers I have learned from, and I know that starting respectfully with a story is important (Archibald, 2008; Tuck and Yang, 2014). I have thought about my own journey to understanding my worldview and recognize that (dis)placement, or perhaps it is replacement, is a good place to start. As my Kookum taught me, the beginning, middle and end are always there, but linear learning is not our Indigenous way.

As with any journey, the direct path we plan is not the one we end up taking. My family, much like many Indigenous people from the plains, were displaced from their home territories in the early 1960s (Norris & Clatworthy, 2011). My grandparents’ desire to keep their own children from going to a residential school led to them move around Saskatchewan for many years before they came to the realization that the safest thing for them would be to relocate to another province. This relocation was a choice they made, but it actually resulted from the forced migration of Indigenous peoples of the Plains due to a lack of resources and safety and to keep their children from attending a residential school (Norris & Clatworthy, 2011). My aunt tells me that when they arrived in Vancouver, she remembers my Kookum crying every day. “It's ugly here. Everything is so different. I miss our people,” were statements they heard her telling Grandfather daily. They all struggled to adjust to living in a city that was so different from their homeland as well as to the loss of culture and connection they were also experiencing. This migration has changed my worldview and changed our own understanding of the world as a family. Our teachings come from oral stories passed down without a physical connection to the land. This is true of many Indigenous people today. I have struggled with this over time, but I eventually have come to understand the power of what I think of as a (dis)placed worldview. It is hard to explain how my own journey through academia has helped me sort my stories or my families’ hiSTORIES to create an understanding of my worldview, but through the stress and turmoil of academia this is what happened.

Being Anishinaabe and Nehiyaw in an urban area where I am a guest is not easy. I grew up with a non-Indigenous (adoptive) mom and was only offered glimpses into my culture during summer vacations and visits from my grandfather, who helped raise me. I was starved for stories of my culture, my homelands and ways of knowing that spoke to my soul. It would not be until I was engaged in my master's degree work that I realized there were so many Indigenous people that had experienced and were experiencing the same thing. This need to find a cultural identity and sense of belonging is rampant among Indigenous people, especially with those living in urban areas as a result of migration or displacement (Daschuk, 2019). For many, blending into mainstream society or not identifying with their Indigenous roots becomes a way of coping with these feelings. Research and personal experience have taught me that this is not a solution that works long term (Goodwill & McCormack, 2011). It creates a sense of isolation, fear, identity crisis, and even loathing as one tries to find a place in a world that holds no place for you (Goodwill & McCormack, 2011). Living in this space of disconnection leads to the need for healing and rediscovery, and learning our true stories can be used as a tool of healing in this journey. This journey often begins with examining one's own story, and this can be a difficult journey to navigate alone. Learning to be an Anishinaabe/Nehiyaw woman has been a difficult journey. It competes with a dominant framework and way of knowing that often imposes and makes me forget my traditional ways of knowing. Daniels-Fiss (2008) states that learning to be Nehiyaw (which was once ingrained in her) is difficult and that early education had almost made her question her traditional ways of knowing. I struggle with this knowledge and know that education has damaged and, in some cases, continues to damage the identity and ways of knowing of Indigenous people. Misunderstanding and misusing Indigenous ways of knowing or worldviews also has a history that has inflicted damage on Indigenous peoples,
and I have been taught that it must be engaged with in a way that upholds the stories, ways of knowing and Indigenous knowledge that are shared with you (Archibald, 2008; Coombes & Ryder, 2009; Kovach, 2000). My aunt tells me that our worldview is always with us, even when we are (dis)placed and that the need to engage in story is weaved into my DNA.

“My girl, you have listened and told stories since the beginning of time. Long before you were in this dimension, your spirit lived and played in stories. Speak from the heart and listen to the stories of others. What you need is there if you listen with your heart,” she tells me, and I can feel the words come alive within me.

My aunt’s words are important, and they speak to me in a way that reassures me that I will engage in telling this story in a good way. There is a sense of healing that comes from being connected to the stories of those who have walked before me. Wilson (2008) writes that he sees research and writing as ceremony and that while creating a research paradigm he found it difficult to articulate what he knew intuitively. I have struggled with Wilson’s (2008) work in the past, as I struggled to understand the connection of the sacredness of ceremony and the academic world of research and writing, yet I am now able to see that there is a connection. I need to engage in writing with the same care that I would enter a ceremony, and I am not exposing the sacredness of the ceremony but embracing the sacredness of the stories that will be shared with me. I have spent my life trying to be a good listener and will continue to ensure that I listen with an open heart and mind as well as recognize the need for respect, relevance, responsibility and reciprocity when engaging in listening, sharing, telling and learning from story (Archibald, 2008; Botha, 2011; Iseke 2012). The word ‘weave’ has stayed with me from my aunt telling me that story is weaved into my DNA. Weaving is an important part of who we are as Indigenous people, and while my own nation does not weave, I think about our teaching of ‘All my Relations’. This teaches us that we are all interrelated with each other and the land, animals, plants, air and spirit world around us. Our stories weave together, and through them we learn the importance of being connected (Daniels-Fiss, 2008; Kovach, 2012). I know that my own Indigenous worldview has come from the weaving together of stories from two different nations, from the stories of (dis)placement and loss, and from the stories of strength and resilience. Indigenous worldview is the concept of “All My Relations”, as it reminds us of our responsibilities to each other and how our stories may change, but they are always the same.

I keep thinking about the concept of stories finding their way home, and I wonder what happens to them when they get lost. Where do they go? Where do they live? Do they visit with the ancestors, or do they hibernate like a bear does in the winter? I have a sudden visual of myself as Mary (as in Mary Had a Little Lamb), and I am trying to guide stories instead of sheep as I try to help them return home, and they are all running in different directions. “Stop,” I yell at the stories. “Line up! We need some order here”. We need order, as how else is there to convey a worldview in a way that is coherent and makes sense? The image of my errant stories comes back to me, and again I picture myself trying to wrangle them like sheep. As hard as I try to file them in a straight line, they insist on running around and circling around each other. Perhaps this is a distinct difference between living with an Indigenous worldview and trying to write about one. For Indigenous people, stories have no beginning, middle or end and cannot be organized in a linear way (Fixico, 2003; Iseke, 2012). How does one do this in a way that shows respect to the knowledge passed on as well as the knowledge that has been gained through life experiences. How will I ensure my work is done in a good way and holds up the stories of those who have walked before me? I want to ask my Elders’ opinions, but I know that this can be problematic for a number of reasons. I ask my aunt how to approach those who I want to talk to about their own Indigenous worldview. “Show up and do the work” my aunt tells me when I question her. This is not a new answer, and I have often wondered what this means, but I am beginning to understand that there will never be a perfect time, place or way to learn, but that if I show up and do my work in a good way the stories will follow.

Indigenous methodologies in education and research honour our voices in our ways of knowing that connect us in mind, body, and spirit to knowledge that has existed since time immemorial (Kovach, 2000). These methodologies include the use of story, as it helps us navigate and understand Indigenous worldview. I know this to be true, and I remind myself that I have known since I was nine years old that story is always the most important thing I can learn from. So why do I continue to come back to this feeling of unsettledness? Perhaps it is because I am still struggling to locate myself within my own worldview. I consider what this means and know that I must continue to question my own ways of understanding and how they have been shaped by my own history, family, displacement, and culture and ultimately how they have been shaped or reshaped by euro-centric education (Peltier, 2018). I am aware that I have not
escaped from the years of influence that higher education imposes on us. I move cautiously in all that I do to ensure that I am honouring those that have walked before me and that my work will enhance the journey of those that walk after me. I still wonder how to get to the heart of explaining my own worldview. Like in all moments of internal conflict, I call my aunt and hope that she will help guide me and offer some clarity on my current uncertainty. I call her and share that I am struggling with the concepts of Indigenous worldview.

“Tell it to me, your worldview,” my aunt tells me.

“Well, I know everything is interconnected and that doing things in a good way is important”.

“No, no, my girl. Tell me what speaks to you and what guides you,” she tells me and chuckles.

“Well, to me, respect and responsibility guide me, as it reminds me I have to value everything and everyone I am working with and their way of doing things and their way of understanding. I think of all that I have been taught and realize that there are so many aspects to respect that I must weave into my work. Peltier (2018) reminds me that respect means sharing worldviews and finding space for all ways of knowing to be upheld. It means understanding that everyone is in different places and spaces in our life journeys and with this comes different abilities. Most of all, I think that respect means that I must always reflect on what I bring to the table and adapt it to meet the needs of those I work with in regard to both research and teaching. I also know that I need to respect my own learning journey and ways of knowing,” I tell my aunt. I believe that responsibility and reciprocity cannot be separated from respect. I am always accountable to those I am working with, and as I consider how stories will be shared with me through the scope of my research and teaching I realize that I will be responsible to the stories and to those who share them (Archibald & Parent, 2019; Iseke 2013). I also must reciprocate by sharing myself, my own stories and any knowledge that is shared with me through the work I do (Archibald, 2008; Archibald & Parent, 2019). I believe that to do all of these well, I have to focus on balancing in two worlds and weaving Indigenous ways of knowing with non-Indigenous ways of knowing, as not everyone I work with will embrace the same ways of knowing that I do (Hatcher, Bartlett, Marshall & Marshall, 2012).

“My girl, you have what you need. Just respect in your own process and speak from the heart. Trust in the knowledge your ancestors have shared with you since the beginning of time and what you do not know yet will come to you when the time is right.” My aunt tells me she believes in me and hangs up.
I hear a hushed voice

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I hear a hushed voice behind me and blink my eyes to try to focus. I realize I am in the forest that has become the space and place where I meet with Coyote. This interstitial space has provided me with healing and a sense of understanding and belonging.

“Coyote,” I call out when I do not see him right away.

“SHHHHHHHHHHHHHH,” Coyote appears and hushes me. “I just got them to sleep”.

“Just got who to sleep?” I whisper.

“Why, the Stories of course! No thanks to you. They spent all day crying. Shame on you for yelling at them like that. You know Stories are sensitive and should never be linear. Asking them to line up; have you never listened to anything I’ve said?” Coyote stumps off in a huff.

I stand there wondering if I should follow him, but I hear him whispering to the stories.

“Shhh, shhh, it is alright. She won’t hurt you,” Coyote soothes the stories.

I sit down on a rock and sink my feet into the moss. I allow the connection with the earth to ground me, and I feel the stress of the last few days fade away. I reflect on what Coyote has said to me, and for the first time I realize the damage I may have inflicted upon the stories.

“Non-maleficence,” I say out loud. I contemplate the first principle of ethnography and what it means to do no harm. In ethnography, this refers to the research participants.

“But what about the Stories?” I ask as Coyote appears.

“Exactly,” Coyote sighs and sits down beside me.

I hear a Story whimper from behind me, and my heart squeezes when I think about how I made the Stories feel.

“Maybe you should ask them,” Coyote offers, and he seems to have nodded off.

I take a long look at my friend and realize he has what appears to be Cheerios and applesauce stuck in his fur. I feel grateful for the kindness and support he offered the Stories and realize that there may not always be someone there to undo the harm I cause. The need for relationship and care in those I work with is more important than I realize. I cover Coyote with a small blanket that is sitting beside me. I sit for a while, listening to Coyote’s quiet snores and wonder about what I should ask the Stories.

I stand and walk towards where I heard Coyote comforting the Stories. I come across what appears to be a small nursery and see small bundles lying in cradles. I sit down and rock the cradle nearest me.

“You are so important,” I tell them.

Coyote appears by my side and smiles, “Beautiful aren’t they”?

Margaret Kovach (2000) says that “Oral stories are born of connection within the world, and thus recounted relationally. They tie us with our past and provide a basis for continuity with future generations” (p.94). So... this means that I should treat the Stories as my relations...

I stop talking, and Coyote looks at me patiently as I struggle to make sense of what he was trying to teach me. I look at the cradles and smile.

“You always make it harder than it is... Did you ever think that you were the reason I needed a nap and not the Stories?” Coyote shakes his head at me.

“They are the centre of everything we do. Like child-centred education, the Stories will take the lead,” I say, and Coyote pats me on the back and nods as he hands me a crying bundle of Story.
In the first year of my master's degree in Curriculum and Leadership, I met Coyote. Coyote first appeared to me as I unpacked how my Indigenous ways of knowing fit into the world of academia. I often found myself in a place of unsettledness and found that writing in partnership with Coyote helped me balance who I was as an Indigenous learner and educator while fulfilling the expectations of academia and work. Coyote helped me understand that I did not have to choose one way of knowing but that I could learn to dwell in between these different worlds. This relationship with Coyote helped me on many levels, as I found it safe to engage in conversations with Coyote in what had become not just a writing style but a virtual space of gathering. I realized that I was dwelling in what is often referred to as third space (Nakata, 2007). This space where I met Coyote was safe, and I was able to reflect on and speak freely about areas of contention and my growing understanding of what Indigenous ways of knowing and understanding meant to me as an Indigenous student and educator. During this time, I also met Ted Aoki's (1986/2012) Miss O and was instantly drawn to her. Ms. O dwells between curriculum-as-lived and curriculum-as-planned (Aoki, 1986/2012). I resonated with Ms. O for reasons outside of the fact that being flexible in what we have planned to teach makes good sense, but I felt like this is what I was learning to do as an Indigenous educator. I was learning to dwell in the space between my Indigenous ways of knowing and academia in a comfortable way. As I learned to walk in both these worlds, I could begin to make sense out of how to uphold Indigenous ways of knowing and worldviews in a Eurocentric curriculum without losing any of my own beliefs about learning. Of course, it was not quite that simple, and I still find myself questioning how to engage in academia in a way that encompasses Indigenous ways of knowing and embraces my worldview in relevant and meaningful ways. I grapple with a sense of loss, as I know there are stories that will forever be lost to me due to growing up away from my home territory. My aunty offers me the word kiscâyäwin when I explain to her how hard it is to explain longing for something you have never had. She tells me it means to belong somewhere, and this belonging is missing for many. “They are kaskeyïhtamowin,” she tells me. This means to long for home to a point that it causes physical illness. I think about what this means and how my need for a sense of belonging has caused physical, emotional, spiritual and mental sickness throughout the course of my life. Connection to the land, connection to place, pedagogy of place and space, walking in two worlds and land education are all discussions and theories I know well and yet I still long for a place to call home. Fiss (2008) reminds me as a Nehiyaw woman that I am tied to the traditional land of my people through song, story and blood memory. It is this tie to a land that I have never lived on that continues to call to me and move me forward in my work. I am reminded of a dream I had when I first started graduate school, and now as I revisit the story I can see that the stories that inform my worldview were waiting for me even before I was aware of them (Cajete, 2005; McLeod, 2012).

It was hot, and I could smell the scent of sweet grass on the wind. It was dark, and I could not quite see where I was, but I knew I was at home. The sounds and smells of my home territory were all around me. I could hear the drums in the background and the sounds of a pow wow I was suddenly eager to find. It was as I went to start off towards the sound of the drum that I realized I was not alone. I turned, and there stood an old man; he was small and seemed friendly. “Who are you?” I asked. He didn't seem to speak, but I could hear his chuckling in my head.

“So many times we have been visiting lately, and you don’t recognize your old friend. How many lessons, how many fears have I put to rest, and how many laughs have I given to you?”

Suddenly, the man was gone, and in his place was Coyote.

“You hurt Nanabush's feelings, and now he won't play our game,” Coyote whined at me.

“Raven, Raven! Where are you?” Coyote's voice echoed around me

“Is this a dream?” I asked Coyote as Raven appeared.

“Is it? Haven't you been asking questions all week? Perhaps we are here to answer them,” Raven said as he flew in circles. It was now that I realized that Coyote and Raven were standing in a grove of cedar trees and that I could smell the earthy, wet smell of a rainforest. I was still standing on what I knew was my home territory, and I still could hear the pow wow...
drums. But I was not quite home. I seemed to be straddling a space between the land I grew up on as a guest and the land I called home. I looked towards the sound of the drums and felt the sense of peace that always comes over me when drumming starts. I looked back, and both Raven and Coyote were gone, but Nanubush was back but in a younger form. He was dressed as a young grass dancer. “You are keeping me from the pow wow,” he stated. “What will our relatives do if I am not there for their stories? What kind of a pow wow would that be? Listen carefully, you have a habit of not listening,” Nanubush said and seemed to glow a little. “I have been here always. If I don’t have the answer, ask Raven or Coyote. Boy, do they love to talk! Whether you knew it or not, you learned from us, and now you know if we are not around you are not doing things in a good way.” Nanubush disappeared, and I was standing at the edge of a river with my feet in the water. I heard some rustling behind me, and Coyote darted through the bushes.

“By the way,” he said in panting breaths. “If you don’t know something, ask and listen to the stories. It’s never too late to say, ‘Can you tell me that story again’.”
The dream

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The dream means something different to me as I reread it and contemplate the layered messages that are now apparent. This is what happens when we engage in sharing stories; the current environment we are in shifts, and we are then able to learn in a different space and place, one that connects us with stories that are waiting to be heard. What a story may teach us depends on where we are in our life journey. I believe this is at the heart of Indigenous worldview (at least for me). I strive to create safe spaces to engage in ways that allow others to understand Indigenous ways of knowing in a meaningful way. I think of Coyote and how he has helped me safely unpack my own struggles with understanding Eurocentric concepts and worldviews as well as how he has helped me understand my own worldview. This brings us back to the concept of having to balance in two worlds and how hard it is to dwell in a space and place that one does not understand. I consider the dissonance I felt when I first started visiting Coyote in our interstitial meeting place and understand that learning to dwell in place and space can be difficult and uncomfortable for non-Indigenous learners. I wonder what Coyote's role could be in helping us engage in place and space in a meaningful way. Tuck & Yang (2012) discuss the importance of understanding creation stories that belong to a place but, more importantly, how people become a place. I think about my relationship with Coyote and how he has become the interstitial space where I learn best. Or perhaps we have become the interstitial space where we visit and neither of us exists in that space without the other, and therefore the space would fail to exist if our stories were not intertwined. Coyote's role is important in many Indigenous nations, and without Coyote we would be missing an important historian that shares with us stories about our histories, philosophies and ways of knowing (Archibald, 2008). In fact, Coyote works hard to ensure we understand our connection to the land, place and space around us (Archibald, 2008). Maybe it is not physical space that we need to dwell in to understand the importance of Indigenous worldview but an in-between space where Coyote can help us understand the importance of belonging, connection and the importance of story as a worldview. Maybe Coyote is the key to my worldview, as he allows me to address my sense of (dis)placement in a way that feels like I still belong to home. Connection to land and the stories it holds is a critical component of Indigenous ways of knowing, and through engaging with Coyote in our interstitial place of gathering I have found a way to connect.
I rest my head

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I rest my head on my desk and try to center (or perhaps decentralize) myself before I continue writing. I spend some time letting the pressures of the day fall away, a practice I find helps with my ability to focus on the task at hand. I take a deep breath and realize it smells like the forest, and the scent immediately relaxes me. I notice that the sounds of my office around me have dissipated and there is an almost shift in the feeling of the space I am in. I lift my head, open my eyes, and nearly jump out of my skin. I am no longer in my office but sitting in the forest in what seems like a small waiting room. I recognize the space immediately as the in-between space where I meet Coyote. I have never met with Coyote during the day and only when I have been at home. I try not to panic and take a deep breath; the scent of the forest works its magic and calms me.

I slowly take in my surroundings; I am sitting in a chair in the clearing where I always meet Coyote, but I am not alone. There are chairs and a table set up around me, as if we are in a waiting room of sorts. Magazines sit on the tables, and I glance at the title... ‘Coyote Weekly’... ‘Trickster Times’... ‘Journal of a Place That Just Is’... I reach forward to grab one as someone bumps into me, and I realize I am not alone. I look around and take stock of the waiting room. A collection of forest animals sit in chairs looking bored. I shake my head, trying to wake myself up. I must be dreaming, as this seems out of the ordinary, even for a meeting in third space.

“Excuse me,” I say to the possum beside me, even as I question the possibility that I have in fact lost my grip with reality. (I should probably examine why even when in this interstitial space I question the possum’s existence, but I will save that for later). “Could you tell me what we’re doing here?” I ask the Possum.

"Why, waiting of course," the Possum answers.

Just as I am about to ask for whom, Coyote appears as if out of nowhere.

“Hurry, hurry,” Coyote shouts at me and gestures for me to follow.

We rush through the forest, and I follow behind Coyote until we come to the side of the river.

“You are so needy,” Coyote shakes his head at me. “I have other patients you know!”

“Patients? I’m a patient?... Coyote..." I look over and see Coyote is dressed as a doctor and is writing notes in a chart.

“Look... It’s not always that simple. Of course you’re a patient, but you’re also a...” Coyote doesn’t finish his sentence as he madly writes notes.

“A what, Coyote, and why am I here?” I ask, trying not to sound as confused as I feel.

“I can’t answer that. You came to see me, and I have a one problem limit per visit sooooo... Tick tock...” Coyote points at his Apple watch.

“...I...well...” I stagger as I try to formulate a question.

“Look, I can’t help you if you don’t know, but I do know this...Sometimes there is more than one worldview. There is always more than one story, and there is never a beginning, middle or end. So, stop struggling with how to start, as it has already started long before you got here,” Coyote pats my hand and hands me a lollipop.

“Coyote,” I call after him as he hurries away. I want to ask him about the chart, but he disappears, and I realize I am sitting back in my office. I feel unsettled but more relaxed, and I ponder my visit with Coyote. I realize that Coyote is right and that I am part of a story that has started long before I have arrived. Hannah Arendt’s ideas of belatedness come to mind, that indeed I have been born into a story that was already started, and with that comes a certain sense of responsibility, but it also means there is important work done by those who have walked before me. It is my responsibility to uphold this work and engage with it in a good way. I think about the women I have met that have and the stories they shared that led me to this space in my educational journey. I have been taught that the four R’s are always to be used when engaging with story in any way (Archibald, 2008). Respect, reciprocity, responsibility and reverence should always be enacted (Archibald, 2008).

So, does this sum up Indigenous worldview? I would hope not, as I have been taught that if I do not have more questions than when I started, I had better go back and do it again. I do know that Indigenous worldview is forever changing yet always staying the same. For my own teaching, I know that our Neyihaw creation story reminds us of a time...
when animals spoke to us and we lived together as a large community. When we as humans started to take advantage and forgot about unity, Creator planned on taking the animals away where they'd be safe, but the animals refused. They understood the importance of interconnection and that without them we would not survive. So, they gave up the ability to communicate with us to continue to nurture us. Just like that, we are back at the very first story, even though we are at the end and it is this that reiterates the importance of learning in a cyclical and not linear way. We are also back at understanding that the story will always be at the heart of understanding, being and worldview.
I look around

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I look around and realize I am back where I started, as I am sitting on a rock in the forest with the moonlight shining down on me. Beginning, middle or end I am not sure, but what I do know is that I have a better understanding of the importance of visiting Coyote. I have brought a small gift to show my appreciation for Coyote for always embracing the 4 R’s with me and being patient while I work my way through challenging concepts and learn new stories. I sense Coyote before I see him and smile, as he always brings me a sense of peace, even though confusion often accompanies the peace.

“It took you long enough,” Coyote says and plops down beside me.

“Is this the end or the beginning,” I ask as he sits beside me.

“Oh my girl... you still don’t get it. It just is. The thing about cyclical understanding is it can be the beginning, middle or end all at the same time, or it could be none of those,” Coyote pats my hand. “Whether it is here or there or there or here, we carry our worldview in our hearts and in the stories we have known since well since before forever... It doesn’t matter how you get there or where there is; as long as there is story there will be”.

“Will be?” I ask. He nods, and we sit in silence, and I know that my journey with Coyote is far from over, just as I know the beginning, middle and end come in no particular order.

**Discussion Questions**

1. How do your own stories pass down through your family influence your own worldview(s)?
2. Explore the concept of interconnectedness? How do the experiences of others around us (both historically and currently) change how a worldview is formed?
3. Discuss the difference between cyclical learning and linear learning.
4. What is Coyote’s role in the author’s journey of understanding her own worldview?
5. How can you be connected to a place or way of knowing if you have never been to that place?
References


PART III
LIBERALISM: FROM THE "FREE MEN" TO THE "FREE MARKET"

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, you will be able to:

- Critically assess the importance of liberalism and its link with modernity;
- Name and explain the various values of liberalism;
- Distinguish the variants of the ideology;
- Critically discuss the future of liberalism.
In the Western world, liberalism holds a privileged place. After all, we often depict today’s democracies as liberal democracies – meaning that democratic decision making is supposed to conform to liberal principles. As the oldest Western ideology, liberalism has faced many criticisms from all sides of the ideological spectrum, but it has survived in a recognizable form for at least 200 years and has adapted in the face of criticism and major historical and social developments. To better understand the ideology, we will first look at its core values, some of which are common to all of its varieties, and some of which are debated and resonate more with specific variants of liberalism. Then, we will discuss the various types or variants of the ideology, before briefly exploring the challenges confronting liberalism as it faces the future.
3.1 Liberalism and Modernity

DR. GREGORY MILLARD AND DR. VALÉRIE VÉZINA

It is important to begin by situating liberalism in historical context. The ‘birth’ of the ideology unfolded during a period of effervescence on all fronts in Europe – an epoch running from the 16th to the 18th centuries when Europe transitioned from Medieval or feudal society to a condition known as modernity. Speaking very schematically, feudal society was marked by closed economies based on subsistence agriculture, as well as by religious orthodoxy, and complex layers of inherited social rank. Most people living as peasants, or serfs, in a relationship of fealty to the local lord, who in turn owed loyalty to a king. People were seen as members of the social groups to which they belonged: their family, village, local community or social class. Their lives and identities were largely determined by the character of these groups in a process that changed little from one generation to the next. There was relatively little social mobility: ‘a man is his rank’ as the saying went, and that rank was usually inherited. Those roles came with distinctive and complex sets of expectations, norms, and legal privileges and responsibilities. Thus, people tended not to see themselves primarily as individuals with a unique identity and a destiny to be discovered in the way that today’s university students, for example, might be trying to ‘find’ themselves, working out what they value in life and what their career choices might be. Rather, one’s identity was defined by the small community and social role one was born into.

Nor was there much physical mobility. People did travel (e.g., on religious pilgrimages), but tended to live out their lives in the same village or valley of their birth; and such local communities tended to be quite homogenous (see: Bloch, 2014).

Modernity, on the other hand, is the world we know today. It is marked by dynamic, competitive market economies – a system eventually labeled capitalism. Kicked into high gear by the Industrial Revolution that began in the 18th century, the modern condition is marked by ever-changing technology and driven by a combination of the scientific method and competitive market economics; high levels of urbanization; and extremely mobile populations moving over vast distances abetted by transportation technologies such as trains, planes or motorized ships. People also move up and down the social ladder much more swiftly than in societies based on subsistence agriculture, sometimes within a generation, and certainly across generations; a father might be poor, his son middle-class, and his grandson rich. The reverse also holds true.

The modern world is one of large, centralized, bureaucratic states – countries – comprised of national populations living together under shared laws and (usually) shared language. These huge modern states have tended to subsume and destroy many of the local varieties of pre-modern life. For example, according to Eugen Weber, almost half the people in France did not speak French until the latter half of the 1800s; instead, they spoke a polyglot array of dialects and tongues (Weber, 1976). Paradoxically, modern life is also extraordinarily diverse, as massive mobility and urbanization result in people from all sorts of cultural backgrounds, religions and philosophical outlooks living together in the same space. The decline of religious orthodoxies and fixed, inherited systems of rank contributed to heightened individualism: the sense that each individual is unique, with a path in life that is not predetermined at birth but rather explored and chosen by the individual themselves. People were thus confronted by a broader range of choices and social possibilities, encouraged to think for themselves, and to think of themselves in personal terms (e.g., Taylor, 1989; Giddens, 1990).

Hence, as the certainties of feudal life broke down, a new intellectual climate emerged. The Protestant Reformation of the mid-16th century shattered the Roman-Catholic unity of Europe, and the individualism associated with Protestantism – emphasizing salvation through faith alone with the Bible as the ultimate source of authority – encouraged people to value individual conscience more than church orthodoxy. This in turn influenced capitalism, since the individual had a direct relationship with God, which, Protestants argued, made followers more self-directed and disciplined. Over time, material success became viewed as ‘a sign of God’s favour.’

Meanwhile, scientific explanations gradually came to displace traditional religious theories themselves, as the 18th-century Enlightenment emphasized the power of human reason to shape and improve the world, and society was increasingly understood from the viewpoint of the human individual (Robertson, 2015). Individuals were thought to
possess personal and distinctive qualities: each was of special value. Emphasizing the importance of the individual, however, has important consequences. It draws attention to the uniqueness of each human being; individuals are defined primarily by the inner qualities and attributes specific to themselves.

Modernity is often contrasted, not just with Medieval Europe, but with ‘traditional’ societies around the world, which tend to be agrarian, defined by somewhat static and homogenous local identities, and relatively disengaged from technological dynamism and science. The classic process of political and economic ‘development’ (or modernization) generally entails a traditional society moving into a more ‘modern’ condition akin to that described above. Thus, modernity has spread, with many variations, across much of the globe (e.g., Eisenstadt, 2002).

Liberalism can be understood as the first ideology of modernity. It arose as European society gradually shifted from its feudal to its modern incarnation, and it supplies a way of thinking that justifies many of the tendencies of modernity.
3.2 The Values of the Ideology

DR. GREGORY MILLARD AND DR. VALÉRIE VÉZINA

Like every ideology, liberalism is not a single, static thing but an evolving tradition. Some of the values below will have more importance in a particular time period or within certain countries than others. Nevertheless, there is wide agreement that **liberty** is at the core of this ideology. **Liberalism** comes from the Latin word *liber*, meaning ‘free.’ Individual liberty is for liberals a supreme political value and, most would argue, the unifying principle of the ideology.

Many early liberals saw individual liberty as a ‘natural’ or God-given right, an essential requirement for leading a truly human existence (Patterson, 1997) It also gave individuals the opportunity to pursue their own interests by exercising choice.

Liberals tend to see two main threats to the liberty of the individual: other individuals and arbitrary and oppressive governments. Other people can encroach on our liberty by stealing our property, threatening or damaging our person, enslaving us, etc. Individuals therefore do not have an unlimited entitlement to freedom. As **John Stuart Mill** argues in 1859’s *On Liberty*, although the individual may be sovereign over their body and mind, each person must respect the liberty of others (Mill, 2015).

This is a major reason why liberals believe we must have governments: to protect our liberty against such threats. On the other hand, those same governments can become an even greater threat to liberty! Governments can grow tyrannical, using their massive power to arbitrarily control, detain, punish, terrorize, or even kill us. For this reason, liberals place great importance upon **limited government**. As the very influential 17th-century British thinker **John Locke** argued, ‘Guards and Fences’ need to be placed around governments, ensuring that they do not expand their power too far and thereby corrode our liberty (Locke, 2003). Liberals therefore support the **rule of law** – the idea that laws must be publicly known and apply to all equally so that no one, including governments, can be exempt from them.

Liberty has been depicted in **two principal ways** within the liberal tradition (Berlin, 2002). First, there is negative freedom. This is called ‘negative’ because it is defined by the absence of something, i.e., the absence of interference in the individual’s affairs by external actors. While all liberals value negative liberty, it is, as we will see below, of particular importance to classical liberalism and neoliberalism.

There is also ‘positive’ freedom. Often defined in terms of the capacity for self-mastery or self-realization, we will use it here to denote the idea that for an individual to be truly free, they must have an actual capacity to pursue their ends in life. It is all fine and good to say that you are ‘free’ to get a university education as long as no one is physically barring your access to campus; but if you lack the funds to pay for expensive tuition, this freedom is meaningless. Positive freedom usually needs some form of external intervention, which is often performed by the state. For example, this
will mean making school or education accessible (via free education or student loans) so that all can potentially attend regardless of their level of income. Positive freedom is usually associated with reform liberalism (see the next section).

You may have noticed that, in discussing liberty, we have been consistently speaking about individual liberty. This reflects another key value of liberalism: individualism. This is the idea that human beings are first and foremost individuals and that the individual has supreme moral value. This is a bold change from the more group-centered dynamics of traditional societies, as we saw above.

With this emphasis on individual liberty, it may come as no surprise that liberalism moves its faith away from religion and toward reason. The ideology has deep roots in the Enlightenment project, which aimed to release humankind from its bondage to superstition and ignorance, and to build an age of reason. The idea here is that, to the extent that human beings are rational, thinking creatures, they are capable of defining and pursuing their own best interests. Related to this faith in human reason, many liberals have also been inclined to view human history – or at least, modern history – in terms of progress (e.g., Gray, 2002; Fawcett, 2018). In the liberal view, the expansion of knowledge, through the scientific revolution in particular, enables people not only to understand and explain their world but also to shape it for the better. In short, the power of reason gives human beings the capacity to take charge of their own lives and fashion their own destinies. Reason emancipates humankind from the grip of past superstitions and traditions. Each generation is thus able, at least in theory, to advance beyond the last; a strong emphasis is put on education, discussion, debate and the free exchange of ideas.

So far, we have seen that liberals view people as individuals imbued with reason who should be free to pursue their own ends in life. Two more values are worth noting: justice and toleration.

Justice denotes a particular kind of moral judgment, one focused on the distribution of rewards and punishments (or what each person is ‘due’). Liberal views of justice are based on a belief in equality of various kinds (see: Pennock and Chapman, 2017). First, individualism implies a commitment to what might be called a ‘foundational’ equality. Human beings are seen as born equal in the sense that each individual is of equal moral worth. It is from this logic that the concept of natural rights or human rights emerge, along with the idea that each person’s happiness should be given equal consideration in moral and political calculations. Secondly, foundational equality implies a belief in formal/legal equality or equal citizenship. This is the idea that individuals should enjoy the same legal status within society, particularly in terms of the distribution of rights and entitlements. Consequently, liberals fiercely disapprove of any social privileges or advantages that are enjoyed by some but denied to others on the basis of what they consider irrational factors such as caste, colour, gender, race, religion or socio-economic background. Everyone should be equal under the law; arbitrary discrimination is unacceptable.

Relatedly, this means that every individual should have the same freedom to rise (or fall!) in society. This does not mean equality of outcome or reward, or of living conditions, since liberals accept that people possess different talents and skills, and some are prepared to work much harder than others. It does mean that social rewards, such as wealth and power, should be available to everyone regardless of arbitrary factors of birth – and they should go to those who earn them through hard work and ability. Society should reward merit, not inherited privilege. This concept is called meritocracy.

To go further

Canada, like many Western countries, has adopted some form of liberalism, but injustices were, and are, still being felt. We invite you to read more about Canadians of Japanese descent during WWII, Aboriginal peoples, and the fight for women to get the right to vote. Reflect on why those injustices occurred.
The word ‘meritocracy’ has origins in both Latin and Ancient Greek. The word ‘merit’ has a Latin origin meaning ‘to earn’, whereas ‘cracy’ stems from the Greek word ‘kratos’ meaning ‘strength’ or ‘power’. Therefore, meritocracy is the term given to a system by individuals characterized by their ability, skill and education (or, in short, merit) to hold power positions. Meritocracy ensures that individuals employed in the system are merited for their position and that these employments are not used as political favors. Merit is often decided by an examination, although in the economy it is often thought to be determined by open competition for jobs and market share.

Note that the emphasis on legal equality, meritocracy, and individual freedom all tend to steer liberals toward a belief in equal rights of political participation. Consequently, liberals tend to support democratic forms of political organization in which competition for public office is open to all. However, they insist that democratic decision making should always conform to liberal principles. For example, it is, according to liberals, fundamentally illegitimate for a democratically elected government to persecute a minority group or otherwise compromise basic liberties or liberal justice, even if doing so is extremely popular with a majority of citizens (e.g., Mounk, 2018).

Continuing on the theme of justice: one form of liberalism, known as reform liberalism, argues that in order to achieve a meritocracy, legal equality and the absence of formal discrimination is not enough. We must also have equality of opportunity. That is, we must all have real-life access to a wide range of opportunities and the capacity to meaningfully pursue them. Everyone should have an equal shot at succeeding in life, and the absence of discrimination under law does little to empower us to pursue our aims if, for example, we are trapped in a life of grinding poverty. As we will see, reform liberals conclude that achieving equality of opportunity requires assistance from the state.

The last value we will discuss is toleration. The liberal social ethic, or the will to live together, is ideally characterized by a willingness to accept moral, cultural, and political diversity. The idea of toleration originates in religious wars between Catholics and Protestants following the Reformation and spanning from the 16th to the 18th centuries. John Locke argued that persons of good conscience would never agree on which form of Christianity was correct, and that, therefore, the state should not try to force one model on everyone; rather, it should tolerate such differences (Locke, 2003). As the famous quote (often wrongly attributed to Voltaire, as it appeared in Friends of Voltaire) goes: “I detest what you say but will defend to the death your right to say it”.

Toleration is both an ethical ideal and a social principle. As an ethical ideal, it is a corollary of individual liberty, calling upon us to respect that other people are autonomous, in control their own destinies, and entitled to live as they please. As a social principle, it establishes a set of rules about how human beings should behave towards one another when it comes to disagreement and differences of opinion: through rational discussion. Some liberals, such as Harvard philosopher John Rawls, have built on the idea of toleration to argue that the fundamental structures and symbolism of the state should be neutral regarding the ‘comprehensive doctrines’ – that is, the life philosophies – of the citizens who comprise it (Rawls, 2005).
There are a number of important divisions within the liberal tradition. At the most abstract level, there is a deep disagreement over how to justify liberalism's core principles. It is all well and good to talk about principles such as individual freedom or equality, but imagine you were speaking to someone for whom these are unfamiliar or strange ideas. How would you convince them of the rightness of the liberal vision? Liberals have given many answers to this question over the years. The two most important are utilitarianism and rights-based liberalism.

Utilitarianism, despite the ‘-ism’ suffix, is not a political ideology as such; rather, it is the label we give to a family of ethical theories. These theories hold that, when making important choices, the priority should be creating the most happiness possible. Jeremy Bentham stated in 1780 that ‘Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do’ (Bentham, 1988). Therefore, in deciding which ideology best serves human beings, we should choose the ideology which, when implemented, will maximize overall societal happiness. For many liberals, that is exactly what liberalism will do. (Note that we do not need to argue that liberalism will make everybody happy; rather, happiness is ‘maximized’ if a liberal society results in a higher level of overall total happiness in the society under any other system. This model still leaves room for plenty of unhappiness, in theory).

Why can liberalism be thought to maximize overall happiness? At root, the case is straightforward. As an individual, you know better than anyone else what will make you happy. You may not get this right every time – we all make mistakes – but if you are left alone, free to make your own choices in life, the outcomes will be more likely to result in happiness than if parents, priests, or governments manage your life for you, even with the best of intentions. It follows that we should leave people alone to freely run their own lives if we wish to build a society with the happiest possible people in it. This, then, is a utilitarian argument for the core liberal principle of individual liberty. And so utilitarian liberals argue that a liberal society will be the happiest overall society. This is why we should defend liberal principles.

A whole other approach centres on the intrinsic value of liberal principles, irrespective of their real-world consequences. (Such approaches are often called ‘deontological’). When the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant quotes the Latin phrase Fiat justitia, pereat mundus – ‘let justice be done, though the world perish’ – he captures the idea that justice has such high value for its own sake that we cannot allow any ‘real-world’ considerations to distract from our commitment to it (Kant, 2006). The effects of our choices, including the happiness or unhappiness produced, are less important than the principles that inform those choices. For liberals in this tradition, human beings just do have rights – rights to freedom, due process, security of the person, and so forth. To violate individuals’ rights is, on this view, wrong in and of itself. There is an inherent worth to the human individual that cannot be compromised for greater gains in happiness, prosperity, or other considerations. Rights-based liberals argue that liberalism is the best ideology because it protects these rights better than any other alternative.

John Locke, for example, famously argued that humans once lived in a ‘state of nature:’ a world without government. In this world, people had ‘natural rights’ to do as they pleased. While he thought that, on the whole, people would respect what he called the ‘laws of nature’ – basic moral principles about how to treat other people – he acknowledged that there was no way, absent government, to ensure they would. Some people would be predatory, stealing our property or otherwise threatening our lives and liberty. Sometimes people would honestly disagree over how to treat each other.
There is no way to arbitrate such disputes without government. So, Locke concluded, in order to better protect our natural rights, human beings agree to establish governments and to abide by their laws. This principle, whereby we agree to limit our natural freedoms under laws enforced by governments, Locke called ‘the social contract.’ The key, of course, is that the entire point of creating governments is to better protect our rights, which Locke saw as God-given. A government that consistently fails to protect our rights, or, worse, makes itself a threat to them, breaks the terms of the contract. We are no longer obligated to obey such a government. Indeed, Locke said, we can justly overthrow it (Locke, 2003).

Locke published his works long before the distinction between utilitarianism and rights-based (or 'deontological') liberalism had emerged. His own writing freely mixes the two levels of argument. But thought experiments like his 'social contract' have been influential among later generations of rights-focused thinkers. John Rawls, the most important liberal thinker of the postwar era, argued that if we want to know what a just society would look like, we should imagine ourselves deliberating with others about the basic rules of our society behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ concerning our actual situation in life. Not knowing whether we were rich or poor, for instance, would allow us to settle upon genuinely fair principles of economic organization unaffected by our vested interests. And, as a good rights-based liberal, one of the key principles he thought we would agree on is that individual freedom and equality of persons should be afforded strong protection by the society. Indeed, they should have ‘lexical priority’ over considerations of happiness. In other words, they should come first, having primacy over other values. Knowing that, once the veil of ignorance was lifted, we might end up as members of a vulnerable minority, for example, would motivate us to build very strong protections for freedom and equality into our society (Rawls, 1999).

As noted above, this is a fairly abstract distinction. Not all arguments between liberals have been so rarified. The most important division within the liberal tradition – the break that has mattered the most to ordinary people’s lives, as opposed to debates between political theorists – is between classical and reform liberalism.
Classical liberalism represents the ideology in its original form: a set of beliefs that coalesced in Britain and from there penetrated into America and Europe, over the 17th and 18th centuries. By the middle of the 19th century, this classical version of liberalism had attained peak influence, becoming something like the ‘common sense’ of a great many statesmen. As opposed to a model of society defined primarily by aristocratic privilege, religious orthodoxy, and closed economies, classic liberals emphasized individual liberty and what we would today call ‘personal responsibility.’ For example, a person could do as they pleased as long as they injured no one; the appropriate role for government intervention in social life was modest, involving such activities as maintaining a military, and building roads and bridges and other basic infrastructure. This approach gave people considerable freedom to live as they wished. That said, people who made what were understood to be irresponsible or immoral choices were left to fend for themselves, relying on private charity; those who could not pay debts were thrown in prison, and little consideration was given to life circumstances. If someone turned to crime, the fact that they might have been born into abject urban poverty and had few other options was simply irrelevant.

Formal/legal equality was an important classical liberal principle; however, it was usually defined very narrowly by today’s standards. Early classical liberals tended to believe that there should be legal equality for propertied men. This represented a huge advance for equality compared to the complicated networks of inherited legal ranks and privileges that tended to mark pre-liberal Europe. Its limitations, however, are obvious. The idea was that, if one did not possess property, one had no stake in social prosperity – and, as Bob Dylan sings, ‘when you ain't got nothing, you got nothing to lose.’ Such people could not be trusted to make responsible choices with the public purse. Therefore, a wide diffusion of full rights of citizenship, including the right to run for office, was out of the question as far as many early classical liberals were concerned. There was also a belief that reason, and other basic attributes of fully realized humanity, required a degree of cultivation that was beyond the reach of poor and working-class people, who were consumed with a desperate daily grind and in no position to realize such gifts. Thus, only well-to-do men had full rights of citizenship. Women, meanwhile, were also regarded as less than fully rational and were generally considered property of their husbands. Unattached women could find employment in some domains, such as teaching and service, but they lacked the full array of legal rights and entitlements that classical liberal ‘equality’ demanded for propertied men. The fact that women in Canada were not legally declared ‘persons’ until 1929 exemplifies the blatantly patriarchal assumptions that tended to inform classical liberal thought in the 18th and 19th centuries.

Still, we should not be too dismissive of the radical seed contained in the classical liberal commitment to equality. As noted, it was a bold idea when compared to what went before. Classical liberal nostrums about ‘the rights of man’ and ‘all men [being] created equal’ could eventually be leveraged to demand full legal rights for all males, irrespective of property or wealth, which is what happened over the course of the 19th century in many countries influenced by liberalism, such as Britain, Canada, and the United States. Legal discrimination on the basis of religion and race gradually became more distasteful to classical liberals over time. Furthermore, the English words ‘man’ and ‘men’ often meant ‘humanity as a whole,’ including women. Suffragettes could call upon the same ideals to demand equal legal rights for women – a struggle that won many key victories in the early 20th century.

Economically, classical liberal doctrine was heavily influenced by the great economist and moral philosopher Adam Smith. Smith argued, in effect, that the free market is an optimally efficient system. The profit motive gives businesses a strong incentive to produce things that people want to buy, while competition gives them strong incentives to do so as cheaply and efficiently as possible. The market acts like an ‘invisible hand:’ overproduction is swiftly corrected because flooding the market destroys profits, so people stop producing such items and services; under-production is swiftly corrected because of the rewards that come from meeting untapped demand. The best thing for governments to do is to get out of the way: laissez-faire, i.e., leave the market alone, was the watchword. Doing so will lead to economic expansion, or ‘the wealth of nations.’ The role for government, Smith thought, was to provide national security,
law enforcement, and infrastructure, which could not profitably be provided by market actors. (Smith also argued for the public provision of schooling at all levels and showed openness to government regulation in some cases, but later generations of his followers often ignored these arguments) (Smith 1970).

Historically, classical liberalism grew in influence as capitalism and the effects of the Industrial Revolution spread throughout much of Europe and North America and, eventually, beyond. These forces came together to provide colossal technological innovation, urbanization, and the creation of huge amounts of private wealth. The classical liberal model seemed, in many eyes, to work. Those countries in which it was influential seemed incredibly dynamic and often very prosperous, taken as a whole.

However, the second half of the 19th century brought increasing doubts about all of this. Laissez-faire capitalism and industrialization created immense wealth and technological innovation, but also appalling poverty. Labourers often worked in miserable conditions for long hours and for minimal pay. They were frequently children. Urban slums abounded and were rife with prostitution, disease, and violence. Economic slumps brought little assistance from the state and could leave even hard-working and capable people in desperate straits. As workers gradually acquired voting rights and as labour unions increasingly mobilized – and socialism and anarchism gathered force as possible alternatives – liberals began to rethink what their ideology meant. Gradually, this ushered in a new version of liberalism often called ‘reform’ liberalism.
Reform liberalism modifies the meaning of liberalism's key ideas of liberty and equality. Classical liberals focus on negative liberty – freedom as the absence of interference with the individual. Reform liberals certainly agree that the freedom to be left alone ('negative liberty') is important, but they add a more positive requirement: for an individual to be truly free, they must have an actual capacity to pursue their ends in life.

Similarly, where classical liberals see equality in terms of equal legal rights, reform liberals argue that, yes, equal rights are important, but we also have to have equal opportunities. Taking the same example, the 'right' to get a university education is worthless unless one has a meaningful opportunity to act on this right – e.g., through government subsidies to post-secondary education, paid for by taxation, which make it financially affordable to attend.

As this example suggests, the standard reform liberal answer to the question of how to create 'positive' liberty and 'equality of opportunity' involves a much more active role for government than imagined by classical liberals. This typically involves redistributing wealth: taxing those with higher incomes and directing that money into government-sponsored programs accessible to all (such as old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, subsidized higher education, publicly funded health insurance, and so forth). The assemblage of social programs intended to protect citizens from destitution ‘from cradle to grave’ came to be known as ‘the welfare state’ and by the mid-20th century had become a more-or-less consensus position in liberal democracies (Renwick, 2017). The role of the state expanded massively between 1900 and 1970, as governments influenced by reform liberal ideas became providers of a huge array of programs.

U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt captured the spirit of reform liberalism toward the end of his 1944 State of the Union Address when he declared that ‘true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. Necessitous men are not free men.’ He went on to propose a new Bill of Rights that included the right to a good job, food, clothing, recreation, housing, medical care, good education, and economic security in old age. These aspirations capture very well the reform liberal view of the role of government.

Reform liberalism also took a different view of economics. Here, the key figure was the great economist John Maynard Keynes. Keynes argued against the laissez-faire preferences of classical liberals. Recessions and depressions caused enormous unnecessary suffering, and the Great Depression of the 1930s showed that the ‘invisible hand’ could not be trusted to end that suffering in a timely manner. The solution, again, was a much more active government. Governments could stimulate ‘aggregate demand’ for products and services through make-work projects, infrastructure development, and subsidies to individuals and companies (later Keynesians added tax cuts and lower interest rates to this formula). Stimulating demand would lift the economy out of recession and get things back on track. To pay for economic stimulus, Keynes thought governments should practice deficit spending if necessary during downturns. Once the economy picked up again, they should pay down the deficit. Such ‘Keynesian economics’ promised to smooth out the ‘business cycle’ of economic growth and contraction that had long bedeviled capitalist economies (Skidelsky, 1986).

This combination – welfare states plus Keynesian economics – defines reform liberalism, and it became the dominant liberal model during the postwar era (1945 to about 1980). Most liberal-democratic governments practiced some form of it. States came to oversee a suite of social programs, regulations, powerful labour unions, and what was often called ‘macro-economic management.’ This entailed a larger degree of economic planning and public ownership that had prevailed before the Second World War. Full employment was often the stated goal. The state, far from leaving people to fend for themselves in a dynamic but often merciless market, now had a direct responsibility for the economic welfare of its people.

By the 1970s, this semi-consensus had begun to break down. The western postwar boom seemed to have ground to a halt: a combination of high inflation and high unemployment (‘stagflation’) baffled economists and challenged governments, which found themselves running structural, that is, ongoing, deficits, and ratcheting up debt.
3.4 Back to the future? Neoliberalism

Classical liberalism had never really vanished; its thinkers and economists toiled on the margins during the reform liberal heyday. But with the crisis of reform liberalism, they once more stepped into the spotlight. Thinkers such as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman argued that the reform liberal state that had developed over the 20th century was bloated, inefficient, and oppressive. The more governments did, the greater the proportion of our lives that fell under the influence of a single, coordinated source of human control. Whereas in a laissez-faire economy, outcomes are determined as a result of a multitude of free and uncoordinated individual choices by producers and consumers, in an economy marked by heavy redistribution and macro-economic management, outcomes that shape our lives are determined by a small number of deciders in government, backed by the coercive power of law. This, Hayek thought, was tyranny, the ‘road to serfdom’ (Hayek, 2014). Meanwhile, Friedman argued that high inflation, caused in part by minimum wage laws and labour union demands driving up wages, distorted price signals and discouraged entrepreneurial dynamism, thereby crushing economic growth (Milton, 2017).

Both agreed on the answer: much smaller and less active government, much lower taxation, minimal regulation, and a general emphasis on private ownership and market mechanisms. By rolling back government, minimizing redistribution and social programs, and leaving the market alone, we would have a dynamic and innovative economy that spurs higher levels of prosperity and is freer to boot.

Leaders such as U.S President Ronald Reagan (in office from 1980–88) and U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (in office from 1979–1990) embraced this approach, a configuration that became known as ‘neoliberalism.’ The agenda called for tax cuts, including to the wealthy and corporations; the privatization of publicly-owned assets and companies; and international and global trading agreements designed to lock in the free movement of capital and, to a lesser extent, labour across national borders (a formula known as ‘free trade’ and, later, ‘globalization’). A tight money supply completed the picture. If the consequence was lower levels of protection for citizens and workers – weakened social programs, diminished unions, reduced job security, possibly stagnating wages, and rising inequality – this would be made up for by greater innovation and economic dynamism, cheaper consumer costs due to increased competition and lower interest rates and taxes, and balanced government budgets.

By the year 2000, even nominally left-tilting governments, such as Tony Blair’s Labour Party in Britain or Jean Chrétien’s Liberal Party in Canada, had embraced much of this recipe. These years were generally marked by sustained (if unspectacular) economic growth. They were also years of enormous technological change, with digitization and the rise of the internet.

Yet neoliberalism perhaps contained the seeds of its own demise. Globalization brought increased levels of inequality in the prosperous countries that embraced it most fervently. Many felt that globalization hollowed out much of the western working classes, as jobs migrated to low-wage countries such as China. The deregulation of the financial sector, in line with the neoliberal preference for less intrusive government, contributed directly to a global economic meltdown in 2008 triggered by irresponsible mortgage lending: the ‘Great Recession.’ Faced with this cascading economic catastrophe, governments frantically rediscovered Keynesianism, launching huge stimulus programs. Meanwhile, under the influence of protests such as the Occupy Movement and progressive economists such as Thomas Piketty, economic inequality returned to the mainstream public agenda after years of being little discussed (see Piketty, 2014). Western governments once again fell into structural deficits, as citizens demanded more active spending without quite being willing to surrender the neoliberal emphasis on low taxation. Trade agreements such as 1994’s North American Free Trade Agreement as well as the much deeper economic and political integration entailed by the European Union (EU) came under attack by populist-nationalist governments, such as the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump (2016–2020) and the ‘Brexit’-supporting U.K. Conservative Party, which pulled Britain out of the EU. Globalization seemed on the retreat, and government spending was back ‘in.’ Keynesian stimulus dominated the 2010s, and then came the dramatic government response to the even more dramatic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
3.5 The Future of Liberalism

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The neoliberal project (peaking from 1980–2010) seems to have fallen into disarray. It has been succeeded by a somewhat nostalgic turn back toward reform liberalism and nationalist economic protection, but also by massive government deficits and ongoing low rates of economic growth in western nations. Meanwhile, liberalism as an ideology faces increasing challenge from other quarters.

Anti-racist, decolonizing, and feminist intellectuals critique liberalism’s emphasis upon individual liberty, and even reform liberalism’s ideals of equality of opportunity, as insufficient. By taking people as they are and encouraging mere ‘toleration’ rather than a deep understanding of, and deference toward, marginalized perspectives, liberalism (they argue) allows profound and invisible biases to fester. For example, hiring committees might unconsciously favour Caucasian, settler males; voters and political parties might harbour received understandings of ‘leadership’ as inherently male (or white). Standard practices in business and government, and all sorts of spheres of private life, presented to us as ‘fair’ and ‘neutral’ might in fact reflect norms created by (and for) straight, white, able-bodied, male settlers. For that matter, liberal societies in countries like Canada are built on the seizure of indigenous lands and the genocide of indigenous inhabitants. Liberalism, these critics assert, has failed to meet the challenges of systemic racism, micro-aggressions, and the fundamental problem of liberal-democratic states and economies having been constructed upon indigenous territories and the forced labour of black bodies. Proponents of ‘social justice’ frequently articulate a need to go beyond liberalism toward a transformation of the prevalent practices, beliefs and assumptions at work in liberal societies. Many liberals worry that this emphasis on social justice pays too little heed to due process, formal equality, and the possibility of sincere and thoughtful disagreement (Campbell and Manning, 2018).

Meanwhile, the existential threat of global warming casts a pall over contemporary capitalism, raising questions about whether the endless quest for economic growth associated with market economics is even compatible with the flourishing of human life on the planet. It remains to be seen whether liberalism, which has been so influential for the past 200 years, can retain its favoured status in light of such challenges.

Discussion Questions

1. Imagine yourself behind Rawls’s ‘veil of ignorance,’ deciding on the basic parameters of a just society without any idea of what your life-circumstances will be in that society once the ‘veil’ is lifted. Would you settle on a reform liberal society? Why or why not?

2. J.S. Mill thought that people should be allowed to express any idea – including ideas that members of racialized and other marginalized groups find deeply offensive – partly because he believed that good ideas would gradually overcome bad ones in free debate. Do you agree?

3. Do you think liberalism will be able to adapt to the many diverse views in today’s globalized society, or will it fade away? Why? If it does die, what do you think will be most likely to replace it?
References

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, you will be able to:

• Distinguish between classical conservatism and modern conservatism;
• Discuss and analyze the main unifying values of conservatism;
• Name key thinkers of conservatism;
• Critically assess the role of conservatism in today's politics.
Conservatism: Slow change please!

DR. TYLER CHAMBERLAIN

It is a general feature of human experience that a large segment of the population will have an attachment to past or current ways of doing things. As a political attitude, this attachment forms the basis of what is nowadays called conservatism. The conservative political attitude is therefore a near universal phenomenon. Along with the universality of conservatism, however, we must remember another important fact: there is such disagreement among conservatives that identifying a set of ideals or values that is common to all conservatives is difficult. For example, the conservatism of populists like Donald Trump is very different compared with the former Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and neither of these conservatives have much in common with Benjamin Disraeli or John A. MacDonald, two proponents of what has been called Tory democracy.

It is in the nature of conservatism that it will differ from place to place. At the simplest level, it aims to conserve; the specific traditions a conservative movement will seek to conserve depend on the political traditions in question. That is why, for example, American conservatism is often different than Canadian conservatism: conservatives in each country are attempting to conserve different traditions and institutions.

Most conservative outlooks fall into one of two broad categories: classical conservatism and modern conservatism (sometimes called the New Right). This chapter will examine both variants, but first looking at classical conservatism, then modern conservatism. A final section will look at the future of the ideology.
4.1 Classical Conservatism

DR. TYLER CHAMBERLAIN

Classical conservatism is characterized by a complex of themes and values, none of which are completely independent of each other. The following section will discuss the most important of these in order.
4.1.1 Tradition

DR. TYLER CHAMBERLAIN

Perhaps the most important marker of conservatism is the importance of traditional practices and modes of thought. Tradition plays two distinct roles in conservatism. First, it refers to ideas and practices that have stood the test of time. Edmund Burke (1729–1797) wrote of the partnership between the living and the dead, and conservative writers in many eras have echoed this sentiment. It may be helpful to think of tradition itself as the accumulation of practices and ideas that have been proven to work for generations. This does not mean that every old idea is good or that all new ideas must be viewed with suspicion. However, the fact that an idea or practice has persisted is said to count as a point in its favour.

In fact, we can take this idea one step further. It may not even be a question of whether one should accept or reject tradition; instead, a conservative would argue that we cannot help but be shaped by the traditions our society has inherited. Proposals for political reform only make sense or are feasible in a given society if they are products of its own traditions. This does not mean that no new ideas are possible. As conservative philosopher Michael Oakeshott (1901–1990) suggests, traditions are “neither fixed nor finished,” but are more like conversations (Oakeshott, 1991, p. 61). New ideas can always be introduced into a conversation, but it is better if they arise naturally and organically out of what has been said before instead of being an abrupt change of topic. Following Oakeshott’s conversational model of tradition, new ideas for political reform are acceptable if they are based on longstanding practices and norms.

The second way in which tradition is important to conservatives is that political institutions take time to build. Though they are not perfect, and in some cases may serve unjust purposes, conservatives warn that once torn down, political systems can only be rebuilt with great difficulty. Radical change in the hope of a more just alternative is risky, since there is no guarantee that the new system will be more just or stable than the old. As American conservative Russell Kirk (1918–1994) writes, “[conservatives] prefer the devil they know to the devil they don’t know” (Kirk, 2007, p. 7). This was a central concern in one of the classic works of conservative theory in the modern era: Edmund Burke’s *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790). One of its recurring arguments was that, in toppling the existing political system, the French Revolution destroyed the basis of order and stability. Burke wrote:

> Rage and frenzy will pull down more in half an hour than prudence, deliberation, and foresight can build up in a hundred years. The errors and defects of old establishments are visible and palpable. It calls for little ability to point them out... At once to preserve and reform is quite another thing (Burke, 2003, pp. 142–143).

Tradition, in sum, is a set of limitations on what can or should be done in the political sphere. It is important to classical conservatives because justice and social order will be best achieved if we begin from what we currently have, even if it falls short of perfection.
Classical conservatives place a premium on preserving social order and stability, and respecting tradition is a means to that end. Hierarchy and authority are important for the same reason. Each of these terms must be precisely defined in order to avoid confusion. Hierarchy does not mean that all social differences are natural or just, but only that a social order requires at least some stratification. At the most basic level, there must be some members of society with more social or political power than others. This does not necessarily mean that those with more power are intrinsically more important or intelligent than the rest, though some conservatives have, unfortunately, believed this. There is, however, and must be, a measure of inequality between certain groups: politicians and citizens, employers and employees, and parents and children.

Authority requires the recognition of legitimacy and is therefore different than mere power. It goes hand in hand with hierarchy because the social bond between members of a political society must be held together by a sense of legitimacy if the political community is to survive. This creates two sets of obligations. Citizens, employees, and children should respect the legitimate authority of their superiors; their superiors, however, also have an obligation to behave in such a way that they honour and preserve the legitimacy of their authority. For example, legitimate authority can easily degenerate into illegitimate power when, for example, employers exploit their employees; classical conservatism is strongly opposed to such exploitation and abuse of authority.

Social bonds, and hence political order and stability, flourish in an environment of legitimate authority rather than mere power. This is one reason for the importance to conservatives of the family unit; for many of us, families are the first experience of legitimate hierarchical authority. Families are the basis of communities, so family allegiance helps create the broader bonds of allegiance and legitimacy that a healthy social order requires.

At this point, we can see that conservatism – at least as defined by some of its major theorists – is not necessarily a justification of an unjust status quo for the benefit of the rich and powerful, as some liberal or radical critics might argue. This disagreement between conservatism and its critics is not about whether human rights should be protected or not, but about the best way to protect those rights. Without denying the importance of human rights, Edmund Burke argued that abstract natural rights alone cannot be the basis of political order. Counter-intuitively, the best guarantee of political freedom is to preserve the natural aristocracy, by which he meant the system of hierarchy and authority that is held together by feelings of legitimacy and allegiance.
4.1.3 Organic Theory of Society and the State

DR. TYLER CHAMBERLAIN

Politicians and political theorists often use terms like “body politic” or “social body.” Classical conservatives take this idea very seriously and think of the state as being like a living organism. A political society can be healthy or sick, just like a living organism, and the preservation of social health is of the utmost importance to conservatives. That is why it is so important that relationships – even when unequal – remain legitimate. People must feel a natural allegiance to their community; a political system upheld by power or coercion alone is unhealthy and cannot be expected to survive, let alone flourish.

This is another way of thinking about the need for the unequal distribution of rank and authority. Just like a physical body, the body politic requires many parts, each of which must perform its assigned function if the organism is to flourish. This was argued in great detail by the Greek philosopher Plato, who in the Republic compared the city to the human soul. The individual soul is made up of a thinking part, a desiring part, and a passionate or courageous part; in the just individual, the thinking part controls the desiring part with the help of the courageous part. Plato argued that the city can be thought of in the same way, being comprised of three classes – guardians, auxiliaries, and producers – corresponding to the parts of the soul. A just city, like a just individual, is one in which each class performs its proper function.

The organic conception of society also means that change must be gradual and incremental, not drastic and sudden. A radical change, or the introduction of completely new governing principles, is unlikely to be perceived as legitimate by the majority of citizens, which can have a detrimental effect on social cohesion and political stability. Political reform, while possible – and often desirable – must arise out of principles already at work in the society and its inherited traditions. Biological organisms do change, but they change slowly and in keeping with their inner principles – that is, their genetic structure. For the classical conservative, growth in this manner is the ideal model of social and political change.
4.1.4 Human Imperfection and Fallibility

Dr. Tyler Chamberlain

It should be clear by now that classical conservatism is less idealistic than many other political perspectives, and indeed it can be accused of being downright pessimistic. The main reason for this is its opposition to political rationalism, namely the idea that political systems should be patterned after rational and all-encompassing systems of thought. According to classical conservatism, human beings are motivated by feelings, friendships, and allegiances as well as by reason. Therefore, reducing politics and law to a set of rational principles runs the risk of failing to secure the allegiance of citizens. Put simply, political allegiance and social bonds must, for these conservatives, appeal to the heart as well as the head. In practice, this means that the best possible set of laws and political institutions, even if they were perfectly designed in accordance with the best possible rational plan, would not work in the real world with people as they are. Contrary to idealist conceptions of justice and political order, human beings act on the basis of communal loyalty, custom, and selfish interests in addition to abstract principles of right. A set of laws that has any hope of maintaining peace and order must take the entire range of human motivations into account.

Political rationalism

With the rise of modern philosophy in the 16th and 17th centuries there was a growing desire to explain more elements of human life in terms of reason alone without having to rely on other sources such as tradition, authority, or faith. This approach was adopted by political theorists who proposed theories of morality and political justice that were based on universally valid principles of reason. Rational principles of justice are, in theory, understandable and acceptable to anyone willing and able to exercise their private faculty of reason. This political approach assumes that there is one set of universally valid principles of justice, and that any state that fails to put these into practice is acting unjustly and, more importantly, violating its citizens’ rights.

Classical conservatism suggests that this approach does not pay sufficient attention to the risk of instability that arises whenever one’s political arrangements are measured against an idealistic vision of justice. According to the classical conservative, no political system will ever live up to such a lofty vision, and the attempt to make it do so is liable to do more harm than good. Michael Oakeshott analyzed political rationalism from the classical conservative perspective in *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (Oakeshott, 1991).

Another way to put this is that classical conservatism has a more negative or cynical conception of human nature than other political ideologies like liberalism or socialism. The progressive pursuit of more just social arrangements in line with a set of rational principles – liberal, socialist, or otherwise – is a dead end, according to classical conservatives, not only because the principles themselves are wrong, but because the limitations of human nature will prevent their realization in human history.

Two important points follow from this. First, this outlook emphasizes prudence over perfection. Prudence refers to the recognition of the limitations of what is possible. This is not to say that there is no concern with justice; it simply puts a greater emphasis than other ideologies on the dangers of redesigning society after a systematic blueprint. Indeed, one prominent conservative writer has even suggested that conservative politics has no proper “end in view” towards which all politics should strive, other than the continuance of social life (Scruton, 1980, p. 23). The social relationship,
and the communal bonds that sustain it, has a life of its own and is therefore its own goal. It is for this reason that some classical conservatives prefer to speak of conservatism as a disposition or attitude rather than as an ideology.

Second, there is no single political system that will work in all times and places. Because there is no universally applicable blueprint for the perfect political system, every society ought to be governed according to principles that naturally and organically arise out of its own history, culture, and traditions. The danger of imposing a foreign political system on a society, as proponents of democracy promotion overseas have discovered, is that eliciting broad social support for its rules and institutions is overwhelmingly difficult when the ideas themselves are foreign. It is for this reason that conservatism prefers a closer fit between society and government, even if the resulting system may fall short of rational standards of justice. This hearkens back to the conservative's preference for social order over the risk of instability.

In practice, classical conservatives see traditional customs and political institutions as the best available guarantor of peace and stability. They are wary of political programs that threaten to replace existing institutions with entirely new ones, as Edmund Burke saw with the French Revolution and as United Empire Loyalists saw with the American Revolution. The founders of Canadian confederation were motivated by these classical conservative values. They struggled for Canadian self-government without getting rid of the parliamentary and constitutional traditions that had taken root in British North America. Their desire to pattern Canada's House of Commons and Senate after Britain's House of Commons and House of Lords, while remaining loyal to the Crown, are excellent examples of the classical conservative themes discussed above. In fact, Canada's classical conservative – or high Tory – heritage is one important factor in accounting for the difference between Canadian and American conservatism. This has been referred to as the 'Tory touch' thesis (Horowitz, 1966).

Even though conservatism has evolved in recent decades, remnants of classical conservatism can still be found today. For example, contemporary conservatives often warn against the dangers of social engineering, by which they mean attempts by the state to alter the shape of society in accordance with a rational plan. Similarly, some defenses of the traditional family are based on classical conservative premises, such as the need to maintain the family as an important social institution. The raising and educating of children has traditionally taken place in the family unit, and hence most attempts to modify it are viewed with suspicion by many conservatives. As we turn to modern conservatism, it is important to remember that despite many changes, and even some outright reversals, in what is now considered as conservatism, the legacy of classical conservatism has not been completely eradicated.
Though I have noted some of the classical conservative tendencies that persist today, much of contemporary conservative discourse and policy making bears little resemblance to the outlook just described. In the decades following the Second World War, conservative political thinking changed drastically. The Reagan-Thatcher revolution in the 1980s saw a particularly pronounced shift away from classical conservatism. Classical conservatism could be called socially conservative in that it prioritized protecting society from threats to long-standing institutions and practices. It was not, however, economically conservative in the way that phrase is used today. Classical conservatives were generally not opposed to state intervention in the economy whenever such intervention could strengthen social bonds or promote the common good. Writers in Canada’s high Tory conservative tradition particularly emphasized this point.

Reagan–Thatcher Revolution

Under the political leadership of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990) and American President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989), conservatives moved more fully in the direction of free markets, deregulation, and a business-first approach to statecraft. Most political problems were understood to arise from an excess of government regulation and activity, so the overriding policy aim of the Thatcher and Reagan governments was to unleash private market forces to areas previously under the purview of government oversight. President Reagan perfectly encapsulated the governing philosophy of the Reagan-Thatcher Revolution in his first inaugural address on January 20, 1981: “Government is not the solution to our problem, government is the problem.”

Modern conservatism retains some hints of classical conservatism but combines them with elements of classical liberalism, most notably the emphasis on limiting state interference in economic matters. Modern conservatism is also notably more ideological and rationalist than its classical counterpart. There are many different perspectives and outlooks in the New Right, but two important versions of modern conservatism will be considered here: libertarianism and neoconservatism.
4.2.1 Libertarianism

Although libertarians make up a sizable portion of today’s conservative movement, they nevertheless sit uneasily within it. They embrace the free market and small government ideals of other conservatives, but they do not always agree with the social conservatism of other groups, particularly when it is used to justify the restriction of individual freedoms. We will return later to the theme of tensions within or between conservative groups.

Social Conservatism

Social conservatism refers to a multifaceted set of political concerns, all of which are related to the broad aim of protecting society from threats. These threats come in different forms, and different types of social conservatives are worried about some threats more than others. First, there may be some moral threats to society against which the government should act. These can include pornography, profanity, and gratuitous violence in films and video games. Second, some threats may be cultural in nature. The preservation of a culture is often accomplished by using the education system to inculcate each new generation into the values of the political community. Some conservative opposition to immigration also stems from this concern to preserve a particular culture. Third, there may be general threats to social cohesion and communal loyalty, against which many social conservatives are on guard. For example, some conservatives worry that the rise of individualism can weaken social bonds and the sense of community that is required to maintain social health. Excessive economic inequality can also weaken the feelings of mutual loyalty between the rich and poor.

It is important to point out that social conservatism can be motivated by either religious or secular concerns. Much of today's social conservative movement happens to be religiously based, for example in many religious groups’ opposition to abortion and same-sex marriage, but there is nothing inherently religious about social conservatism.

Libertarianism is anti-statist. This does not mean it opposes the existence of the state as such, but it prefers to limit its activity to a carefully defined sphere and demands that it not unnecessarily interfere with citizens' lives. Rather than enforcing a particular set of outcomes, libertarians believe the state should instead allow individuals’ interactions and decisions to transpire as they will within a neutral set of legal rules that is enforced fairly and equally. Libertarians therefore agree with classical conservatives about the danger of social engineering or using the state to produce desired outcomes. Modern conservatism makes a distinction between equality of opportunity and equality of result. It endorses legal equality, in which everyone has the same legal freedom to pursue life projects and seek wealth, but it rejects the notion that the state must actively redistribute wealth to eliminate real inequalities.
After the similarity concerning social engineering, however, major differences emerge between libertarianism and classical conservatism. According to the latter, the libertarian emphasis on the free market and individual rights allows markets to have a corrosive effect on social cohesion and moral character. For example, excessive economic inequality, which often results from unregulated markets, can lead to a breakdown in the social trust that is so important to classical conservatives. When faced with market forces that have a negative impact on the social fabric, classical conservatives often prefer state activity to protect social health, whereas libertarians prefer to let the market play out as it will.

Another difference is the ideological character of libertarianism. Libertarianism is a set of philosophical claims about the primacy of individual rights and proper limitations on what governments can justly do to their citizens. It is therefore comprised of universally valid claims about individual rights and the proper role of government that ought to apply everywhere. This contrasts sharply with the classical conservative emphasis on working within existing traditions to bring about reforms that are a proper fit for the society in question. It is difficult to see anything but a major difference between these views.

The important point here is that despite disagreements with other conservative outlooks, libertarianism has more in common with the New Right than with other contemporary political outlooks. Before starting the People's Party of Canada, Maxime Bernier was one of the more well-known libertarians in the Conservative Party of Canada. In the United States, Paul Ryan, Ron Paul, and Rand Paul are prominent libertarians in the Republican Party. On the other hand, it is difficult to find many self-described libertarians in today's left-of-centre political parties.
4.2.2 Neoconservatism

DR. TYLER CHAMBERLAIN

Neoconservatism is a distinct political movement that has its roots in a group of New York intellectuals who attended City College of New York in the 1930s and 1940s. Among them was Irving Kristol, who has been called the Godfather of Neoconservatism. Neoconservatism has been particularly influential in American politics, though Canadian conservatives have taken in some neoconservative influences as well. The ‘neoconservative persuasion’, as Kristol called it, was decidedly anti-communist. Moreover, the US-led victory over fascism in World War II gave neoconservatives a favourable impression of the moral role of American power in the world. These two distinct elements combined to create a distinct political outlook that was neither libertarian nor classically conservative. It shares libertarianism’s emphasis on free markets, privatization, and economic growth, but is much more comfortable with a strong state in other areas, including criminal justice, foreign affairs, and cultural issues.

Domestically, neoconservatism stresses the importance of law, order, and traditional cultural values. In practice, neoconservatives have acted on these values by supporting strong and active police forces, harsh criminal punishments, and government censorship of pornography and other materials that would threaten traditional values. Neoconservatives see education and public morality as proper concerns of the state, and neoconservatives believe that a healthy democratic culture can only be preserved if the state takes an active role in preserving it. These are clear similarities to classical conservatism’s emphasis on the preservation of social health.

Neoconservative foreign policy is worth discussing here, since this is the issue over which it has received the most criticism in recent decades. Three main points will clarify the neoconservative approach to foreign affairs. First, global politics is understood through the lens of friends and enemies. It is of utmost importance for neoconservative leaders to understand who their friends and enemies are. This may be a product of the Cold War environment in which neoconservatism took shape; the world at this time was sharply divided between rival blocs, each of which was seeking the destruction of the other. After the end of the Cold War, neoconservatives were behind the movement to frame radical Islam as a global threat, much in the same way as Soviet communism had been understood.

Second, neoconservatism is distrustful of international organizations and sees them as a possible bridge to tyrannical world government. This is especially the case when they attempt to constrain behavior that neoconservatives see as in the United States of America (thereafter: America)’s best interest.

Finally, since America was influential in bringing the Second World War to what they perceive as a moral conclusion, neoconservatives see a special role for America in the world. Because of this, they pay close attention to the internal politics of other states and prioritize the global promotion of democracy and political liberty. This is related to a broader theme in American politics known as American Exceptionalism, or the idea that America is set apart from other nations due to its unique emphases on democracy and political liberty.

Two comments can be made regarding neoconservative foreign policy. First, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, arguably the best-known event in the neoconservative foreign policy legacy, is a foreseeable consequence of these principles. It is easy to see how the distrust of international organizations and the goal of spreading American-style democracy could have increased support for the Iraq War. Second, the above themes point to the ideological nature of this outlook. Neoconservatism at its core is strongly anti-communist and believes in a universally valid set of political ideals that should be in place everywhere. It differs significantly from classical conservatism in this aspect.
This chapter has highlighted some of the many varieties of conservative political thought. There is not one form of conservatism, but many. Multiple groups and perspectives lay claim to the label, and although there are some commonalities there are also deep political and philosophical differences. Moreover, it is of little use to group them all under the category “right wing,” since some ideas that have been espoused by conservatives bridge the left–right divide that currently shapes political discourse in advanced democracies; this is especially so with classical conservatism. As noted above, Canadian classical conservatives have advocated for policies that are recognizably left–wing, such as support for labour unions, government regulation to reduce economic inequality, and stronger environmental regulations. Eugene Forsey and George Grant, two influential writers in this conservative tradition, strongly supported the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, the precursor to today’s left–wing New Democratic Party. This is not just a Canadian phenomenon; classical conservatism generally prefers a more activist state than do many of today’s right–wing parties.

There are differences and tensions within today’s conservative parties, too. A major fault line divides libertarians from both social conservatives and neoconservatives. Libertarians prefer limited government involvement in the personal affairs of private citizens and are thus more willing to support, for example, the legalization of abortion and same–sex marriage. Social and neoconservatives, on the other hand, feel that it is the government’s duty to preserve traditional values and hence are more likely to oppose these practices. The conservative split over social issues can be seen in the level of support for Bill C–7, an Act to amend the Criminal Code (medical assistance in dying) that was passed by the Canadian House of Commons on December 10, 2020.[1] This bill would relax some of the safeguards around medical assistance in dying, including the requirement that a person’s death be reasonably foreseeable in order to be eligible. There was almost complete unanimity within all parties except for the Conservative Party of Canada, which saw almost 13% of MPs (15 of 118 MPs) break from their colleagues to support the bill. The Liberals, by way of comparison, voted 142–2 in favour of Bill C–7.[2] The relative diversity of the Conservative Party, at least on some social issues, reflects the differences between the varied political outlooks that have come to call themselves ‘conservative’.

The future of conservatism is likely to be very different from its past. The rise of populism has been particularly influential among conservative parties in many advanced democracies. Populism itself is not a new political attitude, but it has reshaped the political landscape in recent years. There are competing definitions of populism, but most accounts agree that it is based on a core distinction between the elites and everybody else. Cultural, political, and business elites are working against the interests of the common people, and populists seek to restore political power and influence to ordinary people. Donald Trump’s presidency was largely a populist phenomenon, as is the Brexit movement in the UK. In both cases, much of their public support arose out of frustration with the failure of political elites to understand and serve the needs of the common people. For a more detailed analysis of populism, see chapter 7 in this book.

For our purposes, the relevant questions are the following: Does the populist turn represent a lasting change in mainstream conservatism, and, if so, how does it differ from classical conservatism and the New Right? These are complex questions that cannot be fully answered here. However, whatever becomes of populism within conservative parties in the future, it will probably be one of multiple factions competing for influence alongside libertarianism, neoconservatism, and others. From our current vantage point, we can safely say that right–wing populism is here to stay. Its many differences from other conservative outlooks may create difficult problems for conservative parties. Populists do not see eye–to–eye with libertarians or neoconservatives on important issues like the role of the state in regulating the economy, the importance of global military action, or the value of adhering to traditional norms of constitutionalism and liberal democracy. It is not clear how the Conservative Party of Canada or the American Republican Party will
manage this emerging perspective or whether they will be able to agree on a consistent set of policy proposals, but this dynamic is likely to be the defining feature of conservative politics for the foreseeable future.

Discussion Questions

1. Classical conservatives believe that political reform should always take existing traditions and institutions into account and should not reject them out of hand. How do you think they would respond to the claim that a certain institution, modern police forces for example, is structurally racist and beyond reform?
2. Given the many differences between classical and modern conservatism, does it make sense to call them both conservative? Are the many perspectives currently called conservative bound together by any commonalities?
3. Many classical conservatives, libertarians, and neoconservatives have argued that right-wing populism is not really conservative at all. Do you agree with this claim? If right-wing populism is deserving of the label of conservative, on what grounds? If not, why not?

[1] At the time of writing, the Senate has passed the bill with some amendments. The House of Commons must now consider the amended version of the bill before it can receive royal assent and become law.

References


Further Readings


Learning Objectives

At the end of the chapter, you will be able to:

- Define the socialist core;
- Distinguish between the many currents of socialism;
- Name key thinkers of socialism;
- Critically assess what is socialism today.
Socialism emerged at the beginning of the 19th century in the context of the Industrial Revolution and the rise of capitalism. In two hundred years, it has spread to most of the countries of the world and contributed to extensive social changes. This emergence has given rise to important ideological diversity since many currents are related to it, such as communism, social democracy and eco-socialism. This chapter highlights the distinctive characteristics of socialism while relaying the differences between the currents that claim to be socialist and the contemporary challenges they face.
Socialism is an ideology that is difficult to define since it incorporates many currents that are sometimes antagonistic and often contradictory. However, all the currents that claim to be socialist share the same conception of society, which they perceive as an egalitarian human community that aspires to the common good through social progress.

Socialism thus envisages changing today’s society. For this reason, it is critical of capitalism, which is seen as a system that allows those who hold the means of production to establish their domination. In the face of capitalism, socialism advocates for emancipation, which means “overcoming obstacles in the path of self-control; a release from waged production (...); and the consequence enabling of self-realization within a social framework, which exploitation and alienation had impeded” (Freeden, 1996, p. 456). This desire for emancipation leads socialism to oppose any other forms of power deemed oppressive, whether they originate from the state, the market or any other institution.
From this common basis, the currents claiming to be socialist have many differences. Three historical divisions can be observed: the first was between idealistic (or “utopian”) and rationalist (or “scientific”) currents, the second between anti-statist and statist currents, the third between revolutionary and reformist currents. To illustrate these divisions, this section will describe the four main historical variants or currents that have dominated the debates: utopian socialism, libertarian socialism, communism and social democracy.
The first division was established by Friedrich Engels ([1876] 2020), who contrasts “utopian” currents that seek to transform society through an ideal organization with “scientific” currents that seek to correct it through scientifically elaborated solutions. Although this categorization seeks to undermine the credibility of the so-called “utopian” currents, since Friedrich Engels refers to them as unrealistic, the fact remains that socialism is divided between idealistic and more pragmatic currents. Historically, utopian socialism included several currents with different philosophical influences, but with the common point of wanting to establish ideal communities. Utopian socialists included several authors of the first half of the 19th century who are perceived as the precursors of socialism, such as Saint-Simon and Robert Owen.

**Saint-Simonism: the workshop utopia**

Claude-Henri de Rouvroy Count de Saint-Simon (simplified to “Saint-Simon”) is perceived as a “utopian” author by Marxist thinkers because his perspective integrated a religious dimension or more specifically a scientism based on the belief that the law of gravitation is the foundation of all things. Beyond this aspect, Saint-Simonism wished to create a society in which the social classes would join together to manage the nation in the collective interest. Industry would be thought of as the engine of such a society, with politics existing only to maximize it. To do this, Saint-Simon imagined a parliament composed of three chambers: a chamber of inventors who conceive projects, a chamber of scientists who examine the projects, and a chamber of industrialists who adopt and execute them. Society would be similar to a workshop in which everyone works together, fulfilling his or her role. However, Saint-Simonism is not deterministic, as it suggests that social elevation is the consequence of work. Therefore, it does not establish any inequality based on gender, birth, wealth or cultural criteria. Saint-Simon has influenced many authors from both the left and the right. Karl Marx took up several Saint-Simonian concepts (Durkheim 1958–2018), including the notion of social class.

**Owenism: the co-operative movement**

Robert Owen also belongs to the authors who qualified as “utopian” by Engels. He is the inspirer of the cooperative movement generally referred to as “Owenism”. In Robert Owen’s perspective, “innovations included the upbringing of children, the approach to crime, the design and location of buildings and leisure facilities, the relationships between the sexes, and the way in which work was organized. His claim was that by introducing such changes, based on the principles of rationality and cooperation, behaviour would be transformed” (Newman, 2005, p. 11). Although this approach aspires to change society through cooperatives, that is, communities in which the tools of production, work and property are collective and advocate for the complete equality of their members, Owenism rejects the idea of revolution and is circumspect about the political organization of society (Rogers, 2008). Robert Owen is often seen as the father of British socialism since the Fabian Society, which created the Labour Party, was inspired by him. From Tony Blair to Jeremy Corbin, all trends within New Labour are now claiming Owen’s legacy.
5.2.2 Libertarian Socialism

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The second division of socialism comes from the conflict between the “anti-statist” and “statist” currents during the First International. Founded in 1864, the International Association of Workers (known as the “First International”) aspired to unite the labour movement in most European countries and in the United States of America. Very quickly, this movement was divided into three tendencies: Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s mutualism, Mikhail Bakunin’s anarcho-collectivism and Karl Marx’s socialism or Marxism. Both Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s mutualism and Mikhail Bakunin’s anarcho-collectivism are part of the libertarian tradition since they both aspire to the immediate abolition of the state, while Marxism sees the state as a transitional instrument used to get rid of capitalism. Although anarchist in their orientation, mutualism and anarcho-collectivism aspire to an egalitarian society marked by social progress, i.e. socialism.

**Mutualism**

If mutualism is critical of private property, it must be differentiated from Robert Owen’s cooperative movement. Indeed, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon rejects the idea of owning property because property is capital that allows one to receive an income through this collective force that is labour. To free themselves from capitalism, workers must organize production themselves. Mutualism proposes to offer capital without interest so that only labour generates value. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon sees in federalism the political continuity of mutualism. Federalism is based on a federation’s contract in which individuals bind themselves by a common obligation and commit to providing resources only to those they receive, but they also retain their sovereignty. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s libertarian socialism is thus based on the principle of autonomy, but it is also on an individualistic conception since the community is ultimately the result of individual will. After individuals have formed communities, they gather into territorial entities which federate themselves by pooling public services, establishing the mutuality of credit and tax equalization. Proudhon offers here a model of a stateless society, which “consists in the fact that, as political functions are reduced to industrial functions, social order would result solely from transactions and exchanges” (Proudhon, 1863, p. 20). The philosophy of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon inspired several theorists of socialism after him, the most famous being Karl Marx. He would conceive his notions of property, capitalism and the alienation of the working class on the basis of Proudhonian theory.

**Anarcho-Collectivism**

Taking up the concept of anarchy from Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin vigorously opposes Marxism. Indeed, he criticizes Karl Marx’s vision of a stateless society after a transitional phase called the “dictatorship of the proletariat” that would use the state to break with capitalism and bourgeois society. Mikhail Bakunin writes on this point: “Both the theory of the state and the theory of so-called revolutionary dictatorship are based on this fiction of pseudo-popular representation – which in actual fact means the government of the masses by an insignificant handful of privileged individuals, elected (or even not elected) by mobs of people rounded up for voting and never knowing what or whom they are voting for – on this imaginary and abstract expression of the imaginary thought and will of all the people, of which the real, living people do not have the faintest idea” (Bakunin, [1873] 2020). Proposing to destroy the state that he perceives as the counterpart of capitalism, Mikhail Bakunin favours an anarcho-collectivist model. For him, the revolution necessarily begins with the abolition of private property, the pooling of the means of production and the self-management of the agricultural and industrial sectors. Individuals then would come together in autonomous federations based on their common identity, interests and aspirations. Mikhail Bakunin’s philosophy is egalitarian to the point that he aspires to destroy religions, because they create social hierarchies and prevent absolute freedom of conscience.
The third division separates the “revolutionary” currents, for which the break with capitalism necessarily involves revolution, from the “reformist” currents, which aspire to transform social and political institutions by peacefully gaining power. This division was shaped in the 19th century and took on considerable importance with the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the creation of the Communist International (Third International) in 1919. The Third International’s membership provoked a definitive split between revolutionary and reformist currents within the labour movement.

**Socialism or communism?**

What is communism and how does it differ from socialism? Before the creation of the Third International in 1919, there was no clear distinction between socialism and communism. Certainly, on a conceptual level, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels explain that socialism corresponds to a historical phase in which a permanent revolution will lead to the advent of communism; they describe this as an ideal society, liberated from capitalism, without class or state. In fact, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels rarely use the term “communism” in their writings, especially after the League of Communists, – which they joined in 1847 and for which they wrote the political program: *The Manifesto of the Communist Party* ([1848] 1969), – was dissolved in 1852. Moreover, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels – as well as their direct successors commonly called “Marxists” – did not define themselves as Communists. It is therefore difficult to speak of communism before 1919 and preferable to speak of socialism.

**Before Communism: Marxism**
So then, what is Marxism? Karl Marx himself defines his ideology as “scientific socialism” that is socialism based on a scientific analysis of human societies. From this analysis, Karl Marx proposes a materialist conception of history, perceiving it as the perpetuation of the class struggle. He explains that the changes in modes of production: slavery, feudalism, then capitalism, create struggles between a dominant class and dominated classes. In the era of capitalism, domination is achieved through labour. For Marx, the value of a good is determined by the material cost of production and the labour necessary to produce it. However, the bourgeoisie that owns the means of production – that is, the capital – determines the value of a good not according to the value of production, but according to the value of exchange. And this exchange value includes the remuneration of capital. To remunerate itself, capital attributes to itself surplus value or the difference between the value added by the worker to the good and the value of the labour-power necessary for its production. The holding of capital is therefore the spoliation of the labour of others.

For Karl Marx, the constant search for profit leads to the accumulation of capital, which causes the impoverishment of the proletariat. Becoming aware of itself as a social class, the proletariat turns against the bourgeoisie. This is class struggle. The proletariat, however, is not only exploited: it is alienated by the bourgeoisie. The state, the nation, religion and collective values are shaped to establish the domination of capitalism and to comfort the bourgeoisie in its privileges. This is why Karl Marx and his followers advocate for a revolution to overthrow the existing system and build a truly socialist society in which the means of production are collectivized. Before that, the proletariat must come to power. The dictatorship of the proletariat, conceived by Karl Marx as a transitional step toward socialism/communism, is organized on the model of a revolutionary democracy in which every proletarian has a voice. In this way, it would restore equality and deconstruct capitalism.

**The Bolshevik Revolution and its consequences**

Communism was clearly different from socialism under the influence of Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (known as Lenin). Lenin develops the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat theorized by Karl Marx in order to propose a proletarian state that would help establish a communist society. Lenin suggests that this state can be called communist “as the means of production becomes common property, the word ‘communism’ is also applicable here” (Lenin, [1917] 1999), adding that it is certainly not integral communism. Thus, in Lenin’s vision, a political regime can be qualified as “communist”, though only imperfectly so.

Serving to justify the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the creation of the Soviets, Lenin’s interpretation of Marxism earned him several criticisms, including those of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky, heirs of Karl Marx’s philosophy. In addition to justifying the possibility of a communist regime, Lenin believes that the proletarian revolution must be organized on a vanguard, a party of professional revolutionaries, that pursues the objective of taking power. Communism is no longer just a regime; it is a party. This idea, which is set out in his pamphlet *What is to be Done?* ([1902] 1961), is, once again, at odds with orthodox Marxism, which argues that revolution must emanate from the social movement.

Lenin succeeded in imposing the idea that the Bolshevik Revolution was the beginning of a world proletarian revolution. According to him, the Bolshevik Revolution was the concrete perspective of communism. Other revolutions, such as in China (1949), Cuba (1961), Vietnam
(1954) and Yugoslavia (1945), led to the creation of singular communisms. In spite of their differences, all were inspired by Marxism–Leninism; that is, they were founded by a revolutionary party centered on a vanguard, the internationalism of the workers’ movement, the dictatorship of the proletariat as the basis for the self-emancipation of the working class and collectivism as the pooling of the means of production.
5.2.4 Social Democracy

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Much like “communism” until 1919, social democracy was not clearly distinguishable from socialism. As a polysemous expression, it referred to both socialist parties and “reformist” currents that proposed to gradually transform society through democratic institutions. Social democracy evolved in several contexts, most notably in the debate between orthodox Marxism and revisionist Marxism that took place in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, which laid the groundwork for all social democratic currents.

The opposition between Lassallism and Marxism

German social democracy emerged with the creation in 1863 of Ferdinand Lassalle's General German Workers' Association (Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein, ADAV). Although he was close to the League of Communists, Ferdinand Lassalle never shared the ideas of Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx. He believed that a democratic and socialist state is the ideal framework for the emancipation of the working class since such a state could organize production cooperatives to put an end to capitalism. Ferdinand Lassalle conceives universal suffrage – which was extremely rare in his time – as the instrument of this state revolution. Although Ferdinand Lassalle died prematurely in 1864, his influence on the development of German social democracy was immense.

The break between Lasallians and Marxists has not fully taken place yet. Because of the repression of the socialist movement, Lasallians and Marxists even ended up agreeing on a common platform at the Gotha congress in 1875. Strongly criticized by Karl Marx, who saw in it the stranglehold of Lassallism over the workers' movement ([1875] 1970), the Gotha Program is one of the founding acts of German social democracy. From this program, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) was born. Although it became illegal as a consequence of the anti-socialist laws proclaimed in 1878, the SPD continued to operate underground until 1890, when the ban on it was lifted.

Eduard Bernstein's Revisionism

To avoid a new Gotha, Friedrich Engels entrusted one of his followers, Eduard Bernstein, with the task of writing the new SPD program. He partnered him with another emerging figure of Marxism: Karl Kautsky. While Karl Kautsky wrote the theoretical part of the program, Eduard Bernstein developed the practical part. Adopted the following year at the Congress of Erfurt, this program has an undeniable Marxist hue, though a gap between theory and practice is felt. In this respect, the Erfurt Program heralds the opposition between Kautsky's orthodox posture and Bernstein's revisionism. With the death of Friedrich Engels in 1895, Bernstein gradually developed reformist ideas. He published a series of articles between 1896 and 1898 entitled Problems of Socialism around a central question: Is revolution desirable? Following the lively debates his articles provoked within the SPD, he published a book: Evolutionary Socialism (1899), which marked a breaking point with orthodox Marxism.
While subscribing to scientific socialism, Eduard Bernstein believes that Karl Marx’s predictions have not been fulfilled: the proletariat has not become poorer and, on the contrary, a middle class has emerged. As times had changed, he insists that the analysis cannot be dogmatic and that it is necessary to take into consideration not only the evolution of the workers’ movement but also that of capitalism. In putting forward this rationality in the analysis, he wants to be reasonable in the face of the idea of a violent revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat that would succeed it. Moreover, he believes that socialism not only fights for the emancipation of the proletariat but for society as a whole. Social democracy must integrate all the dominated classes, including the middle classes. Rather than revolution, Eduard Bernstein favours evolution. Thus, he conceives democracy as the principle of “the suppression of class government” (Bernstein, [1898] 1907). Nevertheless, this aim requires real democracy. To achieve it, Eduard Bernstein takes up the Lasallian thesis of universal suffrage expecting that it neutralizes the bourgeois character of the state to become an instrument of the general interest.

Social democracy elsewhere

Eduard Bernstein’s revisionism strains Marxist theory of its revolutionary elements while rehabilitating the Lasallian theses in order to put them back within scientific socialism. If Bernstein’s social democracy encompasses the context of Germany at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, the reformist currents in other countries are also drawn on local political ideologies to revise Marxist theses. In France, republican socialism is inspired by republicanism, utopian socialism and mutualism. In the United Kingdom, the labour movement is instilled by the Fabian Society articulating the heritage of Owenism and that of trade-unionism. In Italy, social democracy is the work of Filippo Turati, who developed a non-dogmatic reading of Karl Marx rooted in a progressive republicanism inspired by one of the fathers of Italian unification: Giuseppe Mazzini. In the United States of America, social democracy was built on the trade union and anti-segregationist movements. This broad diversity of local contributions makes it difficult to designate social democracy as a homogeneous current.
According to commentators, socialism is in decline. The facts seem to speak for themselves: utopian and libertarian currents are now marginal; after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, most communist regimes collapsed or adapted to the market economy; communist parties in liberal democracies had to transform, abandoning the idea of revolution and Marxist references; and social-democratic parties recorded major electoral setbacks in the 2000s and 2010s. While this decline can be seen in all the historical currents of socialism, it is noticeable those who have been predicting its death since the 1990s were wrong. The resilience of socialism lies in its formidable capacity to adapt to social issues, of which it is ultimately only a political echo. Since 1990, socialism has been constantly adapting to a society in full mutation. New divisions have emerged, such as those opposing productivism and environmentalism, or globalization and anti-globalization. Similarly, socialism is reinventing itself through issues of feminism, multiculturalism and nationalism.
In *The Condition of the Working Class in England* ([1844] 1969), Friedrich Engels developed an environmentalist critique of workers’ working conditions, denouncing pollution, noise and odor issues. Despite this work being seen as a precursor of green socialism, socialism developed according to a productivist doctrine that sought to increase the means of production through the exploitation of resources and the domination of nature. With the development of the environmentalist movement in the 1980s, several authors such as André Gorz (1987) have emphasized that capitalism cannot be ecological because it is based on the production of goods with an exchange value, while the environment has a use value. It is important to subordinate exchange value to use value in order to refocus production on social needs and the preservation of the environment. Eco-socialism is an alternative to capitalist and socialist productivism. At the convergence of a social critique and an environmental critique, it renews socialist thinking. If part of the left has remained productivist, certain political formations – including post-communist parties – have evolved towards eco-socialism, such as the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet – Sweden), Die Linke (Germany), Syriza (Greece), La France Insoumise (France), Podemos (Spain) and the Democratic Socialists of America (United States).
5.3.2 Globalization vs. Anti-Globalization

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In the 1990s and 2000s, globalization created a division within socialism. While some of the social democratic currents adhere to it, seeing in globalization the opportunity for a more regulated world thanks to international agreements and organizations, the emergence of a middle class in developing countries, and even the democratization of these countries with the help of soft powers such as culture, development, education, sport and technology, globalization is also seen as the upper stage of capitalism. Globalized companies are freeing themselves from states and imposing their neo-liberal ideology on them; an ideology that legitimizes private interests at the expense of the common good and the exploitation of developing countries, thus creating a globalized proletariat.

The anti-globalization movement is very heterogeneous and weakly organized. However, the Porto Alegre Manifesto produced at the 2005 World Social Forum lays out its main orientations, including the establishment of an international tax on financial transactions, the cancellation of public debts of developing countries, the guarantee of food security through the promotion of self-sufficiency and fair trade, the fight against racism in all its forms and the restoration of indigenous rights. The proposals of the anti-globalization movement – mixed with populism – find a certain echo in South American socialism, particularly in the Bolivarianism of Hugo Chavez, which is based on food and industrial self-sufficiency, a critique of the imperialism of developed countries and the recognition of indigenous rights.

The social democracy that adheres to globalization will develop the thesis of the “third way”. Theorized by Anthony Giddens and Tony Blair (1998), it considers that there is a place between the “old” statist and redistributive social democracy and deregulatory and unequal neoliberalism. Because globalization imposes economic, political and societal changes, this third way aims to accompany with them equal opportunities rather than egalitarianism and the delegation of public services to private companies in order to increase the state’s performance, but also a strong societal progressivism with the recognition of ethnic, national and sexual minorities. The third way corresponds ideologically speaking to social liberalism. It is being emulated almost everywhere in the West: German Chancellor Gerard Schröder was inspired by it from 1998 to 2005, as was US President Bill Clinton from 1993 to 2001 and French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin from 1997 to 2001.
At the end of the 19th century, many women and men contributed to the development of socialism and linked the domination of capitalism to that of patriarchy, foreshadowing intersectionality. While it is necessary to underline the strong misogyny of certain socialist thinkers, conversely, August Bebel in his book *Woman and Socialism* ([1879] 1910) theorized the oppression of women from a Marxist perspective. But it was activists such as Claire Zetkin, the founder of Socialist International Women in 1907, and Alexandra Kollontai, a free-love theorist and an outspoken critic of the bourgeois family and sexuality (*Free Love*, 1932), who linked feminist struggles to proletarian struggles. Despite these efforts, feminist struggles were long relegated to the background by the socialist ideology. Socialist feminism underwent a revival in the 1980s, most notably thanks to the work of feminist intellectuals such as Marlene Dixon (1978). Through their militancy, the socialist and communist parties gradually integrated feminism into their platforms, making the right to abortion, the parity of political bodies and equality between men and women demands assumed by all socialist currents.
5.3.4 Multicultural and nationalist issues

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To the historical divisions that oppose idealistic and rationalist, anti-statist and statist, revolutionary and reformist currents, we should add that of monism and pluralism. Socialism postulates that individuals are always reduced to their social class in a capitalist system since this system is based on the exploitation of the dominated by the dominant. Moreover, certain collective affiliations – such as cultures, ethnic groups, nations or religions – participate in domination because they degrade the dominated classes. According to this perspective, socialism is more or less receptive to the recognition of collective affiliations. To be precise, it oscillates between a monism that perceives the individual solely through the prism of his or her social class and aspires to unite the dominated in order to fight against the dominant, and a pluralism deemed emancipatory in the face of the bourgeois ideology and its corollary: imperialism. This underscores the many ideological contradictions within socialism and its currents.

The national question bears witness to this debate between monism and pluralism. For Karl Marx, there is a primacy of social class over any other historical category, including the nation. Nevertheless, Karl Marx acknowledges the existence of oppressed nations such as Ireland and Poland, both victims of imperialism. Austromarxism seeks to demonstrate that the national struggle is complementary to the class struggle. Thus, Otto Bauer ([1907] 2000) believes that nations are not naturally instruments of oppression. It is the bourgeoisie that creates nationalism in order to divide the workers’ movement on an international scale and to maintain an artificial sense of belonging that does not allow the proletariat to recognize itself as a social class. According to Otto Bauer, a nation is both an association of individuals who share social and cultural characteristics (community of character) and common interests and history (community of fate). The working class must re-appropriate the nation in order not to cede its cultural goods to capitalism. The role of socialism is then to achieve international unity in national diversity. Otto Bauer thus pleads for a multinational state. Lenin re-appropriated the concept and, as early as 1917, declared himself in favour of the self-determination of nations within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). With its desire for world proletarian revolution, Marxism-Leninism then claimed to be the defender of the nations oppressed by capitalism. It inspired several national liberation movements, but also certain authors of decolonization such as Franz Fanon (1965).

It should be noted, however, that socialism has not been immune to hate speech. The anti-Semitism, colonialism, homophobia, misogyny, racism and xenophobia espoused by some theorists in the fight against capitalism cannot be excused, especially since some thinkers at the same period sought to emancipate oppressed minorities. This is the case of August Bebel who, in addition to advocating for the equality between men and women, pleaded for the legalization of homosexuality ([1879] 1910) and virulently denounced anti-Semitism in the ranks of socialism, which he called “socialism of fools”. It was only with the decolonization movement, the anti-segregationist and anti-apartheid struggle, widespread immigration and the composition of an immigrant proletariat, and the numerous struggles for the recognition of minorities in the 1980s that socialism began to describe itself as pluralist.
Conclusion

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This chapter highlighted the many interconnections and reciprocal influences between the currents of socialism. Since this ideology evolves with society and the demands of dominated groups, it offers an incredible diversity of perspectives enriched by the two centuries of history that have forged it, by the extremely varied local contexts in which it arose and was developed, by the internal conflicts that have occurred and continue to occur in it, and by the different philosophical traditions it has been able to integrate and that emanate directly from it. If socialism is declining as a political force at the beginning of the 21st century, we should not believe that it is an outdated, moribund ideology. On the contrary, it is reinventing itself in a context of more diversified, more open, more globalized societies, where economic and labour transformations as well as environmental and technological issues are generating new momentum. This new industrial revolution is leading to a re-reading of the theories formulated by yesterday’s ideologues, hence the success of intellectual figures such as Thomas Piketty (2014). It will undoubtedly create the currents of tomorrow.

Discussion Questions

1. Have all regional and national contexts seen a socialist movement?
2. Are globalization and new environmental and social questions of socialism leading to the creation of a “new proletariat”?
3. What can socialism today learn and, more importantly, keep from the past?


Proudhon, P.-J. (1863). Du principe fédératif et de la nécessité de constituer le parti de la révolution. BNF Gallica.

Learning Objectives

At the end of the chapter, you will be able to:

• Distinguish various types of anarchism;
• Provide examples of anarchist societies;
• Critically discuss the state of anarchism today.
“Whosoever lays a hand on me in order to govern me is a usurper and a tyrant; I declare him my enemy” wrote the 19th-century philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1849). His statement captures the core of what is one of the oldest and most diverse political philosophies of the human experience: the rejection of institutionalized, permanent leadership and coercive government in order to preserve individual and societal freedoms. Indeed, the etymological origins of the word “anarchy” come from the Greek anarkhia, meaning without (an-) ruler (arkhos). Beyond a definite consensus on the rejection of permanent political authority, however, it is not easy to define anarchism. Partly due to its long history and partly because of the immense complexity of the political structures anarchists seek to abolish and replace, there is a wide variety of interpretations of anarchist thought, some of which can be at odds with each other. Accordingly, anarchism is best understood as a collection of practices and philosophical traditions that seek to dissolve hierarchical political power into horizontal, egalitarian organizations of willing individuals and groups. That being acknowledged, most anarchists see themselves as on the far left of the political spectrum and identify as anti-capitalists and anti-fascists. Historically, anarchism has been associated with socialism, with which it shares a number of assumptions and aims, diverging most notably on the abolishment of the state and its institutions. In fact, socialist thought owes some of its formative concepts to William Godwin, the first modern anarchist, whose theories on men’s inherent equality and the illegitimacy of political institutions profoundly influenced European revolutionary thought during and after the French Revolution. Much like socialists, anarchists aim to end the exploitation of labor and establish genuine equality in society.

Societies without permanent political structures are as old as humanity, dating back to before the establishment of the first cities, realms, and empires. They exist today throughout the globe, in particular in indigenous and semi-nomadic populations where leadership is often task-based and temporary. The formal codification and definition of anarchism and its main principles, however, date back to the revolutions in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries (see Box 6.1). Anarchist groups and thinkers have been involved in rebellions and revolutions since, most notably the Springtime of Peoples in the 19th century and the Russian and Spanish civil wars in the 20th century. Following a period of relative quiet during the Cold War, anarchist political movements are on the rise once more, focusing on grassroots methods to create and support workers’ movements and joining anti-capitalist and climate justice struggles. While anarchists argue that only a true transformation of society can bring about a real political revolution, anarchism’s critics describe it as utopian, unrealistic, and often dangerous.

Box 6.1 – Proudhon on to be governed...

“To be GOVERNED is to be kept in sight, inspected, spied upon, directed, law-driven, numbered, enrolled, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, estimated, valued, censured, commanded, by creatures who have neither the right, nor the wisdom, nor the virtue to do so... To be GOVERNED is to be at every operation, at every transaction, noted, registered, enrolled, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorized, admonished, forbidden, reform, corrected, punished. It is, under pretext of public utility, and in the name of the general interest, to be placed under contribution, trained, ransomed, exploited, monopolized, extorted, squeezed, mystified, robbed; then at the slightest resistance, the first word of complaint, to be
repressed, fined, despised, harassed, tracked, abused, clubbed, disarmed, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, shot, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed; and, to crown all, mocked, ridiculed, outraged, dishonoured. That is government; that is its justice; that is its morality.” Proudhon, *General Idea of the Revolution*, 1851]
6.1 Types and Examples

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At its core, anarchism is the rejection of permanent political authorities. The objection to and abolishment of states is a central, unifying theme of all the different strands of anarchical thought. Anarchists see permanent institutions with the monopolistic power to exercise violence and impose their will upon populations as dangerous, harmful, and inhibiting of human capacities and freedoms. Another 19th-century philosopher, Mikhail Bakunin, explains: “If there is a State, there must be domination of one class by another and, as a result, slavery; the State without slavery is unthinkable, and this is why we are enemies of the State” (1873) (see Box 6.2). As such, anarchists reject all arguments for the legitimacy of the state and see the state as an illegitimate construct that relies on propaganda and, ultimately, inescapably naked force to control and command people. Beyond this consensus, as an ideology focusing on individual liberty and freedoms, anarchism is subject to dozens of schools of thought prioritizing different values and prescribing different actions. We can group this broad variety of anarchist thought into three main streams: social anarchism, individual anarchism, and others.

Box 6.2 The monopoly of violence and the control of populations

With the monopoly of violence they exercise over their territory, all states control their populations. Examples of such control can be found in almost every state. One particularly strong example is the US, where almost 1% of the total population is incarcerated – more than any society in history, an overwhelming majority of which are imprisoned for nonviolent offences. A further 1.5% of the population is registered in the penal system and under constant control and surveillance through correctional practices like parole. The incarcerated portion of the US population doubles as cheap to free labor and is forced by the state to work for wages that vary from $0.25 to $1 an hour for giant corporations such as Walmart, Microsoft, Starbucks, Nintendo, Whole Foods, Chevron, Bank of America, Boeing, Costco and others. Prisoners in the US have repeatedly rebelled against these practices, which they still argue amount to slave labor.
Social anarchism is a category that comprises the collectivist or socialist wing of anarchist thought. Social anarchism has been and remains the dominant form of anarchist thought, so much so, in fact, that the most common usage of the term ‘anarchism’ refers to social anarchism. Indeed, social anarchism has historically always been more engaged with political struggles and conflicts. It prioritizes community, cooperation, and social freedoms, seeing them as necessary for and complimentary to individual freedoms.

To social anarchists, the state is an undeniably oppressive institution that inhibits freedoms and forcibly prevents or destroys collectivist organizations: What the state cannot control, it seeks to destroy. Different forms of social anarchism such as anarcho-communism, anarcho-syndicalism, social-libertarianism, and collectivism have played major roles in numerous revolutions. As a political project, social anarchists seek to replace the state with smaller-scale, naturally democratic collectives that organically emerge from life: workers’ cooperatives that allow workers to collectively own and manage factories, citizens’ assemblies that allow direct democratic participation in decision making in communities and cities, and horizontally connected citizens’ confederations that will eventually replace the state through bottom-up organization. Thus, anarchists from this school of thought are involved in struggles on both smaller and larger scales, from establishing and defending workers’ cooperatives, associations, and trade unions, to armed uprisings and assassinations. Other politically engaged groups like anarcho-feminists (see Box 6.3) and green-anarchists prioritize forming grassroots organic groupings and establishing horizontal alliances.

Various forms of social anarchism briefly explained

- **anarcho-communism** aims to establish geographical communities collectively owning the land and ruled in every way through direct-democracy;
- **anarcho-syndicalism** focuses on worker’s cooperatives, trade unions, and horizontal alliances between those;
- **social-libertarianism** largely aims to shake off all authority and create individualistic communes each with their own rules;
- **collectivism** is aiming for similar communities but giving priority to the group over the individual;
- **anarcho-feminism** is focusing largely on gender inequalities and aiming to dismantles structures of patriarchy;
- **green-anarchists** prioritize human to non-human interactions, seeking to dismantle men’s domination of the environment.
Emma Goldman is one of the most famous anarchists of the 20th century. A theorist, agitator, prisoner, and would-be assassin, Goldman played an immense role in developing and popularizing anarchism in North America. She was present and fought in several of the major events of 20th century, including the Russian October Revolution and the Spanish Civil War. Today, she is best known for her tireless feminist work. One of the most famous quotes attributed to her – ‘If I can’t dance, I don’t want to be in your revolution’ – is derived from her own memoirs. She writes:

"At the dances I was one of the most untiring and gayest. One evening a cousin of Sasha [Alexander Berkman], a young boy, took me aside. With a grave face, as if he were about to announce the death of a dear comrade, he whispered to me that it did not behoove an agitator to dance. Certainly not with such reckless abandon, anyway. It was undignified for one who was on the way to become a force in the anarchist movement. My frivolity would only hurt the Cause. I grew furious at the impudent interference of the boy. I told him to mind his own business, I was tired of having the Cause constantly thrown into my face. I did not believe that a Cause which stood for a beautiful ideal, for anarchism, for release and freedom from conventions and prejudice, should demand the denial of life and joy. I insisted that our Cause could not expect me to become a nun and that the movement should not be turned into a cloister. If it meant that, I did not want it. ‘I want freedom, the right to self-expression, everybody’s right to beautiful, radiant things.’ Anarchism meant that to me, and I would live it in spite of the whole world—prisons, persecution, everything. Yes, even in spite of the condemnation of my own comrades I would live my beautiful ideal.” [Living My Life (New York: Knopf, 1934), p. 56]
6.1.2 Individual Anarchism

Individual anarchism champions individual freedom over all else, including society and the community. In that way, individual anarchism takes the anarchist opposition to organized power to its extreme and acknowledges no legitimate power over an individual's will and freedom. In this way, individual anarchists focus not on communities but on the individual as the primary and ultimate extent of government, rejecting all power over an individual as external tyranny. As a less politically active stream of anarchist thought, individual anarchism has thrived in philosophy and literature, largely establishing the theoretical doctrines and arguments that form the basis of anarchism. As such, individual and social anarchists all agree on some of the main precepts of anarchistic thought. The forefather of individualistic anarchism is often seen as the German philosopher Max Stirner, who prioritized individual freedom and liberty above all, including notably anarchist organizations that may seek to abolish the state. The individualist branch of anarchist thought has done particularly well in the United States, where a long-standing tradition of individual freedoms have proved fertile ground for thinkers such as Henry-David Thoreau, Benjamin Tucker, and Josiah Warren. Having accepted the state as despotism, these thinkers nevertheless argued that the individual should not be subsumed into a revolutionary party either, as this would require submitting to one organization to counter a greater despotism. Individual anarchism has been criticized by social anarchists as a non-political lifestyle choice that does not go beyond non-conformist individual choices such as dress or behavior (Bookchin, 1995).
Other anarchists are a group with far too many variations to fully describe here. In his attempt to summarize this wild diversity, Peter Kropotkin once noted that there are six major schools of anarchism: Mutualist, Collectivist, Communist, Individualist, Literary, and Christian. If we group the first three as branches of social anarchism and the next two as branches of individual anarchism, we should also quickly mention the Christian branch. Indeed, although almost all religions have been said to contain anarchistic veins (such as Taoism (Rapp, 2012), or Islam (Rammah 2011)), anarchist thought and behavior occupy a key place in the history of Christian reformist thought. Anarcho-Christianism, and its better known arm anarcho-pacifism, are still alive and vibrant today in communities such as Quakers, Mennonites, and Doukhobors, all of which have sought to escape the state's control and establish their own autonomous communities. Perhaps the most famous anarcho-Christian, Leo Tolstoy, famously donated his wealth to the Doukhobor cause.

Besides religious anarchists, dozens of ideologies use the prefix ‘anarcho’ to describe their rejection of hierarchical authorities, even though they do not always share the core principles of anarchist thought described above. Ideologies such as anarcho-capitalism (which rejects the state's presence and power but embraces free markets and the capitalistic economy), anarcho-monarchism (which embraces a feudal-like political landscape of rulers over certain territories), anarcho-primitivism (which argues for a return to a pre-historical scale of very limited political organizations) and others are often seen as either misinterpreting or purposefully misrepresenting the egalitarian nature of the ideology. Such criticism flows from the essential principles of anarchism that reject all hierarchies, domination, and unjustified and unjustifiable authority. The above variants, however, all seem to reject one form of domination for another that seems preferable in their assessment.
Anarchism in the 20th century was marked by a strong paradox: The first half of the century saw the golden age of anarchist thought and action, with anarchists playing important roles and making substantial political gains from Asia to Europe to North America. The second half of the century, on the other hand, saw the retreat of anarchist thought into the margins of political struggles, with ‘anarchism’ in the public eye largely becoming a synonym for a complete lack of order and aimless chaos and violence. Much of this latter development can be explained by the bipolar world of the Cold War era and the stark division of the global political order between capitalist democracies and state-socialisms, both of which saw anarchism as a threat to their institutionalized order.

At the turn of the century, anarchist movements across the globe inherited a strong heritage of political action. Anarchists were present across the political spectrum, from violent political action to philosophy and literature. While anarchist labor organizations were notable parts of the global struggles for the five-day workweek and eight-hour workday (from the previous seven days of 12 to 14 hours of work), other anarchists took to violence, and yet others published and agitated. Anarchists killed kings, nobles, presidents and parliamentarians (for instance, the Italian anarchist Gaetano Bresci shot and killed King Umberto of Italy in 1900; in 1901, the American anarchist Leon Czolgosz shot and killed US President William McKinley). In the philosophical realm, anarchism was making splashes as well: one of the most influential anarchists of the time, Peter Kropotkin, who was once a Russian Prince and aid to the Tzar before stepping down for his ideals, published his “Mutual Aid” in 1902. Anarchist communes and groups played major roles in numerous uprisings in Europe and beyond. Following the First World War in particular, widespread disillusionment with the economic and political systems further fueled anarchist movements and even gave rise to the world’s first anarchist territory in Ukraine (see Box 6.4). Anarchists also had a major presence in the Spanish Civil War and resisted the fascist takeover alongside communist forces. As could be expected, anarchists were present in all resistance movements fighting the Nazi occupation, and they even formed loosely organized guerilla forces throughout Europe.

Box 6.4 – ‘Ukrainian Free Territory’ (1918 to 1921)

The Free Territory was a large swath of Ukraine managed by free Soviets (workers’ associations) and
communes that federated closely to form the world's first Stateless-Libertarian territory. It was protected in its operation by the ‘Revolutionary Insurrectionary Anarchist Army,’ a large collection of anarchist guerilla bands that fought in the Russian Civil War. The Insurrectionary Anarchist army was widely known as the Black Army, named so in rivalry to the communists' Red Army and monarchists' White Army. Numbering between 20,000 and 100,000 troops with its irregular members, the Black Army marched under the anarchist slogan “Land to the peasants, factories to the workers”. The Black Army led an uneasy alliance with the Red Army against the monarchist forces in the Civil War, and the combined anarchist-communist forces defeated the Tzarist armies. However, as soon as victory was on the horizon, the communist forces turned on the anarchists, and through a series of scorched earth tactics (burning the land, killing all inhabitants) they managed to isolate the Black Army, finally annihilating its regular forces after sending over 300,000 troops against it. The remaining forces of the anarchists dispersed into the rest of Ukraine and continued to wage guerilla operations until well into the 1940s. (Eikhenbaum, 1974)

The relatively stable bipolar world order following the Second World War left little room for anarchism as both poles – authoritarian communism and liberal capitalism – fought to silence alternative ideologies. Despite a concerted effort from the world's superpowers, however, anarchist communes blossomed wherever they could find room, from the freed territories in Denmark, to Kibbutzim in Israel, to communes in San Francisco. Anarchism, however, ceased to be perceived as a major world ideology, and was demoted in the public eye to disorganized chaos and meaningless violence.

In the absence of diminished militantism and direct political action, literary anarchism became the main stream of anarchist presence, continuing a strong tradition of anarchistic education theory (like the Ferrer and Moderna schools). Thinkers and writers such as Robert Paul Wolff, John Simmons, and James C. Scott have been prolific in arguing the case of anarchy in history, philosophy, and political science.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it seemed, momentarily, that capitalist liberal democracies had won the day. Disillusionment soon followed, however, and faced with tremendous economic inequality and collapsing ecological systems, anarchistic communes and movements are resurfacing throughout the globe. Workers’ collectives, associations, syndicates, anti-fascist organizations, climate justice movements, feminist and LGBTQI+ movements, and even local electoral politics have become fertile grounds for social anarchists seeking to engage in direct political action. Indeed, compared to a few decades ago, it is safe to say that anarchists and anarchism are making a strong and visible comeback.

Discussion Questions

As a political theory, anarchy remains a controversial proposal.

1. Do you believe society can function without a state? What would that look like?
2. Anarchists believe that men are rational and ultimately capable of governing themselves and that coercive governments that use force are more of a threat than a help. Would you agree?

3. Anarchists argue that most humans are inherently good natured and, if left alone, would often form supportive groups based on equality and collaboration. In other words, cooperation, and not conflict, is the basic rule of humanity. Do you agree?

4. Anarchists, in particular in the past, always had a strong preference for direct militant political action often amounting to bombings and assassinations. Anarchists justified these methods as ‘self-defense’ in the face of despots that forcibly imposed their rule on an unwilling population. Are these methods justifiable in our time?


At the end of this chapter, you will be able to:

- Discuss the various theories of nationalism;
- Distinguish between the various types of nationalism;
- Critically discuss the different waves of nationalism.
The Latin term *natio*, Elie Kedourie reminds us, originally referred to “a group of men belonging together by similarity of birth, larger than a family, but smaller than a clan or a people [and] applied particularly to a community of foreigners” passing through a city or a village (Kedourie, 1961, p. 13). Over the centuries, the term eventually took on different meanings. Eric Hobsbawm asserts that it was only after the French Revolution in the 18th century that the concept acquired its current denotation, that of referring to “the people” in a positive way. This is when French citizenship became the principle of nationality, denoting individual rights and allowing an individual to declare a sense of belonging to a specific nation. Nowadays, the term “nation” most commonly refers to the people living within a political entity such as a state—a term not to be confused with that of a nation—whereas the term nationalism, as will be discussed, refers to the ideology of this form of communal belonging.

This chapter offers an overview of the field of nationalism studies. First, we will present the major theories of the field regarding the sociohistorical advent of nations and nationalism as well as its focus on meso and microsociological processes. Second, we will discuss the different types of nationalism and the main debating points of the field. Third, we will focus on the principal waves of nationalist movement observed between the 19th and the 21st century.
7.1 Overview of the ideology

FRÉDÉRICK GUILLAUME DUFOR AND DAVE POITRAS

Nationalism is a political principle according to which political and cultural boundaries should be congruent. As Michael Hechter puts it: “nationalism is collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation, a territorially concentrated and culturally distinctive solidary group, congruent with those of its governance unit, the agency responsible for providing the bulk of public goods within the nation's territory” (Hechter, 2000, p. 7). A nationalist movement is a movement that aims to implement this congruence. Whereas liberalism sees free and rational individuals as the core constitutive unit of their worldview and Marxism sees relations between classes as the motor of history, nationalism sees nations as the most important political force and the nation as a concrete historical entity.
7.1.1 Modernist and Ethnosymbolic Theories: The Consolidation of Nationalism Studies

FRÉDÉRIC GUILLAUME DUFOR AND DAVE POITRAS

The bulk of the theories on nationalism are based on the assumption, or come to the conclusion, that nations are products of modernity or a modern way of organizing policy. Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism (1983) is the most well-known book that forwards this theory. Investigating culture in 18th century Europe during the industrialization era, Gellner observes that modern economies, or industrial cultures, require the ability to communicate between strangers in a standard idiom and a mobile division of labour that is able to rapidly learn new positions. To provide such a workforce, exo-education must become a universal norm. Only the communities that are able to sustain an independent educational system are then able to reproduce themselves. The state, the only institution that are able to sustain an independent educational system, uses mass education to standardize a culture, that of the political elites, over a large-scale territory. In this sense, Gellner understands the homogenization of cultures through mass education as a necessary measure to meet the economic needs precipitated by industrialization. The homogenization of cultures, the way people understand the world and their position within this framework, is therefore unintentional. The consequences of this transformation are, however, durable. For Gellner, since the industrialization era, individuals have not been loyal to a monarch or a religion but rather a national culture. According to this logic, the state is only legitimate when it represents and protects this culture. While discussing Max Weber’s theory of the emergence of states, Gellner argues that nowadays, the monopoly of legitimate violence is not as important to modern states as the monopoly of legitimate education. Acquiring the cultural idiom in a given state then becomes, Gellner argues, the basis of citizenship. By investing themselves in the mastering of the idioms of their culture, individuals unintentionally become nationalistic.

Benedict Anderson, the author of Imagined Communities (2006 [1991]), emphasizes the role of print capitalism during the proto-industrial era in the advent of nations and nationalism. The diffusion of books published in printed languages, he argues, “created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above spoken vernaculars. Speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, Englishes or Spanishes, who might find it difficult or even impossible to understand one another in conversation, became capable of comprehending one another via print and paper” (ibid.: 44-45). Creating new ways of linking fraternity and power, the homogenization of languages spread while two important cultural systems were losing influence: religions and dynasties. The demotion of such orders, combined with the rise of print capitalism, allowed individuals to project their life in a different perspective. Mass publication and print capitalism, in other words, created another representation of communal belonging by adjoining new symbols: a shared language and culture, but mostly a daily life marked by similar news, events, interests, and routines. In so doing, communities became “imagined” in the sense that a person from a given community—or a contemporary nation—will most likely never know or meet all of his or her compatriots, yet s/he can still imagine their existence and everyday life.

The modernist school of thought in nationalism studies, as discussed through its main representatives, Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson, thus argues that the advent of nations as modern ways of belonging is the unintended or indirect result of state policies. Mainly enforced to sustain the necessary conditions for contemporary economies, this course of action inadvertently homogenized cultures. Nations and nationalism are then to be understood as unintentional consequences of industrialization that became, throughout the years, efficient means of bounding citizens and political elites. In a bid to supply what modernist theories lack, i.e. what is actually national, the ethnosymbolic school of thought further developed the field of nationalism studies. Its founder, Anthony D. Smith, agrees that nations are a modern phenomenon. However, he emphasizes their ethnic origins by arguing that they require the unifying myths, symbols and memories of pre-modern ethnicities (1987; 1991; 1998). The combination of these elements constitutes what he refers to as the ethnic core of a nation. The ethnic core of a nation, in his theory, is what makes it unique—whereas most of its other components, whether it be shared codified laws, common rights and duties, a unified economic zone, or a delimited territory, are interchangeable from one nation to another. The particularities of an ethnic
core mark the difference between the concept of a nation and that of a state, a distinction that modernist theorists have rarely underlined. Hence, instead of examining the role of cultures as Gellner did, Smith explores what these cultures consist of and how their elements have come to be understood as national.

According to Smith, the keepers of traditions, individuals who are or who closely collaborate with the elites of a given political unit, have throughout history passed on cultural components that have come to form the ethnic core of a nation. By the end of medieval times, the culturally homogenous elite of a given territory began forming the core of what would become a state. Growing in complexity, elites would influence the state’s administrative, judicial, fiscal and military apparatus, whose expansion meant the annexation of culturally different territories. To strengthen their legitimacy, government leaders encouraged the assimilation of minorities so that their state could be perceived as a nation-state, an entity that represents and speaks for one people. What is hence precisely modern in the concept of nations, in Smith’s theory, is the idea of merging a political identity with a cultural identity, endowing the nation as the basis of state citizenship.

John Hutchinson, Smith’s student, identifies two distinct processes within the advent of nation-states and argues that nationalism is a twofold phenomenon that mainly involves two types of actors with different yet complementary goals (1987). A first set of actors is engaged in “cultural nationalism.” This form of nationalism is a response to the erosion of traditional religious and feudal identities. It attempts to regenerate the moral of the national community. The protagonists of cultural nationalism are mainly artists and scholars, such as historians, anthropologists, and political scientists. These “ethnic revivalists,” by using the past, formulate the cultural ideals of the nation. The effectiveness of their endeavour rests on their ability to invoke and appropriate genuine communal memories while at the same time connecting them to specific homelands, cultural practices, and forms of sociopolitical organization. A second set of actors is engaged in “political nationalism.” Their aim is to erect a rational and civic political community composed of equal citizens unified through shared idioms and laws. To do so, they transform the ideals formulated by the ethnic revivalists into political, economic and social programs. They mainly consist of politicians trying to legitimize an independent state or an independent state-to-be with the work of individuals engaged in cultural nationalism. They use ethnic sentiments to muster diverse groups and secure a representative national state. Although those two ideal types of nationalism convey different objectives, they complement each other: political nationalists require ethnic sentiments to be conceptualized, whereas cultural nationalists need channels to champion their findings—though the latter may sometimes be invented traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983).
7.1.2 Shifting Focus: From Sociohistorical and Macro-Sociological Perspectives to Meso and Microsociological Analyses

FRÉDÉRICK GUILLAUME DUFOUR AND DAVE POITRAS

Ernest Renan, a French historian and philologist, was among the first scholars to address the nation as a concept. At a conference at the Sorbonne in 1882, he defined the nation as a modern historical construction that prompted, in conjunction with other numerous factors, a significant number of individuals to wish to live together under specific conditions while sustaining both the idea of a common past and a foreseeable future. For this idea to be successful, he noted, the nation must be a daily plebiscite. In spite of this somehow romanticized view on the matter, Renan raised an issue that was not properly addressed within the field of nationalism before the end of the next century: its everyday aspect. Only in the 1990s did a meso and micro-sociological turn take place, echoing back to Renan's position that regardless of how a nation came into being, its existence may rest on everyday plebiscites.

A major work in the revitalization of this aspect of the nation is Michael Billig's *Banal Nationalism*. In this book, Billig defends the following thesis: "Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition" (Billig, 1995, p. 8). Nationalism, he argues, is not a political phenomenon that only occurs during civil or international warfare; it is also at the core of the social reproduction of Western countries, even when under very subtle forms. This is the phenomenon he identifies as "banal nationalism," which covers the ideological habits that enable established nations to be reproduced. According to Billig, nationalism is not only associated with the pre-nation state era of a country; it is intrinsic to the everyday life of all inhabitants of a state. He argues that individuals are constantly socialized to the nation by means of different mechanisms, patterns, daily routines and symbols. Embedded in the everyday life of all inhabitants of a nation, these routines, rituals and symbols usually go unnoticed. In so doing, individuals never forget to which nation they belong, but they forget how they are consistently reminded of this belonging.
As Billig mentions, the flag (or any other symbols) often go unnoticed in front of buildings. The most common symbol Billig employs to illustrate this specific type of nationalism is the flag. There are, according to him, two ways in which it is used. First, there is an active use of the flag: the waved flag. This expression refers to the most conscious use of the flag—or any other national symbols, signs, references, or lexicons—to assert a sense of national belonging or to make a statement involving the nation on occasions such as national holidays or international sports competitions. Second, there is a passive use of the flag: the unwaved flag. This term applies to a flag—or again any other national symbols, signs, references, or lexicons—that goes unnoticed, on a public building for example, but that reminds us unconsciously of our national belonging. Billig argues that everyday life is filled with waved and unwaved flags: the lexicon of politicians (us the nation, them another nation); the weather forecast, which geographically reminds us of where we are in our nation, but also in a world divided into nations; international sports competitions; or again wars between nations that fight for the liberty and freedom of the people of a nation.

The persistence of banal nationalism is, according to Billig, mostly orchestrated by the state, as its existence ultimately depends on it. Constructing banal nationalism in everyday life induces, he argues, citizens to work for the greatness of their nation. But most of all, it induces individuals to sacrifice their lives for their nation's cause, if needed, whence the significance for states to maintain a constant flagging of the nation it aims to represent and defend. For banal nationalism to reach its full efficiency, the nation not only needs to be celebrated on special occasions, but also on a daily basis.

Following Eric Hobsbawm's observation that nations, while constructed from above, cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, Rogers Brubaker developed what he referred to as a cognitive approach to examine the nation both in everyday life and in a macro-sociohistorical perspective. This approach suggests focusing on nationhood rather than nations as groups. Instead of referring to nations as a category of analysis, Brubaker investigates the nation as a category of practice to understand how nationhood structures perceptions, informs thoughts and experiences, or organizes discourses and political actions. Groups, in this perspective, are not a constant but a variable that may become salient under different circumstances. The nation is hence not a thing in the world, but a perspective on the world, among others. By investigating nationhood with this approach, Brubaker aims to prevent groupism, i.e., an analysis that automatically takes nations, races, or ethnic groups as basic units of analysis. In so doing, he avoids contributing to the mere static construction and reification of such groups through his investigations and rather provides a relational and processual understanding of nationhood. His investigation Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town (2006) examines nationhood with this cognitive approach both from above and from below.
7.2 Types of Nationalism and Examples

FRÉDÉRICK GUILLAUME DUFOUR AND DAVE POITRAS

In this section, we will discuss various types of nationalism and provide examples to illustrate them.
A classic opposition in the history of political thought is between two types of nationalism: civic and ethnic. The first type, civic nationalism, is said to have developed in Western Europe and the United States. According to several historians of political thought, civic nationalism is the political force that led to democratic revolutions in France and the United States. It fosters the development of a horizontal solidarity of citizens, in theory, equal before the law, that identifies with the state and its constitutional legacy. It has strong roots in the political thought of the Enlightenment and liberalism. Civic nationalism values the identification of all citizens with the state. It has also been a political force behind the unification of many states. The second type of nationalism developed in Central and Eastern Europe. It is often referred to as a cultural, ethnic or organic nationalism. While civic nationalism is often associated with the Enlightenment, cultural nationalism is more generally associated with the romantic reaction to the Enlightenment. It fosters identification of the members of the nation with a given language, cultural tradition, and often ethnoreligious symbols. Under its more extreme variants, ethnic nationalism can lead to policies of ethnic cleansing and genocide.
Although the opposition between civic and ethnic forms of nationalism remains a useful ideal-type, sociologist Rogers Brubaker has contested its shortcomings (1998, pp. 298-301). Some, for instance, have argued that even when it appears to be inclusive and civic, nationalism is always promoting institutions and symbols that are not culturally neutral, for example: an official language, an official history, political institutions, a constitutional order or legal traditions. It is not because these institutions are not always contested that they are culturally neutral. In Canada, for instance, many institutions and traditions are part of the heritage of the British Empire and the head of the State remains the head of the British monarchy. Other scholars have stressed that the relations between states, nationalism and citizenship policies are always evolving. Germany has for a very long time been associated with ethnic nationalism and very restrictive citizenship policies. Yet, in 1999, it adopted a much more civic political culture and citizenship policies based on soil rather than blood.

Therefore, contemporary researchers of nationalism argue that it is sometimes necessary to move beyond the ethnic/civic divide in order to provide a better typology of different forms of nationalism. Civic nationalism or French Republicanism is sometimes better described as a homogenizing nationalism. The ideal-type of homogenizing nationalism refers to a fully recognized and institutionalized form of nationalism that provides the principal vector of integration to the political culture of a state. Since homogenizing nationalism is always at the core of a state’s institutions, it becomes “banal” or “normal” for many observers. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, has often been prominent among members of a group who seek to build their own sovereign state. In this case, it is probably better to refer to a state-seeking nationalism. When many members of a policy share a different subjective understanding of their past, culture or collective memory, they can mobilize a state-seeking nationalism in order to secede from a state that does not recognize their cultural specificities.

Homeland nationalism is another variant of nationalism that occurs in peculiar geopolitical contexts. Homeland nationalism is the type of transborder mobilization used by a state towards ethnic minorities in neighboring states that “belongs” to the dominant ethnic group of the homeland state. This type of nationalism can become a core instrument of the homeland’s state foreign policy. It can seek either the geopolitical annexation of another state’s territory, a section of the territory or the political destabilisation of a foreign state’s political regime in order to empower political forces more in line with the homeland state.

Diaspora nationalism refers to the nationalist beliefs and nationalist practices of members of a diaspora who remain attached to another state that they consider their homeland. Diasporic nationalist practices can be directed toward an imagined homeland even if the actual members of the diaspora have never set foot in the actual state that they consider “their” homeland. The existence of diasporic nationalism emphasizes the fact that the nation is an imagined community and that it can be imagined from within the existing territory of a nation-state or from outside the actual territory of a nation-state.

The term national populism is often used to refer to the core ideology of the European radical right that blends elements of nationalism, populism and authoritarianism. National-populist movements mobilize their membership along two axes: a horizontal axis where they galvanize the so-called “people” against the so-called “elites” and a vertical axis where they galvanize members of the nation against non-members, foreigners or minority groups. National-populists are also opponents of the counter-powers constitutive of a liberal democracy: an independent judiciary system, a free and diversified press, a constitutionalized division of power, and charters of rights. According to national-populists, these counter-powers have gained too much power in liberal democracies and are threatening the expression of the political will of the majority.
7.2.3 Types of Nationalism: the Case of Quebec
FRÉDÉRICK GUILLAUME DUFOR AND DAVE POITRAS

During the second half of the 20th century, Canadian politics was punctuated by important rounds of constitutional debate regarding the status of Quebec in the Canadian federation (Gagnon, 2004). In fact, the history of Quebec has been shaped by multiple episodes of political contention, several of which have implied republican or nationalist claims. In 1837, a political movement, Les patriotes, inspired in large part by the political institutions of the young United States of America, took arms in order to fight British troops in Lower Canada and demanded representative political institutions and an elected representative body. It was forcefully suppressed by British military forces. For most of the following century, the Catholic Church, the French-language, and le code civil remained at the core of French-Canadian identity. It was during the middle of the twentieth century that new political forces in Quebec merged into a state-seeking nationalism. They opposed what they perceived as linguistic and economic oppression caused by an Anglo-dominated Canada bestriding the political institutions of the Dominion.

During the nineteen sixties, the Révolution tranquille swiftly transformed the relationship between the province and the Catholic religion and its clergy, leaving the door wide open for outside influences and Quebeckers eager for novelty. Alongside this, an important national-liberation movement took root. The once-disparate movement promptly consolidated into an influential political formation during the nineteen seventies, le Parti Québécois. Since then, important constitutional litigations (such as the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Accord) as well as two referendums have been held in Quebec on the status of the province in Canada. At the core of the referendums was the idea that Quebec should become a sovereign country from Canada. The second referendum in 1995 came very close to a victory of the camp in favour of Quebec's sovereignty. It won 49.5% of the vote, while the camp in favour of remaining in the federation won 50.5%. Since the beginning of the year 2000, the sovereignist option in Quebec has held an approval rating slightly below 40%. Although the sovereignist movement seems to be in decline, claims-making in favour of more autonomy for Quebec, a more decentralized federation, and an asymmetric conception of the federation remain popular.

While the sovereignist movement has not succeeded in transforming the province of Quebec into an independent state, it may be argued that this movement nevertheless made it a nation. Before the sixties, citizens of the province would mostly refer to themselves as French Canadians, whereas today they mainly consider themselves as Quebeckers, with French Canadians being the French-speaking Canadians living in the other provinces of Canada.
7.3 Nationalism in Time and Space: from the Revolutionary Atlantic to the beginning of the 21st century

FRÉDÉRICK GUILLAUME DUFOUR AND DAVE POITRAS

Although it is sometimes argued that the modern nation-state system took root in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, it was not until the 20th century that formal empires vanished from global politics. Accordingly, since the French Revolution, many national liberation movements have sought to build a state by seceding from a formal empire and later form an already constituted nation-state.

The development of the first revolutionary form of nationalism is associated with the French Revolution and the wave of social movements associated with the Déclaration des droits de l’homme, the overthrow of absolutist regimes in Europe, and the secession of states from the metropolis of a European empire in the New World, such as the United States and Saint-Domingue (present-day Haiti). Nationalism therefore emerged in a world of agrarian empires, and during this phase it was closely associated with a movement of democratization and abolition of the absolutist and patrimonial state.

A second important wave of nationalist movements is associated with the period of intense revolutionary turmoil known as the Spring of the People in 1848. During this period, many liberal and socialist movements demanded constitutional reforms against the structure of power of absolutist regimes and empires. Many sought to secede from an existing empire. Many of these social forces were crushed by conservative policy. The period between 1860 and 1900 is often associated with a wave of nationalist revolutions from above. The period was strongly influenced by a new conception of the nation often rooted in the romanticism and organicism of the “people”. This period saw the consolidation and unification of the state of Germany under the leadership of Prussia and the formation of the state of Italy. In both cases, a larger territorial and political unit emerged from the unification of smaller principalities. The period between 1917 and 1923 saw the fragmentation of old agrarian empires: the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire. According to historian Eric Hobsbawm, this period saw a logic of balkanisation, that is, a pure application of a Gellnerian logic of political morselling according to ethnocultural boundaries.

Following the First World War, two important world leaders, Vladimir Lenin and Woodrow Wilson, recognized the right of nations to self-determination. This was also the context that led to the institutionalization of an international organization known as the League of Nations. Although Lenin and Wilson agreed in principle with the norm of the right of nations to self-determination, global politics between the two world wars remained far from a world of nation-states. Many European powers maintained protectorates and colonies until the 1960s. Canada, for instance, did not have a foreign policy completely independent from the British Empire before the 1930s. During the Second World War, many colonies fought the war on the side of their European metropolis. Some scholars argue that the experience of war was an important stimulus for the channeling of anti-imperial sentiment and national liberation movements during the middle of the twentieth century (Eckert, 2016). The 1960s was an important decade for national liberation struggles in the Global South but also for nationalist movements in North America, in Quebec and Acadia for instance. This was a global context in which the United Kingdom and France were both losing global influence, while the Cold War divisions between two major spheres of influence, American and Soviet, were settling in.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War between 1989 and 1991 led to another wave of state formation in Eastern Europe. Although this wave was welcomed with optimism among liberal scholars who celebrated the global hegemony of the rule of law, it did not take long for ethno-national conflicts to reappear in former Yugoslavia.

It took a long time for the state to become the dominant political unit of global politics. Yet, even today, despite the collapse of formal empires, there are still many political conflicts along national lines. Some nationalist movements in multinational states are seeking a greater decentralisation of power or a greater recognition of their national autonomy.
In other instances, state-seeking nationalists are asking for political secession from a larger nation-state from which they feel politically alienated.

Since 2016, we have been seeing a new wave of nationalist movements: national populists (Eatwell, 2018). They are surging in a different world characterized by Brexit, the election of Donald Trump in the United States and the election of Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines. These movements are often labelled as national populist and are associated with a current period of right-wing authoritarianism. An important feature of these movements is that they are not interested in the creation of a new state. They mobilize their followers along two axes. Along a vertical axis, they mobilize the so-called “people” against the so-called “elites”; while along a horizontal axis they mobilize the “nation” against foreigners or an internal “threat”. National populist mobilizations therefore seek to create new hierarchies of belonging, where the so-called people of the heartland are presented as more legitimate than others. In many places where national populists gain traction, they can rely on an alliance with ethno-religious political forces; it could be the evangelical movements behind Trump and Bolsonaro, the Catholics supporting the Polish or French far right, the Hindus supporting Modi, or the Christian Orthodox behind Putin.

The Swedish political scientist Catarina Kinnvall further underlines the analogy between nationalism and religion. Nowadays, she suggests, nationalism and religion “are more likely than other identity constructions to provide answers to those in need, [they] supply particularly powerful stories and beliefs because of their ability to convey a picture of security, stability, and simple answers. They do this by being portrayed as resting on solid ground, as being true, thus creating a sense that the world really is what it appears to be” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 742). They are, in other words, the most convincing “identity-signifier” in modern societies (ibid.). Not only can the nation be seen through such theories as the holder of the modern political membership giving access to diverse rights and opportunities, it can also be understood as a factor of ontological security as much as religion (ibid., p. 746). By providing an “abstract identity [...] one identity that answers the need for securitized subjectivity [and] its very long history, this monolithic entity [of the nation] becomes a stabilizing anchor in an otherwise chaotic and changing world, linking the past and the present to future action” (ibid., pp. 758-759).
Conclusion

FRÉDÉRICK GUILLAUME DUFOUR AND DAVE POITRAS

Nationalism has implied for more than two centuries that the world is, or should be, divided into nations. The success of this modern ideology is undeniable, as it has spread to every continent. It has been mobilized by actors that hold diverse, perhaps antagonistic, positions throughout the political spectrum. It may be the malleability of this ideology that has allowed it to triumph throughout the world. Although it has been announced as a passing phase that is in decline many times, in moments of crisis nationalism always seems to resonate anew, as if the remains of an ambiguous past were indicative of a better future.

Discussion Questions

1. Which processes do modernist theories of nationalism associate with the emergence of nationalism?
2. According to a nationalist worldview, in global politics, which boundaries should be congruent? Why?
3. What are the differentiating factors between the ethnic and civic types of nationalism?
References


Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, you will be able to:

• Distinguish between the various schools of thought within multiculturalism;
• Distinguish between multiculturalism as a public philosophy and as a public policy;
• Critically assess the fate of multiculturalism in various polities.
Multiculturalism is a complex and multifaceted concept. In day-to-day conversation, multiculturalism is most often used to describe either a demographic phenomenon – the racial, linguistic and religious diversification of societies – or a particular set of beliefs – that modern societies are better if they are more diverse and heterogeneous. Although scholars sometimes use the word multiculturalism in these two ways, they also use it to describe both a specific set of moral and ethical guidelines for modern societies and governments (i.e., a public philosophy) and a type of public policy.

This chapter provides an introduction to the scholarly use of the word multiculturalism. It begins by exploring multiculturalism as a public philosophy, and, in so doing, it describes multiculturalism's two main intellectual traditions or what we might call multiculturalism's two schools of thought. As this chapter will demonstrate, these schools of thought converge on certain key points but also differ in important respects.

The chapter then discusses three different ways in which modern liberal democratic states have deployed multiculturalism as a public philosophy in the design and implementation of diversity-oriented public policies. The chapter's final section examines multiculturalism's near and longer-term prospects as both a public policy and a public philosophy. In brief, while it is clear that liberal democracies still need a diversity-oriented public philosophy, it is unclear whether multiculturalism will and should continue to fulfill this role.
The following pages describe the six main tenets of the long-standing Canadian school of thought on multiculturalism, named so for its two main contributors: Canadian philosophers Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka. This section then concludes with a brief overview of an emerging school of thought based in the United Kingdom. This school of thought is largely associated with the works of scholars Tariq Modood, Nasar Meer, Varun Ubertoi, and Bhikhu Parekh, all of whom are affiliated with the University of Bristol’s Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship. Geoffrey Brahm Levey (2018) describes these scholars’ contributions to understanding multiculturalism as “the Bristol School of Multiculturalism” (or “BSM” for short) due to their shared institutional affiliation. As we shall see, the BSM is in part a response to Will Kymlicka’s normative theory of “liberal egalitarian multiculturalism,” and therefore some of its tenets differ from those of the Canadian school of thought on multiculturalism.
8.1.1 The Canadian School of Thought

DR. ARJUN TREMBLAY

The Canadian school of thought’s central tenet is that, as individuals, our quest for meaning and fulfillment in life does not and cannot take place in complete isolation from other human beings. In fact, according to Will Kymlicka, each and every one of us belongs to a distinct “societal culture.” To begin with, Kymlicka defines a “culture” – in the now classic Multicultural Citizenship (1995) – as “an intergenerational community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and history” (p. 18). A “societal culture”, therefore, is a type of “intergenerational community” that provides individuals with a set of values, a sense of the purpose in one’s life as well as an understanding of what the **good life** constitutes. Along similar lines, Charles Taylor argues in the equally important Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (1992) that human beings are not “monological” subjects; this means that our individual identity, while “inwardly generated” (p. 34) and disassociated from one’s social position, is actually never fully realized in complete independence from other human beings. Rather, according to Taylor, humans are “dialogical” subjects. We define ourselves (i.e., understand our identity, who we are, our “authentic” self) through the use of a range of “rich human languages of expression” (p. 32) and in **dialogue** with other people.

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On the good life...

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Trying to understand what “the good life” constitutes is something that preoccupied Ancient Greek and Arab philosophers and it continues to be a key question for contemporary philosophers and political theorists. What binds most of these inquiries together is the shared understanding that mere existence is not enough and that human beings need fulfillment, satisfaction, and meaning to truly live. Scholars differ in their perspectives on the means to achieving fulfillment, satisfaction, and meaning and what a life beyond mere existence should actually look like. Consequently, there are competing visions of “the good life.”

The Canadian school of thought’s second tenet is that modern democratic states are “multicultural.” This means that these states contain a variety of cultural groups – by which I mean groups with distinct societal cultures – within their territorial borders. Every multicultural state contains both a majority cultural group as well as one or several minority cultural groups within its territorial boundaries.

A majority cultural group – which can also be referred to as a “majority nation” – is one whose members' shared language, history, customs, religion, values, and/or conception of the good life is reflected in and embodied by the state’s institutions, its ideals of citizenship and political participation, and its national symbols. In addition, the language of the majority group is most often also the language of commerce in the state.

Minority cultural groups emerge as the result of processes of voluntary immigration, the colonization of Indigenous peoples, and the forced incorporation of territorially concentrated nations (such as the Catalans, South Tyroleans, the Basque People, the Scottish, and the Québécois). Due to these processes, the languages, customs, religion, and values of minority cultural groups do not enjoy the same degree of institutionalization and public recognition as those of the majority nation; they may in fact not be institutionalized or recognized at all.

Most modern liberal democratic states consist of a majority nation as well as one or several “polyethnic” groups. The term “polyethnic” is used in studies of multiculturalism to describe minority communities that emerge as by-products of individual and familial immigration. Some countries, such as Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain, contain both
polyethic minorities as well as one or several territorially concentrated (non-Indigenous) political communities that once had some degree of political autonomy but were then forcibly incorporated into a state. These communities are known as “minority nations”. There are only a handful of modern liberal democratic states that encompass polyethic minorities, Indigenous peoples as well as a minority nation within its territorial boundaries. Canada is one of these states.

The Canadian school of thought's third tenet is that Indigenous peoples, minority nations, and polyethic groups face challenges that the majority nation does not. For instance, the processes of colonization and forced incorporation threaten the continuity of the societal cultures of Indigenous peoples and minority nations because it is usually the majority nation's societal culture that is institutionalized and embodied in national symbols and the official language. Additionally, the extent to which the majority nation's customs, language and values naturally pervade private and public spheres means that polyethic minorities must, to some degree or another, abandon their own societal culture and adopt and internalize the majority nation's societal culture if they are to have any chance of fully participating in these spheres.

Charles Taylor brings to light another critical challenge that minority cultures face. One of the key implications of Taylor's understanding of dialogical human existence is that, since our identity is defined by our dialogue with those around us, our understanding of who we are is also in part contingent on how others recognize us. If we extend the understanding of dialogical human existence to examine the relationship between majority and minority cultural groups, this means that a minority group's fulfillment is in part contingent on being recognized by the majority nation. In turn, the non-recognition or misrecognition of members of minority societal cultures by the majority can have deleterious effects: it can stunt, impede, or altogether prevent an individual member of a minority cultural group's quest for meaning and fulfillment. More precisely, Taylor argues that the non-recognition of minority cultures means that only the majority culture's vision of the good life is seen as legitimate while the misrecognition of minority's societal culture means that “people or society mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves” (Taylor, 1992, p. 25).

The Canadian school of thought's fourth tenet is that the American intellectual tradition of liberalism – perhaps the most widely-known tradition of liberalism due in large part to its preeminent position in legal, philosophical, and political scholarship – provides insufficient remedies for addressing the challenges that minority cultural groups face. According to Taylor (1992, pp. 56–58), this tradition embraces an understanding of liberalism based on a “procedural” moral commitment. This particular understanding of liberalism values only the enshrinement of basic rights and liberties and does not believe that it is the state's duty to describe and institutionalize a single conception of the good life; individuals should be free to abide by their own conception of the good life, albeit within constitutional and legal limits. Therefore, within a context of procedural liberalism, minority nations would not be allowed to institutionalize their societal culture as the common public culture at the sub-national level (i.e., at the provincial or regional level) even though this might ensure its proper recognition and its continuity.

Kymlicka, by contrast, critiques liberal scholar John Rawls' theory of justice. Rawls' theory provides a rational justification for a polity built on “a social democratic principle of economic redistribution to supplement a classically liberal principle of equal individual rights” (Forbes, 2019, p.105). Kymlicka argues that Rawls' theory is based on the assumption that societies are mono-cultural (Ibid.) and that societal cultures are not “primary goods” akin to rights and liberties. Therefore, Rawls' theory of justice cannot provide an adequate theory of justice for multicultural democracies.

The Canadian school of thought's fifth tenet is that there are, nevertheless, remedies for the misrecognition and non-recognition of minorities as well as solutions to the challenges that minority groups face. According to Taylor, one potential remedy for the misrecognition and non-recognition of minorities is the adoption of a “politics of difference” based on a “substantive” (rather than procedural) moral commitment. This substantive liberalism would allow for the potential institutionalization of multiple conceptions of the good life within the same liberal democracy.

In Multicultural Citizenship (1995), Kymlicka describes a “politics of multiculturalism” for liberal democracies. Kymlicka's “politics of multiculturalism” provides three sets of “group-differentiated rights” for minorities that build upon, but do not replace, the protection of individual rights. Table 8.1 below highlights these three sets of group-differentiated rights (i.e., “self-government,” “polyethic,” and “special representation”), the specific minority groups to
which they apply (i.e., national minorities, Indigenous peoples, and polyethnic groups), how minorities have claimed these rights in liberal democratic states (i.e., “Nature of the rights claim”), and how some states have responded to these claims (i.e., “Mechanisms for recognizing rights claims”) through the adoption of a range of policies, measures and institutions.

Table 8.1 – The Politics of Multiculturalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group-differentiated rights</th>
<th>Groups that claim these rights</th>
<th>Nature of the rights claim</th>
<th>Mechanisms for recognizing rights claims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-government</td>
<td>National minorities and Indigenous Peoples</td>
<td>“Self-government claims...typically take the form of devolving power to a political unit substantially controlled by the members of the national minority, and substantially corresponding to their historical homeland or territory.” (p. 30)</td>
<td>1. Federalism, where boundaries between subnational units are drawn such that the national minority is a majority within its unit. 2. Asymmetrical federalism 3. Devolution of powers to tribal/band councils.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Polyethnic                 | Polyethnic groups | “...demanding the right freely to express their particularity without fear of prejudice or discrimination in the mainstream society.” (p. 30)  
“...[demanding] various forms of public funding of their cultural practices.” (p. 31)  
“...[demanding] exemptions from laws and regulations that disadvantage them, given their religious practices.” (p. 31) | 1. Anti-racism measures 2. Recognition of history and the contributions of polyethnic minorities in curricula 3. Funding of ethnic associations, magazines and festivals 4. Exemptions of dress codes and Sunday closing laws |
| Special Representation     | National minorities, Indigenous Peoples and polyethnic groups | “Throughout the Western democracies, there is increasing concern that the political process is 'unrepresentative', in the sense that it fails to reflect the diversity of the population. Legislatures in most of these countries are dominated by middle-class, able-bodied, white men.” (p. 32) | 1. Making political parties more inclusive by reducing barriers to minority participation 2. Proportional representation electoral rules 3. Other forms of “political ‘affirmative action’” (p. 32) |


Kymlicka expands on his definition of polyethnic rights (see Table 8.1, column 1, row 3) in Politics in the Vernacular: nationalism, multiculturalism and citizenship (2001). Here, he describes multiculturalism as “fair terms of integration” for polyethnic minorities and argues that “fairness” in the immigrant integration process requires not only that governments engage in the “ongoing, systematic exploration of our common institutions to see whether their rules, structures and symbols disadvantage immigrants” (p. 162) but also that they take active steps to lower barriers to immigrant participation in the private and public spheres of the receiving society. In other words, Kymlicka argues that governments must “accommodate” polyethnic minorities. Table 8.2 below provides a list of the 12 policies identified by Kymlicka that liberal democracies have implemented with the aim of making the integration process fairer.

Table 8.2 – Multiculturalism as Fair Terms of Integration
1. Adopting affirmative action programmes which seek to increase the representation of immigrant groups (or women and the disabled) in major educational and economic institutions.

2. Reserving a certain number of seats in the legislature, or government advisory bodies, for immigrant groups (or women and the disabled).

3. Revising the history and literature curriculum within public schools to give greater recognition to the historical and cultural contributions of immigrant groups.

4. Revising work schedules so as to accommodate the religious holidays of immigrant groups. For example, some schools schedule Professional Development days on major Jewish or Muslim holidays. Also, Jewish and Muslim businesses are exempted from Sunday closing legislation.

5. Revising dress-codes so as to accommodate the religious beliefs of immigrant groups. For example, revising the army dress code so that Orthodox Jews can wear their skullcaps, or exempting Sikhs from mandatory motorcycle helmet laws or construction-site hardhat laws.

6. Adopting anti-racism educational programmes.

7. Adopting workplace or school harassment codes which seek to prevent colleagues/students from making racial (or sexist/homophobic) statements.

8. Mandating cultural diversity training for the police or health care professionals, so that they can recognize individual needs and conflicts within immigrant families.

9. Adopting government regulatory guidelines about ethnic stereotypes in the media.

10. Providing government funding of ethnic cultural festivals and ethnic studies programmes.

11. Providing certain services to adult immigrants in their mother-tongue, rather than requiring them to learn English as a precondition for accessing public services.

12. Providing bilingual education programmes for the children of immigrants, so that their earliest years of education are conducted partly in their mother-tongue, as a transitional phase to secondary and postsecondary education in English.


The Canadian school of thought's sixth main tenet is that there are limits to minority recognition and to minority accommodation. Taylor draws from the case of Québec's language laws – adopted to protect a minority nation's societal culture – to establish what can and cannot be done in implementing a politics of difference. He argues that the implementation of a politics of difference can allow the state to curtail "privileges and immunities that are important" (Taylor, 1992, p. 59) in the pursuit of collective rights; this is consistent with his understanding of liberalism founded on a substantive moral commitment. However, Taylor is also clear that this is where things must stop: a politics of difference cannot and does not allow governments to curtail or do away with fundamental liberties and individual rights.

Kymlicka outlines “limits of tolerance” to multiculturalism understood as “fair terms of integration” for immigrant minorities. He too is very clear about these limits, stating that: “the logic of multiculturalism involves accommodating diversity within the constraints of constitutional principles of equal opportunity and individual rights” (2001, p. 174; emphasis added). Consequently, Kymlicka embraces what he calls a “a liberal egalitarian form of multiculturalism... that respects individual autonomy and responsibility” (2018, p. 81).

In sum, the Canadian school of thought on multiculturalism brings to light the great cultural diversity present in modern liberal democratic states as well as the importance of recognizing and accommodating minority groups, albeit within the limits of the protection of individual rights and liberties. As we shall see, the Canadian school of thought
converges with the newly emerging Bristol School of Multiculturalism in one key way, however, both schools also differ in important respects.
8.1.2 The Bristol School of Multiculturalism

DR. ARJUN TREMBLAY

Just as the Canadian School of the Thought does, the Bristol School of Multiculturalism or “BSM” also views culture as critically important in shaping human existence (Levey, 2018, p. 205). But the BSM is also a response to one of the cornerstones of the Canadian School of Thought: Will Kymlicka’s normative theory of liberal egalitarian multiculturalism. Table 8.3 below highlights the seven key differences identified by Varun Uberoi and Tariq Modood (2018) between the BSM and Kymlicka’s liberal egalitarian multiculturalism.

Table 8.3 – The Two Schools of Thought Compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kymlicka’s Liberal Egalitarian Multiculturalism</th>
<th>The Bristol School of Multiculturalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inspired by Canadian politics and by political events in Canada</td>
<td>Inspired by British politics and by political events in Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discusses three groups: polyethnic minorities, Indigenous peoples, and national minorities</td>
<td>Focuses exclusively “on immigrants who become citizens and their descendants” (p. 960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals are ultimately more important than groups</td>
<td>Individuals and groups are equally important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not address the issue of religious identities</td>
<td>Religion and religious identities are central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative analysis based on “existing empirical evidence” (p. 962)</td>
<td>Normative analysis combined with “extensive empirical research” (p. 961)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing a liberal theory of minority rights is the main focus</td>
<td>Exploring national identity and conceptions of belonging is a key focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits of intercultural dialogue are not given that much importance</td>
<td>Benefits of intercultural dialogue are seen to be of central importance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As a result of its focus on immigration and in light of its key differences with liberal egalitarian multiculturalism, the BSM has also developed a distinct set of tenets. Most notably, the BSM views modern states as a “community of communities” and contends that the principles of equality and fairness of treatment should apply not only to individuals but also to communities themselves. Since all groups are meant to be treated equally, the BSM eschews the distinction between majority and minority groups that is a central tenet of the Canadian School of Thought. The BSM also views immigrant integration as the bare minimum that a polyethnic multiculturalism policy can achieve. Rather, the BSM’s “master principle...[is] the crucial importance of a sense of belonging in one’s society” (Levey, 2018, p. 209). In brief, the BSM’s version of multiculturalism views immigrants as active contributors to the re-conceptualization of national symbols and national myths.
8.2 Multiculturalism’s Variants

DR. ARJUN TREMBLAY

From the mid-20th century onwards, governments across liberal democracies have implemented public policies that recognize cultural diversity and set out to accommodate minority cultural groups, albeit in varying ways and to different extents. For instance, governments in four liberal democratic states – Canada, the Netherlands, Australia and Sweden – implemented a policy of “official multiculturalism.” That is to say, they implemented a national-level policy that formally recognized the multicultural nature of their society – focusing specifically on polyethnic diversity – and pledged to make the process of immigrant integration fairer. Other democracies have adopted a range of “multiculturalism policies” despite never implementing a policy of official multiculturalism. And, as we shall see, multiculturalism has even caught on as a public policy in environments that, on the surface, seem inhospitable to the recognition and accommodation of minority cultures.
8.2.1 Official Multiculturalism

DR. ARJUN TREMBLAY

Canada was the first liberal democracy to officially adopt multiculturalism as a national-level public policy. On October 8, 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau declared in a speech to the House of Commons that Canada's federal government would, from that point on, implement a policy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework”. Table 8.4 below highlights the four main objectives and the six programs of implementation of Canada's policy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework.”

### Table 8.4 – Multiculturalism Within a Bilingual Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Objectives in the Federal Sphere</th>
<th>Program of Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. First, resources permitting, the government will seek to assist all Canadian cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada, and a clear need for assistance, the small and weak groups no less than the strong and highly organized.</td>
<td>1. Program I: Multicultural Grants. Activities eligible for federal assistance will include multicultural encounters; organizational meetings for new cultural groups; citizenship preparation and immigrant orientation programs; conferences; youth activities; cultural exchanges between groups as well as other multicultural projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Second, the government will assist members of all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society.</td>
<td>2. Program II: Culture Development Program. A culture development program will be instituted to produce much-needed data on the precise relationship of language to cultural development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Third, the government will promote creative encounters and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the interest of national unity.</td>
<td>3. Program III: Ethnic Histories. The Citizenship Branch will commission 20 histories specifically directed to the background, contributions and problems of various cultural groups in Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fourth, the government will continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada's official languages in order to become full participants in Canadian society.</td>
<td>4. Program IV: Canadian Ethnic Studies. The Department of the Secretary of State will...undertake a detailed investigation of the problems concerned with the development of a Canadian ethnic studies program or center(s) and will prepare a plan of implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Program V: Teaching of Official Languages. The Federal government...proposes to undertake discussions with the provinces to find a mutually acceptable form of federal assistance towards the teaching official languages to children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Program VI: Programs of the Federal Cultural Agencies. The programs they will be undertaking will enable all Canadians to gain an awareness of the cultural heritage of Canada's ethnic groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to Hugh Donald Forbes, Canada's policy of “official multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” was intended not only to serve the purpose of minority recognition and minority accommodation; the government also deployed official multiculturalism as part of a “national unity strategy” (Forbes, 2018, p. 34) to counteract mobilization for independence in Québec in the wake of the province's “Quiet Revolution.” As a result, Québec scholars criticize Canada's policy of “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” for impinging on a national minority's rights to self-government. In turn, some of these scholars have developed an alternate model of immigrant integration – interculturalism – which is discussed later in this chapter (see section 8.3).

Canada's federal government reinforced and expanded the country's commitment to official multiculturalism in 1982 and 1988. In 1982, the Canadian Constitution Act achieved royal assent leading to the enshrinement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 27 of the Charter requires that “The Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians” (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, S.27). In 1988, the Mulroney government passed the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988. The Act created the Department of Multiculturalism and the position of Minister of Multiculturalism, renamed Canada's official multiculturalism policy the “multiculturalism policy of Canada”, and specified federal institutions' duties and responsibilities in implementing the policy.
The Netherlands is the first and, to date, the only Western European country to adopt a policy of official multiculturalism. Dutch official multiculturalism is commonly viewed as the by-product of the “Minority Memorandum” (or minderhedennota), a White Paper on immigration and integration published by the Dutch government in 1983. In this document, the government identified 15 polyethnic minority groups present in the Netherlands and promised to ensure the fair and equal legal treatment of members of these minority groups and to lower barriers to minority participation in Dutch society. The Dutch government adopted official multiculturalism following a string of terrorist attacks committed by Moluccan immigrants and in the face of clear evidence of striking socio-economic disparities between the national majority and polyethnic minorities.

The origins of official multiculturalism in Australia can be traced to the release of the Galbally Report (i.e., “Report on the Review of Post-Arrival Programs and Services to Migrants”) in 1978. The government commissioned the report after ending racial restrictions in immigration, which resulted in an increase in immigration from Southeast Asia. After the Galbally Report was issued, the Australian government established the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs (AIMA) in 1979. **Table 8.5** below highlights the government’s principal objectives in creating the AIMA.

**Table 8.5 – Why was the AIMA Established?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) to develop among the members of the Australian community:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) an awareness of the diverse cultures within that community that have arisen as a result of the migration of people to Australia; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) an appreciation of the contributions of those cultures to the enrichment of that community;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) to promote tolerance, understanding, harmonious relations and mutual esteem among the different cultural groups and ethnic communities in Australia;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) to promote a cohesive Australian society by assisting members of the Australian community to share with one another their diverse cultures within the legal and political structures of that society; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) to assist in promoting an environment that affords the members of the different cultural groups and ethnic communities in Australia the opportunity to participate fully in Australian society and achieve their own potential.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Australia, *Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs Act 1979*, Part II; Section 5.

There have been two subsequent iterations of Australia’s official multiculturalism policy, both of which were marked by the release of a national-level policy document. In “The National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia” (1989), the Australian government declared its duty to protect the rights of immigrants to preserve their cultural identity but also highlighted an immigrant’s obligation to adhere to the rules and values of Australian society. In “Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity” (2003), the government identified the need to promote “community harmony and social cohesion” (p. 6) post-September 11, 2001 and articulated the importance of official multiculturalism as a means of ensuring both national unity and national security.

Sweden implemented a policy of official multiculturalism partly in response to labour migration and to rights claims by the country’s Finnish-speaking minority. However, according to Karin Borevi (2012), the decision to implement a multiculturalism policy at the national level was also made because “it fitted in well with the national self-image developed in the post-war period of Sweden as a pioneer in human rights issues” (p. 145). Swedish official multiculturalism is rooted in the 1975 Immigrant and Minority Policy. The Policy outlined three main objectives: 1. “[ensuring] that immigrants were provided with conditions equal to those of the native population” (ibid, pp. 143-144); 2. Giving immigrants the choice to determine the degree to which they would retain their culture, on the one hand, and integrate into Swedish society, on the other; and 3. Promoting “partnership [between]...immigrant and minority groups” (ibid; p. 144).
8.2.2 Multiculturalism Policies

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Although Sweden, Australia, the Netherlands, and Canada have all implemented a national-level multiculturalism policy, the vast majority of liberal democracies have not. Does this mean that these democracies do not recognize and accommodate minority societal cultures? The Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI) developed by researchers at Queen's University provides an answer to this question. The MPI is based in part on Will Kymlicka’s categorization of group-differentiated rights for polyethnic minorities, Indigenous peoples, and national minorities. Using this categorization as a starting point, the MPI identifies 23 “multiculturalism policies” (MCPs) that governments can employ to recognize, protect and preserve minority cultures and, in the case of immigrant (i.e., polyethnic) minorities, to make the integration process fairer. Table 8.6 below highlights the 23 MCPs outlined in the MPI.

Table 8.6 – The Multiculturalism Policy Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrant Minorities</th>
<th>Indigenous Peoples</th>
<th>National Minorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional and municipal levels and the existence of a government ministry, secretariat or advisory board to implement this policy in consultation with ethnic communities</td>
<td>1. Recognition of land rights/title</td>
<td>1. Federal or quasi-federal territorial autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum</td>
<td>2. Recognition of self-government rights</td>
<td>2. Official language status, either in the region or nationally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The inclusion of ethnic representation / sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing</td>
<td>3. Upholding historic treaties and/or signing new treaties</td>
<td>3. Guarantees of representation in the central government or on constitutional courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Exemptions from dress codes (either by statute or court cases)</td>
<td>4. Recognition of cultural rights (language; hunting/fishing)</td>
<td>4. Public funding of minority language universities/schools/media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Allowing of dual citizenship</td>
<td>5. Recognition of customary law</td>
<td>5. Constitutional or parliamentary affirmation of multinationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The funding of ethnic group organizations or activities</td>
<td>6. Guarantees of representation/consultation in the central government</td>
<td>6. According international personality (e.g., allowing the substate region to sit on international bodies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction</td>
<td>7. Constitutional or legislative affirmation of the distinct status of indigenous peoples</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups</td>
<td>8. Support/ratification for international instruments on indigenous rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Affirmative action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The two main aims of the MPI are to “[monitor] the evolution of multiculturalism policies in 21 Western democracies” and “to provide information about multiculturalism policies in a standardized format that aids comparative research and contributes to the understanding of state-minority relation” (Multiculturalism Policy Index). The MPI provides a score of “1” for an MCP if it has been fully adopted, a score of “0.5” if it has been partially adopted, and a score of “0” if the policy has not been adopted. Table 8.7 below highlights the 16 countries[1] without a national-level multiculturalism policy (i.e., without the “Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism” at the national level) and highlights their respective “Immigrant Multiculturalism” score for the year 2010, the most recent year examined in the MPI.

Table 8.7 – Immigrant Multiculturalism in Countries Without Official Multiculturalism (2010)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Immigrant MCP Score (out of 8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As one can clearly see, the non-implementation of official multiculturalism does not prevent governments from designing and implementing a range of MCPs. In other words, a vibrant and active "politics of multiculturalism" can be present in a liberal democracy even if there is no formal national-level mandate to recognize and accommodate minority cultures.

[1] Belgium has been excluded from this table, given that the MPI states that it shows "evidence of an “intercultural” policy approach". As we shall see later on in this chapter, in section 10.3, there are important differences between multiculturalism and interculturalism.
8.2.3 Multiculturalism in inhospitable environments

DR. ARJUN TREMBLAY

A “politics of multiculturalism” can also develop in liberal democracies that by all appearances should be inhospitable to the recognition and accommodation of minority groups. As we saw in the preceding section, the American tradition of liberalism is implicitly mono-cultural and embraces a procedural moral commitment that is insufficient for the recognition of minority cultures. Furthermore, the word “multiculturalism” is often negatively associated in the United States with a form of campus politics that arose in the late 1980s and early 1990s that, its critics argue, promotes ethnic separatism. In fact, the word “multiculturalism” is largely absent in American public and legislative discourse and, when it is used, it is sometimes articulated as a threat to the American ideal of the “melting pot”. Yet, since the 1960s, American governments have designed and implemented a number of policies intended to lower the barriers to social and political participation for immigrants with limited English proficiency. This has included the adoption of policies of bilingual education, minority language assistance in voting, and language accommodation in the delivery of public services. Furthermore, according to the MPI, the United States practices one of the most extensive forms of Indigenous multiculturalism, receiving a score of 8/9 for the year 2010 (Multiculturalism Policy Index; Evidence; United States).

In Britain, the contrast between opposition to multiculturalism and its implementation is perhaps even more striking. At the turn of the millennium, the Blair New Labour government rejected in no uncertain terms a proposal that Britain adopt a declaration of cultural diversity patterned after Canada's policy of official multiculturalism. Nevertheless, Britain subsequently underwent a true multicultural policy revolution entailing, among other developments, the British Broadcasting Corporation's adoption of a multi-faith mandate in 2006, diversity-oriented revisions to the national curriculum, and the extension of positive action (i.e., affirmative action) measures to cover religion and belief in 2010.

In brief, multiculturalism has blossomed and can blossom in environments that seem less than amenable to recognizing and accommodating minority groups. In addition, multiculturalism's development in public policy in Britain as well as in the United States shows that there is often a disjuncture between what elected officials say about the recognition and accommodation of diversity and what governments actually do to make the process of immigrant integration fairer.
8.3 Multiculturalism’s near and longer-term prospects

DR. ARJUN TREMBLAY

Multiculturalism’s future is uncertain despite the adoption and implementation of multiculturalism policies across liberal democracies and even in contexts that would seem to be inhospitable to the implementation of group-differentiated rights. This section highlights three major developments that bring into question multiculturalism’s near and longer-term prospects in the 21st century.
Multiculturalism, as a model of immigrant integration, is no longer the only game in town, as other public policies are now being deployed to deliver integrationist outcomes. One of multiculturalism's main rivals are the civic integration policies, as they have come to be known, that governments in a number of European democracies have adopted. These policies make it an immigrant's responsibility – as a precondition for permanent residency and citizenship acquisition – to demonstrate basic fluency in the national majority's language as well as an understanding of the national majority's key societal values. While civic integrationism (i.e., the guiding public philosophy behind civic integration policies) embraces an open-ended conception of national identity that can be shaped by immigrants and that can reflect a diversity of cultures, it nonetheless views the protection and preservation of minority cultures as a private affair and not the responsibility of government and public institutions. Some observers argue that the design and implementation of civic integration policies in the Netherlands in the late 1990s and early 2000s is evidence of the “retreat” of Dutch multiculturalism.

Another alternative to multiculturalism is muscular liberalism, a term coined by former British Prime Minister David Cameron in a speech he gave at the Munich Security Conference on February 5, 2011. In his speech, Cameron advanced muscular liberalism as a policy alternative to New Labour's “doctrine of state multiculturalism”. He argued that this doctrine had “encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream” (Cameron, 2011) and, in so doing, had exacerbated issues of extremism and radicalisation in some British minority communities. By contrast, Cameron's policy of muscular liberalism would deliver integration by “making sure that immigrants speak the language of their new home” (ibid), by instilling a sense of “common purpose” (ibid) in members of majority and minority communities, and by creating a program (i.e., the National Citizen Service) to encourage youths aged 16 and 17 from diverse backgrounds to interact with each other and engage in team-building exercises. Muscular liberalism was implemented in a variety of ways during the two Cameron Conservative governments (2010–2016), most notably in a provision in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 requiring that authorities “prevent people from being drawn into terrorism” (Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, c. 6, Part 5, Chapter 1, Section 26) and in reforms to the national curriculum requiring that public schools promote “British values.”

Interculturalism is an integrationist alternative to multiculturalism that is distinctly Québécois in its origins. Interculturalism has two key tenets: 1. An openness to immigration and a receptiveness to cultural diversity and 2. Ensuring the continuity of the majority culture which, in the case of Québec, is the culture of a nation that was forcibly incorporated into the Canadian state. Interculturalists point to the deployment of official multiculturalism in Canada in response to the rise of Québécois nationalism as evidence of multiculturalism's blind spot when it comes to protecting minority nations. Thus, they argue, an alternative integrationist model is needed to ensure both “fair” immigrant integration as well as the continuity of the minority nation's societal culture. The development of interculturalism as a public philosophy is most readily associated with a series of recommendations issued by the Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences; the Commission was launched by the Charest Liberal government in 2007 and was co-chaired by Charles Taylor and sociologist Gérard Bouchard.
8.3.2 A shift in the ideological environment

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Another major development that threatens multiculturalism's continued implementation is the shift to the ideological right in national-level politics that is occurring across democracies. This shift is evidenced by the formation of new center-right governments, by the rise and mainstreaming of far-right political factions, and by the struggles and decline of center-left political parties. This shift has created in its wake an ideological environment that is less than conducive to multiculturalism's survival as an ideology and as a policy option. Why is this so? The adoption and implementation of multiculturalism policies has generally occurred under social democratic and center-left governments. Additionally, multiculturalism is logically consistent with social democratic and reform liberal ideologies given their openness to radical forms of change and their desire to redress imbalances in power. By contrast, the political right tends to oppose cultural accommodation and minority recognition and to promote integrationist alternatives to multiculturalism highlighted above. There are also major logical inconsistencies between various ideologies of the right and multiculturalism, as one can see in Table 8.8 below. These inconsistencies suggest that if the ideological pendulum continues to shift to the right across liberal democracies, multiculturalism policies may be at risk.

Table 8.8 – Logical Inconsistencies between Ideologies of the Right and Multiculturalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideologies of the Right</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tends to embrace a mono-cultural ideal of society</td>
<td>All societies are multicultural and common public institutions should reflect diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tends to be biased in favour of maintaining the status-quo</td>
<td>Often requires radical and rapid change as well as the creation of new institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tends to value negative freedom, which is to say protection from the state</td>
<td>The state is necessary to protect the rights of minorities (consistent with positive freedom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(neo-conservatism) values the individual over the group</td>
<td>(the BSM) views individuals and groups as equally important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tends to value small government, limited government intervention in society</td>
<td>Government intervention needed to redress the power imbalance between majority and minority groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tremblay, Ar. (2018). Diversity in Decline? The Rise of the Political Right and the Fate of Multiculturalism. Cham, Switzerland; Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 2-3
8.3.3 Multiculturalism’s limitations

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Multiculturalism’s fate might also be sealed for an altogether different reason; it may simply no longer be what is needed to remedy injustices and to protect minority groups in liberal democracies. In the last decade, we have witnessed unprecedented mobilization around issues of diversity and identity. However, social movements such as Idle No More, the Dakota Access Pipeline protests, Rhodes Must Fall, the Catalan independence demonstrations, and Black Lives Matter have largely avoided using the word “multiculturalism”. Rather, these movements have developed and mainstreamed a diversity-oriented discourse built on the ideas and principles of decolonization, Indigenization, sovereignty and anti-racism. Furthermore, a growing number of scholars, including Will Kymlicka himself, have pointed to multiculturalism’s limitations in addressing anti-Black and anti-Indigenous racism. Consequently, it may now be time for the development of a new politics of diversity in liberal democracies that can achieve racial equality and ensure the recognition of minority cultures.

Discussion Questions

1. Which school of thought on multiculturalism (the Canadian school of thought or the Bristol School of Multiculturalism) do you think you might belong to?
2. Is multiculturalism disappearing across liberal democracies or is it surviving as a policy outcome and as a policy option?
3. Should multiculturalism be replaced by one of its integrationist rivals? If so, which one?
4. Is multiculturalism a suitable politics of diversity for the 21st century? Should it be revised, reformed, or replaced?
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Tremblay, A. (2018). Diversity in Decline? The Rise of the Political Right and the Fate of Multiculturalism. Cham, Switzerland; Palgrave Macmillan.

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, you will be able to:

• Discuss the core concepts and themes of the ideology;
• Explain the emergence of variants of populism in different contexts;
• Analyze the relationship between populism, democracy and other ideologies;
• Critically assess the future of populism.
Populism: 'The Will of the People'?

DR. CONRAD KING

Populism has become a political buzzword in the twenty-first century, and yet it remains an essentially contested concept. An early theorist of populism, Ernesto Laclau, recognized that “few [terms] have been defined with less precision. We know intuitively to what we are referring when we call a movement or an ideology populist, but we have the greatest difficulty in translating the intuition into concepts” (Laclau, 1977, p. 143). Populism has been used to describe distinctive social movements, political parties, leaders as well as a tradition of political thought. Unlike other ideologies, however, it is rare that leaders or parties self-identify as populists because populism has been imbued with negative connotations and often used as a derogatory term.

The vagaries of populism should not prevent theorists from trying to develop a suitable definition of it. One such definition has been provided by Cas Mudde and C.R. Kaltwasser (2017, p. 6), who define populism as “a ‘thin-centered’ ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.” This definition reflects the populist assumption that there are fundamentally only two types of people in society: the ‘real’ or ‘pure’ people and a corrupt elite who are not merely out of touch, but also actively working against the interests of the ‘real people.’ As such, the ‘real people’ are right to feel hostility and distrust towards elites, and this creates an antagonistic relationship between the two groups. A distinctive feature of populism is its angry style of politics – indeed, some have referred to populism as less an ideology and more a style of politics.
9.1 Core concepts and themes

DR. CONRAD KING

There are three core concepts that comprise populism as an ideology: the ‘pure people’, the ‘corrupt elite’, and the ‘general will’. The term populism itself is derived from the Latin word *populus* (meaning ‘the people’). Thus, at the core of populism is the notion of popular sovereignty in which legitimate rule can only emanate directly from the people. However, who exactly are ‘the pure people’ is often ill-defined because it is a construction rather than an empirical fact. The people have variously been associated with specific groups in society, such as ‘the nation’ (as in ‘the people of Brazil’, often with ethnic undertones) or even just a silent majority. Nonetheless, populist politicians try to make a direct appeal to ‘the people’, claiming to represent their true hopes and fears as the *vox populi* (voice of the people). Likewise, populists will identify or construct a ‘corrupt elite’ who are enemies of the people. All populists despise political elites, who they refer to as the ‘political establishment’ or the ‘political class’. Yet populists vary on which other groups are amongst this corrupt elite, which might include economic elites (the wealthy, the ‘one percent’), cultural elites (such as academics or scientists), or media elites (‘fake news’ or the ‘chattering classes’). Whatever groups get targeted as the corrupt elites, populists will argue that they not only ignore ‘the people’ but also serve only their own interests, which do not align with those of ‘real’ or ‘pure’ people. Finally, populism makes political claims about the ‘general will’, otherwise known as the popular will or the will of the people. This general will (and popular sovereignty) are claimed to be the ultimate – and only – sources of legitimate authority. Notably, this general will is not one that is constructed or revealed vis-à-vis debates within the public sphere but rather one that is immediately known by populist leaders and often based on a vague notion of ‘common sense’. The notion of a general will is used by populist leaders to aggregate demands and identify a common enemy. Furthermore, populists claim it cannot be wrong. This can lead to the dark side of populism: because ‘the people’ are homogeneous and their will is infallible, there are justifications for a tyranny of the majority as well as authoritarian tendencies amongst its leadership. At the core of the populist ideology is a strategic deployment of three concepts: the ‘pure people’, the ‘corrupt elite’, and the ‘general will’.

Beyond the core concepts, one can recognize consistent if not ubiquitous themes that emerge from populist ideology. An overarching theme is anti-politics, which can manifest in a number of ways. The most obvious way is anger with the political establishment. Populism is an expression of disenchantment with conventional politics, and it facilitates the emergence of anti-establishment political leaders and movements. Populist leaders try to convey an image of being political outsiders who are untainted by conventional power politics. Second, populists are anti-politics inasmuch they distrust and oppose many of the ‘intermediary institutions’ of representative democracy. Representative democracy can get in the way of more direct expressions of the general will of the people. Only those institutions that directly involve citizen expression (such as elections, referenda, plebiscites) are legitimate. Other institutions, such as conventional political parties, bureaucracy, or the judiciary, are illegitimate and interfere with political expression of the popular will. Third, populism is an expression of emotional (often angry) politics. Populists are seldom interested in engaging with reasonable discourse or rational policy choices, and they tend to ignore or even deliberately flaunt the rules and norms of conventional politics. Populists deliberately play on the emotions of citizens – especially feelings of fear, anger, and uncertainty. Historian Richard Hofstadter (1955) suggested that populism was little more than a ‘paranoid style of politics’, while other theorists have commented on how the ‘performance’ of crisis enables populism to flourish (Moffitt, 2015; Stavrakakis et al., 2018). Finally, populism is anti-politics in that it is a moral category rather than an intersectional political identity like class, gender, ethnicity, religion, and so on. Populists adopt a Manichean worldview (i.e., good versus evil, Us versus Them, and the illusion of a unified whole), and populist leaders make claims about having exclusive moral representation of the ‘pure people’ (Müller, 2016). These themes contribute to an understanding that populism is fundamentally anti-politics.
‘What is populism, and what does the term actually mean?’ is a BBC primer on the basics of populism, with some short explanatory videos embedded.

You can access it here.
Populism is a ‘thin-centered’ ideology because it does not have strong concepts of its own. It merely purports to reflect the will of the people – whoever those people are and whatever their will might be. ‘Full’ or ‘thick’ ideologies, such as liberalism, or socialism for example, have clear, consistent, and coherent claims about the way society is and the way it should be. Populism does not. It merely claims that ‘the people’ should be the driving force in politics – without prior claims about what kind of society ‘the people’ might want. Thus, populism is malleable and must attach itself to other ideologies. It is the combination of populism and a thicker ‘host ideology’ that can generate specific (and localized) definitions of ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’.

Two ‘host ideologies’ are natural bedfellows for populism and indeed produce the two distinctive types of populism we see in the world today: left-wing populism and right-wing populism. Left-wing populism is essentially a combination of populism and socialism. Historically, left-wing populism was prevalent mainly in Latin America, yet it has also surfaced recently in Europe and North America as a backlash against the politics of austerity. Austerity refers to government-mandated reductions in welfare state spending, and austerity measures were widely adopted by Western governments during the economic recession that followed the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. A well-known example of a left-wing populist is Bernie Sanders, a self-declared socialist who narrowly missed out on leadership of the US Democratic Party in 2015. In Europe, radical left populist parties emerged in countries hit hardest by economic crisis and recession, countries that were also subject to austere ‘bailout’ rules imposed by international organizations like the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. In Greece, Syriza (the Coalition of the Radical Left) became the largest party in the Greek Parliament during 2015 elections, and its chairman Alexis Tsipras became Prime Minister of Greece. That same year, Podemos (meaning: ‘We can’) became the second largest party in terms of parliamentary seat share in Spanish elections. However, left-wing populism is less common (in practice) than right-wing populism, which we will turn to next.

Right-wing populism is essentially a combination of populism and nationalism. It invokes the ‘pure people’ as a unified and homogenous national identity and claims that this identity (and perhaps also the nation itself) is under threat. Charles Maier (1994) coined the term ‘territorial populism’ to describe a xenophobic national identity that excludes others (usually immigrant groups) while also mobilizing negative and reactionary emotions towards powerful external agents (such as the European Union, China, or multinational corporations). It is in this rejection of external (and often capitalist) agents that one can see some overlap between left-wing and right-wing populism. In the twenty-first century, right-wing populism has effectively become a counter-globalization ideology that acts as a bulwark against cultural and economic globalization. Like left-wing populists, contemporary right-wing populists are against free trade and seek to protect and promote the national (or sometimes local) economy. Unlike left-wing populism, right-wing populism is also characterized by cultural conservativism, which is staunchly anti-immigrant. Right-wing populists galvanize citizens by referencing a constant threat to national identity, a threat that emanates from both inside and outside the nation–state – inside from corrupt elites and minority viewpoints and outside from immigrants who belong to (and retain allegiance to) other nation–states. For right-wing populists, borders become symbolic boundary markers, and the constant threats to identity and security demand a permanent state of emergency that mundane ‘establishment’ politics has failed to recognize or act on. For many right-wing populists, the message is: ‘unless you fight, you will lose your nation’. Due to this messaging, critics of right-wing populism suggest that this ideology is essentially fascist in nature and less related to more benign forms of nationalism. Historically, there might be some veracity to this claim. Frederico Finchelstein (2017) observed that modern (right-wing) populism was born out of early twentieth-century fascism. When fascist dictators were defeated in World War II, populism emerged as a postwar reformulation of fascism. However, populism differs from fascism in a number of crucial aspects. For one, they differ in terms of their commitments to democracy.
Fascists reject democracy in all its forms and see violent struggle as the most appropriate means to getting and keeping power. Populists play the democratic game and typically cede power after losing elections. They also differ in their understanding of legitimate authority. Fascists exalt a charismatic leader – an elite by definition, albeit an incorruptible one – as well as prescribe a totalitarian dictatorship as the ultimate goal. Right-wing populists exalt the general will of the people – even if it is embodied by a charismatic leader – and prescribe to an authoritarian form of democracy. There is undeniable overlap between fascism and right-wing populism, especially in their tendencies towards authoritarianism and their understanding of a single infallible source of political legitimacy (yet differing on what that source is: for fascists it is the will of the leader, while for populists it is the will of the people). Beyond authoritarian tendencies, right-wing populism and fascism explicitly relate to a third ideology: nationalism, with fascists romanticizing a symbolic hyper-nationalism, and populists merely treating the nation as an embodiment of the ‘pure people’.

There are other ideologies that are complete anathema to populism and that populists of all stripes reject. One of these is pluralism, which for right-wing populists also translates into a rejection of multiculturalism. Pluralism refers to a belief in or commitment to diversity, be it political diversity (such as strong competition between political parties) or cultural diversity (the belief that a variety of cultural beliefs is healthy and desirable). Populists have a vision of society being uniform, which often manifests in a unique, singular, and exclusive national identity. Although populists reject pluralism and cultural diversity, they also reject totalitarian regimes, meaning that populists will allow limited space for contestation in the public sphere (De la Torre, 2016; Müller, 2016). The other ideology that populists reject is liberalism, so much so that populism might be deemed anti-liberal. If liberalism is about the protection of individual rights and the separation of powers, then populism is fundamentally against these notions. The protection of visible minorities or minority political opinions is antithetical to policies that should reflect only the will of the majority. Separating branches of government so that the executive branch is constrained from unilaterally executing the general will is also antithetical to populism. According to populists, the executive branch (i.e., the populist leader) should be able to govern without interference from the judiciary because the populist leader is a legitimate representative of the people (and the people cannot be wrong), while a supreme court is unelected and out of touch with regular people, even when their rulings protect the rights of individuals. As we will see in the next section, populism’s rejection of pluralism and liberalism creates a complex relationship between populism and democracy. In effect, populism advocates for an anti-liberal and intolerant form of democracy.
9.3 History of populism: Populism’s relationship to democracy

DR. CONRAD KING

A minimal definition of democracy is some combination of popular sovereignty and majority rule. Beyond this, democracy can take many shapes. Direct democracy, of the type seen where referenda or plebiscites allow citizens to have a direct influence over policy or decision making, is strongly endorsed by populism. Adversely, populists take issue with liberal and representative democracy, which is when citizens elect representatives to make decisions, and those decision makers are constrained by the principles and political institutions of liberalism from abrogating the rights of individual citizens. As such, populism is fundamentally democratic yet also at odds with liberal democracy.

Juan Francisco Fuentes (2020) observes that populism oscillates between ‘hyper-democratism’ and ‘anti-democratism’, with the former being a kind of nostalgia for direct democracy and the latter being the rejection of any kind of political mediation between the people and their leader.

Populism’s relationship to democracy can be partly understood in terms of the process of democratization over time. Populism can be a democratizing force within authoritarian regimes, giving voice to the masses and inspiring regime change. However, we must recognize that populism as an ideological phenomenon is predominantly found within – and challenging to – representative democracies. Dictators sometimes appeal to the masses to retain power in a more frictionless way, yet they do not need popular support to get or keep power. Populists must appeal to ‘the people’ in a representative democracy because populism remains but one ideological choice amongst many. Therefore, the main ideological competitor to populism is liberalism. It was liberalism that was the progenitor of modern (representative) democracy going back to the American and French Revolutions in the eighteenth century. Early proto-populist sentiments might have involved agitation for electoral democracy, yet populists themselves have certainly tried to negatively impact liberal democracy (Rosanvallon, 2008). Populism amplifies political participation over the short term yet minimizes it over the long term because once populism is consolidated, liberal and pluralist elements are the first to go, with democratic representation quickly eroded thereafter. Indeed, populism might necessarily be a transitory ideology in many contexts, because either it fails or it transcends itself into something bigger (i.e., a ‘thicker’ ideology). Populism could be properly understood as a response to other democratic ideologies after a democratic transition has moved into a consolidation phase.

Populism has thus been characterized as either a corrective to, or else a ‘perverse inversion’ of, liberal democracy (Rosanvallon, 2008). Populism can be corrective of representative democracy in that it can: mobilize and give voice to societal groups that feel ignored by political elites, improve the responsiveness of the political system, re-politicize issues that elites have excluded from the political agenda, and strategically promote institutions that presumably construct the ‘general will’ of the people (referenda, plebiscites, etc.). Yet populism also has significant negative effects on democracy as well. It often results in an intense moralization of politics, whereby reaching agreements between disparate groups becomes very difficult. In lieu of agreement and compromise, majority rule is used to suppress minority opinion and circumvent minority rights. The will of the people – often demonstrable by the will of a majority in a plebiscite or election – becomes authoritative and infallible. Populism is democratic because it abides the wishes of ‘the people’ yet authoritarian because not all citizens count as ‘the people’ (and those who do not have no political legitimacy whatsoever). In effect, populism advocates for an authoritarian form of democracy, and it fundamentally rejects liberal and representative democracy.
In practice, populism is localized and deeply contextual. Although we can identify abstract concepts that connect populisms around the world and throughout history, actual populists try to represent the values and interests of ‘the people’ in a specific place and time. For example, the earliest populist movements emerged in the late nineteenth century, and they all had a distinctively rural flavour. Louis Napoleon was the first elected president of France in 1848, and he immediately catered to the concerns of smallholding peasantry in the French countryside as well as implemented a modest kind of plebiscitary democracy. By 1852, he had dispensed with representative democracy altogether by declaring himself Emperor Napoleon III, which ushered in a period of populist politics in France known as ‘Bonapartism’.

In late nineteenth-century Russia, a small group of urban elites tried to mobilize and politicize the rural peasantry. This Russian populist movement (called ‘narodnichestvo’) was an abject failure. Finally, the actual term ‘populism’ was born in the United States during the 1890s following the creation of the People’s Party in the American Midwest in 1891. This political party championed agrarian democracy and rejected the gold standard, financial power, railroad companies, and the political establishment. The People’s Party ran a candidate in the presidential election of 1892 (James B. Weaver) who obtained 8.5% of the national vote share, yet it fizzled out when many of its supporters backed the Democratic Party candidate in the 1896 election. In hindsight, the appeal of populism to nineteenth-century farmers in very different parts of the world is quite logical. Representative democracies were either very new (France), not yet formed (Russia), or else dominated by urban elites (USA). So, farmers in all these places might have had reason to feel neglected by the political establishment. These populisms conform to the patterns of populist democratization discussed above (i.e., early populisms being emancipatory projects), yet each movement was distinct in how it characterized ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’.

Populism seems to follow broad regional patterns as well. In part, this is due to variations in political opportunity structures that different types of representative democracies present to populists. In presidential democracies (Latin America, the USA, the Philippines), populism typically manifests through personalist leaders who try to appeal to the ‘pure people’ directly. Parliamentary democracies (all of Europe) will tend to incentivize new parties to emerge – or traditional parties to transform into populists – even when a strong leader might be part of this process. Thus, we can begin to recognize distinct patterns of populism on different continents. The section below discusses these patterns, beginning with the strongest (and in some respects, oldest) populisms in Latin America, followed by Europe, North America, and finally the newest arena for populism: Asia. It should be unsurprising that populism has emerged only recently in regions with the youngest democracies because populism is fundamentally a response to representative democracy. As such, Africa is not discussed here because populism has not yet become a meaningful force. One could argue that there were populist elements to the Arab Spring uprisings that began in 2011. One could argue that Nelson Mandela (president of South Africa from 1994–1999) was a populist and that his successors Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma tried to govern as populists, yet the core aspects of populism (a ‘pure people’ versus a ‘corrupt elite’) were not entirely central to these political movements. Nonetheless, populism is much more widespread than realized by most North Americans – who have been overly focused on Trumpism, a recent phenomenon. Yet it is necessary to exclude many populisms in order to focus on only the most seminal ones.
9.4.1 Latin American populism

DR. CONRAD KING

Central and South America are where populism has prevailed the longest, perhaps because caudillo political culture tends to venerate strong leaders who purport to rule 'on behalf of the people'. Just about every country in Latin America has had a prominent populist movement, and most have also had a populist regime in power at one time or another.

Caudillos (definition and explanation)

Caudillos were military strongmen that dominated Latin American politics during the period between early 19th century independence movements and widespread democratic consolidation in the late 20th century. The political culture of caudillismo continues in Latin America, but now with a populist twist. Whereas traditional caudillos were elites by definition (i.e., they engaged in patron-clientelist relations with political and economic elites), caudillismo culture has encouraged the masses to look to charismatic and personalistic leaders to defend their interests. Early Latin American proto-populists might have rebelled against caudillos to try to democratize their societies, but, ultimately, populism in consolidated democracies actually encourages caudillismo.

Indeed, the first modern populist regime was in Argentina. This movement, dubbed Perónism, ran the gamut of populisms (from right to left) within a single fractious political party over the course of three decades. General Juan Domingo Perón served as a minister in the military dictatorship that ruled Argentina from 1943 until 1946 and then won the presidential election in 1946. Initially, Perón made appeals to the marginalized and impoverished (what he called the 'shirtless ones') and fed off popular resentment against 'Yankee imperialism'. Yet, he also flirted with fascist elements in Argentinian society, including the harbouring of Nazi war criminals. Perón served as president until he was ousted by a military coup in 1955, yet his ideologically fragmented political party persisted (often underground) even after he was forced into exile. He returned to Argentina for a final term as president from 1973 until his death in 1974. Argentina is a microcosm of just how malleable populism has been in Latin America and how readily populists can win power. There have been extreme right-wing populists in power, such as Perón in Argentina and José María Velasco Ibarra, president of Ecuador five times between the 1930s and the 1970s. There have been right-wing neoliberal populists in power, such as Alberto Fujimori, president of Peru from 1990 until 2000, and Carlos Menem, president of Argentina from 1989 until 1999. And there have been left-wing populists in power, such as Hugo Chávez, who won the Venezuelan presidential election in 1999 and then manipulated the constitution to retain power until his death in 2013 (he also handpicked his successor, Nicolás Maduro, who still retains power in Venezuela). Another is Evo Morales, a leftist ethno-populist who was president of Bolivia from 2006 until 2019 and whose 'Movement toward Socialism' strongly advocated for indigenous rights and equality. Populism of every type has seen its most verdant expression in Latin America, and a number of durable political regimes have been constructed using populist ideologies.
Until the twenty-first century, populism was a marginal ideology in Europe. This ideology was subsumed into communist or fascist movements during the 1920s and 1930s, and it failed to re-ignite after World War II. The only notable exception was Poujadism in France, where Pierre Poujade established a nascent populist party to contest the 1956 French national election, but he failed and Poujadism faded away. A young Jean-Marie Le Pen was active in Poujade's party, and he would go on to form his own political party, the National Front, which has since become synonymous with a European populism that is largely of the right-wing, nativist variety. This party (renamed National Rally) is now led by his daughter, Marine Le Pen. She was runner-up in the 2017 French presidential election, which might have been the highwater mark for right-wing populism in Europe, a wave that began in the 1990s with the creation of xenophobic extreme-right parties in national political arenas across the continent. Many of these right-wing parties were politically irrelevant until changing conditions provided them the opportunity to make broad populist appeals. Two major events (or ‘crises’) generated support for these formerly fringe parties: the 2008–2009 global recession and the 2015–2016 immigration ‘crisis’. Populist parties and leaders capitalized on feelings of nativism by publicly rejecting both immigration and the European Union (EU). Nowhere were the results of this nativist populism starker than in the United Kingdom, where the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) successfully campaigned to win a 2016 referendum that would have the UK leave the EU. UKIP and the Brexit referendum had all the hallmarks of right-wing populism: opposition to immigration and multiculturalism, opposition to the Brussels ‘Eurocracy’ as distant and illegitimate political elites, highly emotive (and seldom factual) campaigning, and the use of direct democracy – the referendum itself – as a fulsome and irrevocable expression of the general will (even though less than 52% of Britons actually supported Brexit). Populism thrives in conditions of fear and insecurity, and populists like Nigel Farage (head of UKIP) promised certainty, simplicity, and unity, with things like a clear and binding national identity.

Although right-wing populism has been predominant in twenty-first century Europe, left-wing populists have also found some electoral success, such as Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain. The country that seems to have seen it all is Italy, but then anyone familiar with Italian politics (the ‘basket-case’ of European politics) might not be surprised by this. The range of populisms in Italy rivals that of Argentina, but in a shorter span of time. Silvio Berlusconi was a neoliberal populist who served as Italy’s prime minister three times (1994–5, 2001–6, and 2008–11) and used his personal resources as a media tycoon (and owner of AC Milan football club) to spread his populist appeal. In 2018, a short-lived Italian government was formed from a bizarre coalition of populists. The Five Star Movement (ostensibly an anarchist-populist party) took on as a junior partner the Northern League (a right-wing populist party that changed its name to just ‘League’ to broaden its appeal). Like Argentina, Italy might be the Western European country that has provided the greatest variety of populism and where populism has had significant impacts as a governing regime.

Finally, it is worth noting European cases where populism has had the most transformative effect, inasmuch liberal democracy (or even democracy itself) no longer functions. In Russia, Vladimir Putin was a relative unknown when he won the presidential election in 2000 with 53.4% of the popular vote. Since then, Putin has used a populist platform to subvert liberal democracy in Russia and then undermine representative democracy altogether. Russia is no longer a meaningful democracy. In Hungary and Poland, illiberal and right-wing populist parties are in government, where they run afool of their obligations to the EU as well as actively suppress free media and public universities (Hungary) or politicize the judiciary (Poland). In Turkey, current president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has altered the constitutional order to retain personal power as a populist. Erdoğan was not a populist when he became prime minister of Turkey in 2003, yet he succumbed to the allure of populism at a party congress in 2007, when he demanded of his critics: “We are the people. Who are you?” (Müller, 2016, p. 3). The advent of right-wing populism on the periphery of Western Europe will not inevitably lead to populists governing in places like France or Germany, yet with right-wing populists in every country in Europe, populism is waiting for suitable conditions to flourish.
The conditions for a flourishing of populism in the USA seemed to culminate in the year 2016. That year, Donald Trump, a right-wing populist, contested and won the US presidential election as the candidate put forth by the Republican Party. His Democratic Party opponent, Hillary Clinton, lost the election in part because she was painted as a corrupt member of the political establishment in Washington, with Trump using slogans like ‘lock her up’ and ‘drain the swamp’ to demonstrate that he was a political outsider who would govern in the interests of ‘real Americans’. Things might have looked quite different had Bernie Sanders won the Democratic Party primaries and if he decided to persist with his left-wing populist rhetoric. We would have seen an American presidential election contested by the conventional establishment parties (the Republicans and the Democrats), yet also contested by two very different kinds of populists, both of whom claimed to govern for ‘real Americans’. Although Trumpism is now its own established phenomenon (which will likely persist long after Trump’s defeat in the 2020 presidential election), it is not the first time we have witnessed populism in American politics. Beyond the ‘invention’ of populism during the 1890s with the short-lived People’s Party, there have been other American populists, usually but not always of the right-wing persuasion: Huey Long (governor of Louisiana from 1928–1932), George C. Wallace (governor of Alabama on three separate occasions), Senator Joseph McCarthy (whose persecution of alleged communists during the 1950s became known as ‘McCarthyism’), and Texas billionaire Ross Perot (independent presidential candidate in the elections of 1992 and 1996). There have also been significant populist social movements on the left (The Occupy Wall Street Movement in 2011) and on the right (the Tea Party Movement that began in 2009). Yet until Trumpism, populism in North America has been characterized by weak organizational capacity and highly regionalized mobilization. Trump was perhaps the first American populist who was successful on a national scale.

Canada follows this pattern of weak organization yet strong regional mobilization amongst populist parties and movements. Indeed, some argue that Canada has been barren soil for populism because of its moderate political culture, lack of party polarization, and widespread norms of inclusivity and tolerance for immigrants (Adams, 2017). Yet, angry populist politics has emerged at the regional level. Preston Manning was a member of Parliament who founded the right-wing populist Reform Party in 1987, and his party had some electoral success in western Canada during the 1993 federal election before eventually merging into the federal Conservative Party in 2003. Right-wing populism has perhaps been strongest in Albertan provincial politics. The current premier of Alberta, Jason Kenney, has been called a populist, yet he has had to ‘compete’ with more marginal right-wing populists like the provincial Wildrose Independence Party and the
federal Maverick Party – both of which agitate for the secession of Alberta from Canada. Frustration with ‘politics-as-usual’ is growing outside of Alberta as well. In 2018, Doug Ford was elected premier of Ontario, and François Legault was elected premier of Québec. Both ran populist electoral campaigns, yet they have not consistently governed as populists when in power. It would seem that provincial populism is becoming an avenue for voters to express frustration with federal politics without actually seeking a populist alternative in Ottawa. The only populist party that has been national in scope has been the People’s Party of Canada created by former Conservative MP Maxime Bernier in 2018. Yet, his national populist message resonated weakly amongst Canadian voters, and his party failed to win any seats (including his own) in the 2019 federal election. Canada continues to follow the North American pattern of regional populism that surfaces occasionally when conditions permit but without a Trump-like figure that has been able to mobilize populism on a national scale.

‘What’s driving populism in Canada?’ is a CBC video from 2019 that discusses the rise of regional populism in Canada, especially Doug Ford.
9.4.4 Asian and Australasian populism

DR. CONRAD KING

As populism is largely a response to the shortcomings of representative democracy, it should come as no surprise that the regions where democracy is least developed or least consolidated is also where populism has had only recent inroads. Still, populism has begun to appear in Asia as well. The oldest representative democracies in the region are Australia and New Zealand, and each saw the emergence of right-wing populist parties during the 1990s, with the New Zealand First Party and the One Nation Party in Australia. Both remain fringe parties with very weak electoral support. There have been somewhat populist leaders in South Korea (Roh Moo-hyun, President from 2003–2008), in Taiwan (Chen Shui-bian, President from 2000–2008) and Thailand (Thaksin Shinawatra, Prime Minister from 2001–2006 and his sister Yingluck, Prime Minister from 2011–2014). However, the most prominent populists in Asia have been Rodrigo Duterte, President of the Philippines since 2016 and a right-wing populist who puts much emphasis on ‘law and order’; and Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India since 2014, who emphasizes Hindu nationalism. It is perhaps Modi that causes the most concern amongst critics of populism, as he appears to be remaking Indian society according to his (Hindu nationalist) view of the ‘pure people’ and their general will.
9.5 The future of populism

DR. CONRAD KING

It is obvious that populism has flourished in the 21st century, leading political scientists to evaluate the conditions that can lead to populism in specific settings and contexts. Explanations for populism fall into two general categories: demand-side (when groups of citizens ‘demand’ populist alternatives) and supply-side (related to the ‘supply’ of populist parties and leaders in representative democracies). It is important to understand that these theories of populism need not be mutually exclusive – they might all operate simultaneously – yet theorists tend to look to one explanation as a predominant reason for populism on a case-by-case basis.

Amongst demand-side explanations, Dani Rodrik (2018) suggests that populism appeals to the ‘losers of globalization’, the idea being that post-industrial capitalism and economic globalization have resulted in ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, and chief amongst the losers in affluent economies have been low-skilled workers. However, evidence from the 2016 US presidential election suggests that the relationship between economic outcomes and populist appeal is far from straightforward (Rothwell & Diego-Rosell, 2016). For example, the median household income for supporters of Hillary Clinton was about $61,000, while for Trump voters it was approximately $72,000 (Silver, 2016). In this case, it was perhaps not the actual socio-economic gap between the haves and have-nots that bred support for Trump but rather the perception that economic prospects were dimming. Despite their relative affluence, some Trump supporters perceived that America was in economic decline and were thus galvanized by his slogan to ‘Make America Great Again’. Another significant demand-side explanation is the cultural backlash theory, which suggests that populist appeal is strong amongst citizens who perceive that they are no longer able to recognize their own national or local community due to immigration and multiculturalism (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Again, these explanations need not be mutually exclusive, and the same groups of voters can often have overlapping perceptions about economic injustice or deterioration and cultural backlash.

Supply-side theories about the appeal of populism have focused on party systems and party competition in national settings. A mainstream party centralization thesis suggests that the perceived ideological centralization of political parties can lead some voters to believe that there are no longer real choices in elections, thus making newer populist alternatives attractive (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995). Another supply-side theory pertains to issue salience, in which fringe political parties can capture the imagination of groups of voters by focussing inordinately on single issues, such as immigration or Euro-skepticism (Meguid, 2005). One can see these supply-side theories coming together with the decline of centre-left and social democratic parties in Europe. These parties have tended to suffer electorally when economic interests or identities (i.e., class politics) begin to compete with ethnic or communal identities (i.e., identity politics). National identity or immigration issues become problematic for the left because right-wing populist parties will remake themselves as more centrist and multidimensional in order to appeal to working-class voters (Berman, 2019). Sheri Berman and others remind us that it does little good to vilify populist voters as just losers or bigots because populism appeals to individuals that have very real grievances (which the left have not dealt with very well). The issue with populism, then, is not that it is a brief anomaly that will go away when populists fail to redress grievances with their oversimplified solutions to complex societal issues. The real problem is that populism often leads to less political participation over time, such that many grievances will not even be heard in the future.

Populism is here to stay because it correlates to representative democracy: as more countries around the world transition to and consolidate as representative democracies, populism will continue to grow globally. However, populism is also an intensely local and contextual ideology, so it is difficult to conceive of populism as being some kind of virulent idea that spreads from one country to the next. At most, populist success in one region might embolden populist leaders and voters in others. Some argue, rather hopefully, that populism reached its highwater mark in 2016 with Brexit and the election of Trump. Indeed, Marine Le Pen’s loss to centrist candidate Emmanuel Macron in the 2017 French presidential election was thought by some to usher in a ‘post-populist’ period later reinforced by Trump’s loss in the 2020 US presidential election. Yet, it is too early to draw such conclusions. Even if populist parties and leaders become
less powerful or less electorally popular in the future, the effects of populism are still being felt. Right-wing populism has reflected (or perhaps spurred) increased feelings of nativism and anti-elitism in countries all around the world. This has now begun to influence conventional political parties and establishment leaders, as mainstream politicians read from the populist playbook to garner support amongst disenchanted voters. As political scientist Yascha Mounk observes, “the past two decades have represented not a populist moment but rather a populist turn – one that will exert significant influence on policy and public opinion for decades to come” (Mounk, 2014, p. 28).

“The Rise of Populism – a different lens?” by Monash University. This video discusses the big ideas in populism, and then looks at populism in Australia.

One or more interactive elements has been excluded from this version of the text. You can view them online here: https://kpu.pressbooks.pub/political-ideologies/?p=724#oembed-1

Discussion Questions

1. In your opinion, does populism have more of a corrective or corrosive effect on democracy?
2. Is Canada immune to the worst effects of populism? Why, or why not?
3. What is the political antidote for right-wing populism? How can conventional politicians appeal to angry voters such that the allure of populism is not so strong?
References


Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, you will be able to:

• Differentiate between the main streams in Islamism;
• Critically discuss and refute the misconceptions about Islam and Islamism;
• Understand how Islamism relates to Islam, and the West.
Islamism and its Relation to Islam and the West: Common Themes and Varieties

DR. SERDAR KAYA

Islam is a monotheistic religion in the Abrahamic tradition, as taught by Muhammad in seventh-century Arabia. Islam's presence in politics is as old as Islam itself, as Muhammad was a spiritual and political leader at the same time. The same is true for the caliphs who led the Muslim community after him. Although the spiritual guidance of even the initial caliphs was never as authoritative as Muhammad's, the political nature of their position was undeniable: they were the rulers of Muslims, and Muslim lands. (For more on Islam, see Box 10.1.)

Box 10.1 – Islam

Islam is a monotheistic religion. Its adherents are called Muslims, and they make up approximately a quarter of the world's population. Muslims consider Islam the successor of earlier Abrahamic faiths such as Judaism and Christianity, and share their primordial assumptions, including their creation myth, where Adam and Eve are central figures. Islam also involves belief in an afterlife, a Heaven, and a Hell.

Therefore, in a general sense, Islam too starts itself with the first man and woman. In a narrow sense, however, Islam started in 610, when, according to Muslims, the archangel Gabriel revealed the first verses of the Quran to Muhammad in Cave Hira, which is located on a mountain outside the city of Mecca in the Arabian peninsula. A 40-year-old merchant at the time, Muhammad used to spend extended periods of time in isolation in that cave, meditating and contemplating. These revelations continued for a little over two decades, or until shortly before Muhammad's death in 632, and they constitute the Quran, the holy book of Islam, which Muslims consider the verbatim word of Allah, which is “The God” in Arabic.

The Quran is the supreme authoritative text of Islam. It mentions, among other things, biblical accounts, including but not limited to those involving Moses, Mary, and Jesus. These accounts are not always in full agreement with those in the Bible, however. For example, according to the Quran, Jesus is not God, or the son of God, but a messenger of God. He is one in a long line of messengers, beginning with Adam, and ending with Muhammad, while including figures such as Abraham, Moses, David and Solomon in between.

The Quran thus reframes and revises some biblical accounts. From a Muslim perspective, however, the Quran actually corrects these accounts. In fact, Muslims consider the Quran not only the latest but also the final message from God. Moreover, they believe its teachings will remain valid until Judgment Day. In that regard, Islam resembles Christianity, according to which, humans have received their final warning, and these are the end times. In other words, life on earth is short and temporary not only for individuals, but also for the human race as a whole. Therefore, what matters primarily is not this life, but the afterlife. After all, according to both Christianity and Islam, this life is, first and foremost, a preparation for the next.

Approximately thirty years after Muhammad, however, the caliphate as an institution came under the control of one dynasty or sultanate after another, where the position would pass from father to son, with little say from the Muslim community. On the one hand, these sultanates used the caliphate primarily as a source of legitimacy, while on the other
expanded Islam's borders, and built major cities and libraries that became places of attraction for scholars from different parts of the world. The Islamic Golden Age (786–1258) under the Abbasid Caliphate is the epitome of that era.

**Caliph (definition)**

The caliph is, roughly, the Muslim equivalent of the pope in the sense that he is the leader of all Muslims in the world. In practice, however, most caliphs in history did not earn but inherit their positions, as one dynasty after another treated it as a hereditary title. Some others militarily defeated an existing caliph, before or after claiming the position for themselves. There are no longer any caliphs with a significant following, since the Republic of Turkey abolished the position in 1924.

**Sultanate (definition)**

Sultanate may refer to (a) the lands ruled by a sultan, (b) the hereditary rule of sultans, or (c) a particular dynasty. A sultan is not very different from a king, especially considering how the authority associated with these two positions varies across historical contexts.

Approximately thirty years after Muhammad, however, the caliphate as an institution came under the control of one dynasty or sultanate after another, where the position would pass from father to son, with little say from the Muslim community. On the one hand, these sultanates used the caliphate primarily as a source of legitimacy, while on the other expanded Islam's borders, and built major cities and libraries that became places of attraction for scholars from different parts of the world. The Islamic Golden Age (786–1258) under the Abbasid Caliphate is the epitome of that era.

Although it has been shaped, controlled, and sometimes even manipulated by such powerful political institutions since its early days, Islam has always remained a major social force, and has influenced the prevalent norms and values in Muslim societies and communities. Caliph-sultans were rulers. They were the leaders of Muslims, but they did not have absolute authority. There were always binding Islamic texts. There were always scholars who studied them. There were always sufimasters with spiritual teachings. In other words, caliph-sultans did not have the authority to interpret Islam single-handedly. On the contrary, even a strong sultan had to respect and follow at least some religious rules and traditions.

Differentiating between Islam and the state has thus been a challenging task; where one ends and the other begins is not always clear. The state and Islam are never the same thing at any point, but they cannot be imagined apart either... This symbiotic structure continued for at least a thousand years, and started to change only after a set of landmark events that extended into centuries: colonialism, the fall of Islamic empires, and the emergence of the nation-state. These experiences radically changed the relations between Islam and the state in Muslim-majority societies, as they led to new types of political regimes that often disrupted the longstanding and well-established arrangements.

The regimes that emerged in the post-colonial or post-sultanate Muslim contexts of the 1900s tended to be nationalist, authoritarian, secular, pro-Western, and oddly-enough, anti-Western. These regimes were anti-Western in that they were anti-colonialist. In fact, many of them emerged out of independence movements. Yet, these regimes
were pro-Western at the same time in that their leaders were often educated in Western or Western-style institutions, socialized into a Western lifestyle, and adopted the political ideologies that were in fashion in the Western world at the time: secularism and nationalism. They were convinced that secular nationalism was superior to other political ideologies, and that it had contributed significantly to the wealth and power of the West, so they wished to model the regimes of their newly-independent countries after their Western countries of choice.

These post-colonial or post-imperial regimes turned out to be highly authoritarian, however. The absence of democratic norms and institutions left these regimes with significant powers, and accountable to no one. There were few checks or balances, if any. There were no longer political or religious institutions with any real power or authority. There was no longer a caliphate. There never was a particularly strong civil society. There were no international norms or institutions that offered protections against human rights violations. On the contrary, fascism was on the rise in Europe, and some of the worst crimes against humanity were about to be perpetrated.

Under the circumstances, the secular elite in Muslim-majority contexts produced leader-oriented authoritarian regimes. Militant- or soldier-turned rulers in Egypt, Turkey, and other places created secular dictatorships of sorts. The new elites imposed secularism and nationalism on their traditional societies. Both ideologies were unfriendly to Islam, but the secular leaders were determined to bring about change. They thus unsettled long-standing religious institutions. Turkey abolished the Caliphate. Egypt modernized Al-Azhar University. New religious institutions emerged. The Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey employed and groomed a new and regime-friendly religious elite. In this new era, Islam came under the control of secular and authoritarian elites, as did many other aspects of public and private life. Only the military concerned the unaccountable political elites, as coups were a constant threat.

Although Islamism emerged in the 1800s as a reaction to Western colonialism, it developed during the 1900s in the context of such ruthless regimes. In fact, many conservative Muslims considered secular nationalism to perpetuate Western colonization, politically and culturally. The rivalry between secular nationalism and Islamism is thus critical to understanding the politics of many Muslim-majority societies. Islamists primarily advocated for respect for religious values, and stronger ties to other Muslim-majority nations, but that was not all. They emphasized social justice, freedom, equality, and sometimes even democracy, among other things. They formed associations, charities, political parties, and other institutions, to the extent their respective regimes allowed them to do so. These institutions taught the Quran and preached piety, but they also fed the hungry and helped the needy. These social activities helped Islamists gain the trust of large populations in the absence of a strong welfare state.

The Islamist discourse against secular authoritarianism was convincing to many. Islamists were thus able to create a large base of sympathizers. They were sometimes even able to find common ground and form coalitions with secular left-wing groups, who were equally critical of authoritarianism, arbitrary rule, social injustices, and severe human rights violations. For example, Islamists and leftists were allied during the civil resistance and demonstrations against the Shah regime in Iran before the 1979 Revolution, which brought Ruhollah Khomeini to power. While these experiences vary across Muslim-majority contexts, national identity and the place of Islam in social and political affairs have always been central to political debates in the Muslim world.
Islamism takes many shapes and forms. When broadly defined, it refers to any social, political or economic policy position inspired by Islamic texts, traditions, or values. Accordingly, in the same broad sense, an Islamist is someone who “believes that Islam has something important to say about how political and social life should be constituted and who attempts to implement that interpretation in some way” (Fuller, 2003, p. 47).

**Common misconceptions debunked.**

- **“Most Muslims are Arabs.”**

  Less than a third of Muslims are Arabs, but people often hear about Arabs and Islam in the same context for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to wars in the Middle East, and the way these wars are usually covered by the mainstream media or Hollywood movies. Regardless, Arabs are a large linguistic community with diverse groups of members around the world, though Arabic is spoken predominantly in the Middle East and North Africa. Most Arabs are Muslims, but many belong to a variety of other faiths, primarily Christianity. It is important to remember that Judaism, Christianity and Islam were all born in the Middle East, so a large number of Arabs being Christian is common knowledge in the Middle East.

- **“Muslims live in the Middle East.”**

  The majority of Muslims live in the Asia-Pacific region, although there are Muslims in all parts of the world. Only 20 percent live in the Middle East and North Africa. Indonesia in southeast Asia has the largest Muslim population at 230 million. Then comes India, which is an interesting case in that it is not a Muslim-majority country, but is home to more than 200 million Muslims. About a quarter of the world's Muslims live in Indonesia or India.

- **“Muslims are violent.”**

  On the one hand, many people are violent, and some of them happen to be Muslims, but on the other, some of the violence in the world is religiously inspired, and Muslims have their share of violent adherents. Violent Muslims do exist, but they are almost categorically a subset of fundamentalist Islamists, who are a subset of Islamists, who are a subset of all Muslims, nominal or devout.

- **“Muslims subdue women.”**

  Abrahamic scriptures are not always friendly to women by modern standards. They advise women to be quiet (1 Corinthians 14: 34, 1 Timothy 2: 11), to be obedient (Ephesians 5: 22–24, Colossians 3:18, Titus 2:3–5, 1 Peter 3: 1–6), and to dress modestly (1 Corinthians 11: 2–7). The Quran follows the same tradition (Baqarah 228, 282, Nur 31, Ahzaab 59). It is largely modernists who argue for a non-literal reading of the above texts. Modernists are not necessarily feminists, but all feminists are in the modernist camp. In all, Islamist positions on this issue also vary significantly by country and camp, as the spectrum of Islamism is quite large. The sex slaves of ISIS are not urban legends. They are real, albeit extremely rare and shocking to people, including most Muslims around the world. Yet, there are also feminist Muslim women who choose to dress modestly, and some of them wear a
headscarf. People sometimes attach very different meanings to the same phenomena, and accordingly come to interpret the same things very differently. A careful study of Muslim cultures is thus key to a more accurate understanding of these meanings and perspectives, as well as the political ideologies they sometimes translate into.

This general framework covers most Islamists in the world. However, there is no consensus on a particular interpretation of Islam, let alone a particular method to implement that interpretation. There is rather a wide variety of movements that derive their inspiration primarily from Islam, yet vary in terms of their teachings, activities, organizational structures, and goals. Nevertheless, most groups exhibit specific types of family resemblance, allowing us to place the vast majority of Islamists in one of the following three camps: traditionalists, fundamentalists, and modernists.

Traditionalists are the largest of the three camps. Islam is important to traditionalists, because they consider it a part of their culture and identity, and respect it as such. Traditionalists are aware the times have changed, so they accept most contemporary social and political arrangements, and do not react to them, unless these arrangements are fundamentally opposed to their religious values. Traditionalists are not violent, and they distance themselves from Islamist groups that aim to disrupt the political order.

Fundamentalists and modernists are much smaller in size, but some of those in the former camp are more widely known around the world, as they are under the spotlight more often, due to their controversial views and activities. Fundamentalists are the most puritanical, the most orthodox, and accordingly the most socially conservative of the three camps. They are not necessarily violent, however. Puritanism and orthodoxy often come in a variety of violent and peaceful forms. Still, it is important to note that Sayyid Qutb's emphasis on an Islamic state have led to a degree of radicalization in some streams within the fundamentalist camp in the mid 1900s, followed by other similar influences in the following decades. (For more on Qutb, and his critical importance to Islamism, see Box 10.2.)
Qutb was a thinker from Egypt. He was a central figure in the development of Islamism as a political ideology. He is the author of the influential book Milestones (Ma'alim Fi Al-Tariq), which was published in 1964, and has since shaped the way Muslim generations around the world think about Islam, as well as its place in their lives and the world.

What Qutb essentially did in Milestones was share his interpretation of the world as a Muslim thinker. The world Qutb saw around him was an unjust one, so he prescribed an Islamic response to it. The 1960s was a time when most Muslim lands were gaining independence after long and exploitative periods of Western colonialism. This anti-Western climate had a major influence on Qutb's ideology.

From Qutb's perspective, the West was the enemy for more reasons than one. The West was the colonizer. It was the Crusader. It was the wellspring of materialist and secular ideas. It was the place where the authoritarian secular governments in the Muslim world drew their inspirations from, and imposed secular laws on Muslims. To Qutb, this was unacceptable, embarrassing, and anti-Islamic. Yet, most Muslims of the twentieth century did not see things as he did, and Qutb argued that they were merely sociological Muslims who actually knew little about Islam. He claimed that they were in ignorance (jahiliyya), which is a mental state the traditional Islamic narrative attributes to the pagan Arabs of the pre-Islamic era. Furthermore, Qutb believed that his Muslim contemporaries were too ignorant to even have a problem with the unIslamic policies of their authoritarian secular governments. Why would they otherwise be complacent to live in nation-states, which Qutb considered a form of idolatry? Why would they otherwise identify primarily with their respective nations, which, to Qutb, were unIslamic communities based on ethnicity? Why would they abide by secular laws, which Qutb believed constituted a rebellion against the authority of God? Qutb believed that only Islam could set Muslims free from this state of ignorance, but he stressed that this could not happen, unless Muslims experienced an intellectual awakening, overthrew their authoritarian governments, and established an Islamic state that would replace secular laws with Islamic ones (Qutb 1964).

In all, Qutb's Milestones was a manifesto of Islamism. It was a call for offensive jihad. It convinced Islamic movements in different countries of the need for an Islamic state, and led them to embrace that objective. The book did not invent Islamism. Many before him had ascribed a central role to Islam in social and political life. Still, Qutb left his mark, and Islamism has never been the same after him, and especially after Milestones.

Qutb died at the age of 59. The Nasser regime in Egypt had him executed by hanging in 1966 by hanging. He was accused of participating in the assassination attempt on Nasser. Qutb's execution at the hands of a secular authority elevated him to the level of martyr in the eyes of many devout Muslims around the world. His ideas influenced many if not most Islamic movements worldwide, and brought issues that revolve around Sharia law and the Islamic state closer to the centre of debates. (For a more detailed account of Qutb and his life, please see Calvert, 2009).

Finally, the modernist camp has its roots in the early efforts to reconcile Islam with modernity. Commenced in Egypt and India in the late 1800s, these efforts involve the reinterpretation of Islam's primary sources through contemporary lenses so as to formulate a political ideology that protects civil rights, and promotes social and economic progress. After about a century and a half, the propositions of modernists are now more varied in content. Most modernists still try
to remain within an Islamic framework, but some tend to be reformists, and thus have less conservative views on social issues. Despite these differences, generally speaking, modernists today tend to emphasize the importance of reason, and favour at least some degree of separation between politics and Islam. For example, contrary to fundamentalists, modernists argue that imposing authentic Islam on contemporary societies is problematic for a variety of reasons, including Islamic ones. They quote from the Quran, “There is no compulsion in religion” (2: 256). They indicate that historical reports from the first century of Islam are often inaccurate, if not outright fabrications. They underline that contemporary Muslims and Muslim-majority societies vary in terms of religious faith, denomination, piety, and practice. They recognize that not all members of Muslim-majority societies are Muslims, not all Muslims are religious, and not all religious Muslims consider it a requirement to live the way the first Muslims did about 1,400 years ago. Based on the above facts, modernists argue that a liberal democracy is the best form of government available for contemporary Muslims, as it protects religious Muslims against secular dictatorships, and nominal Muslims, non-conforming Muslims, non-Muslims and others against Islamic theocracies. After all, a liberal democracy imposes neither religion nor non-religion on citizens. (For more on the three camps, see Fuller, 2003, p. 47-60.)
10.2 Islamism in Contemporary Contexts

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All three camps tend to prescribe a set of social and political arrangements, but public support for these arrangements varies widely. Islamist propositions do not always align well with public opinion. More importantly, Islamism is not the only game in town in Muslim-majority societies. Albeit influential, Islamism is far from being without rivals in the marketplace of ideas. In fact, none of these three camps necessarily constitute a majority even in overwhelmingly-Muslim societies. After all, not all Muslims in Muslim-majority societies are Islamists, and not all Islamists are equally close to the political center of their respective societies.

Islam and Violence: Key differentiations

- Islam and Islamism are two different things. Islam is a 1400-year-old religion with a diverse heritage that reflects on culture, values, customs, arts, and architecture, among other things. Islamism, however, is a political ideology that took shape largely in the 1900s. Accordingly, all Islamists are Muslims, but only a minority of Muslims are Islamists.
- Jihad is an Islamic concept that may have spiritual or violent connotations, depending on context. Jihadism, however, is a neologism. In particular, salafi jihadism refers to and underlines the fundamentalist salafi theology of most contemporary jihadist groups (Kepel 2002).
- Most armed Islamist groups today subscribe to a salafi theology, but most salafi Muslims are not violent. Orthodoxy does not necessarily go hand in hand with violence. Therefore, when studying Islamists or other ideological groups, it is best not to combine categories. Orthodoxy, fundamentalism, traditionalism, devoutness, and piety are separate categories, and each may have their violent and peaceful variants. For example, an Islamist group with an extremist ideology may very well reject violence, and engage in peaceful activities only — for tactical or religious reasons. Hizb ut-Tahrir is one example. Yet, other groups may participate peacefully in the democratic process, while maintaining militia forces. Hezbollah in Lebanon is one example, and Hamas in Palestine is another.
- Time is another important dimension. Like people, institutions too evolve. An Islamist group may denounce violence at one point, and become strictly peaceful. Divisions may also appear at critical junctures in time, where an emerging faction may push a more or less peaceful policy.
- Ignoring the above differentiations and similar others may easily lead to the mistake of perceiving Islamists in fewer typologies than actually exist. Different Islamist groups exist on the violent and peaceful ends of the political violence spectrum, and in all shades of grey in between.

Almost a quarter of the world population is of Muslim background, so Muslims come from all walks of life, and it is not rare for them to politically identify as nationalists, secularists, environmentalists, liberals, or socialists, among other things. Most contemporary Muslims connect with their religion in a variety of social, cultural and institutional settings, but they do not necessarily make Islam a substantial part of their politics. Furthermore, Muslims of the twenty-first century are increasingly secular, and many are cultural or nominal Muslims only. In fact, recent surveys indicate that, even in a seemingly-conservative country like Iran, about half of the population is now religiously unaffiliated, and only 37% believe in an afterlife (Maleki and Arab, 2020). In other words, the aforementioned traditionalist, fundamentalist,
and modernist camps exist merely in the Islamist sphere, which is a subset of the larger Muslim sphere that includes non-practicing and non-religious Muslims, among others. Moreover, even the larger Muslim sphere is a subset of the society as a whole, which usually includes the adherents of a variety of minority religions, as well as the religiously unaffiliated. As a result, depending on the political context, Islamists develop different strategies to increase their influence. They look for ways to respond to local realities better, and appeal to larger groups of people. That said, establishing some type of an Islamic state remains the objective of most, due to Qutb’s long shadow. Still, there is rarely if ever a consensus over what an Islamic state should and should not involve. It is the rule rather than the exception for members of even the same Islamist groups to have only a vague idea about the intricate details of Islamic governance. Yet, the dream lives on...

Nevertheless, some unexpected developments in the late 1900s have created a number of unprecedented offshoots from Qutbian jihadism. After the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan, Islamists from a variety of countries traveled there to join the resistance. Upon victory, however, many felt they should remain in Afghanistan to establish an Islamic state, even though that was not a part of the plan in the beginning.

The experience of international fighters joining forces in a Muslim-majority country to create an Islamic state led to a new, global approach to jihad. It was a paradigm shift, of which Al-Qaeda was a result. Qutbian jihadism thus extended to the global level. This is perhaps best illustrated by the way Al-Qaeda differentiates between the near enemy and the far enemy. Al-Qaeda’s near enemy is the secular regimes in the Muslim world, which Qutb primarily focused on. Al-Qaeda’s far enemy is the United States, followed by other Western powers with a military presence in the Muslim world.

Al-Qaeda propagates a leaderless form of organization that guides lone wolves, or small packs of wolves, around the world to wage war on anti-Islamic targets. This method was laid out in a 1,600-page e-book entitled *The Global Islamic Resistance Call* (Al-Suri, 2004), which earned its author the title of “the architect of global jihad” (Lia, 2008). Along with other documents such as Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri’s *General Guidelines for Jihad*, a whole new perspective on Islamic revival emerged.

This method is prone to creating offshoot groups, some of which end up even more radical than their precedents. ISIS is perhaps the most extreme example to date. Gilles Kepel (2002) characterizes this new variant of jihad as Salafi jihadism, which refers to the concept of jihad, as interpreted by Salafi fundamentalists of the twentieth century. Most people know Islamism largely by this most violent subgroup of the fundamentalist camp.

**Salafism (definition)**

Salafism is a school of thought in Sunni Islam, according to which the Muslims of the first two centuries of Islam represent the religion in its purest form, as they learned directly or indirectly from Muhammad or his companions. Religious Muslims of all denominations have always shared this adherence to the early communities of believers, but the Salafi Movement goes beyond adherence and advocates the revival of the social, political, economic, legal and moral practices of the early communities.

To sum up, Islamism is more a spectrum than a well-defined political ideology. It is not an ambiguous idea, but it is not necessarily coherent across political contexts either. About six decades after Qutb’s *Milestones*, Islamism is still largely composed of a set of social and political propositions that are for the most part shaped in response to local realities, Muslim-majority or otherwise. The globalization of jihad has been the only exception to this rule, albeit a salient one that merits attention.
1. Is Islam usually a unifying or dividing factor in the politics of Muslim-majority nations? Why?
2. Which of the three forms of Islamism, if any, can operate peacefully and become a part of a multiculturalist society? Why?
3. The views of fundamentalist and modernist camps on women and gender issues are less nuanced, and thus more straight-forward. The views of traditionalists, however, vary widely within and across national contexts. How do traditionalists influence policy decisions toward women and sexual minorities, especially since they are the largest and thus the most influential of the three camps? How do women and gender issues overlap with religion in Muslim communities and societies in general? And in what ways have social norms changed in the Muslim world in recent decades?
4. To what extent do people draw their moral and ethical values from religion? How do their differences in value judgments influence the debates pertaining to the social and political spheres? What are the similarities and differences of these countless debates in different countries and cultures around the world, Islamic or otherwise? And what about the Western world, where divisive policy issues also tend to have a religious dimension?
5. Liberal democracies involve not only freedom of religion, but also freedom from religion. Is it possible to simultaneously protect these two freedoms in political contexts, Muslim-majority or otherwise, where religiously-motivated voters are large enough to influence election results.
This chapter is but a very short introduction to Islamism. On the one hand, the chapter summarizes the birth and growth of Islamism as an ideology and movement in a variety of contexts, but on the other, each individual case has peculiarities that short and general summaries such as this one cannot capture. Further readings are thus necessary to appreciate the complexity of Islamism. Variations across and within national contexts are among the first to be aware of. So are key scholastic and political movements, such as Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood, whose influence and membership often transcend beyond national borders (Al-Anani, 2016; Baron, 2014; Meijer, 2013). Also important are key figures and ideologues such as Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838/1839–1897), Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), Ruhollah Khomeini (1900–1989), Abul Ala Maududi (1903–1979), Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949), Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani (1914–1999), and many others. Some familiarity with the above figures, phenomena, and the involved debates and intricacies is necessary for a full introduction to Islamism.


PART XI
CONFUCIANISM: A LIVING IDEOLOGY

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, you will be able to:

• Identify and describe the four main tenets of Confucianism;
• Explain the importance of Confucianism for the four tigers;
• Discuss and analyze the rise of Asian states and the impact of and for Confucianism.
The rapid and dramatic economic rise of the People's Republic of China, and also the four Dragons/Tigers, i.e. Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, has brought greater attention to the political and social aspects of Confucianism in the 20th and 21st centuries. Like other ideologies, Confucianism places emphasis on the individual and their relation to society. This is an ancient ideology that has foundations in imperial China. This ideology had its golden years in the past and has re-emerged in the present in attempts to explain the phenomenal growth of entities in Southeast Asia and East Asia. Through its social and political influences on the individual, this ideology has become associated with the economic successes of a multitude of countries in Southeast Asia and East Asia. The practitioners of the initial version as well as the variants of Confucianism have created the need to understand this ideology.

The 21st century has been argued to be the Asian century. The global economic order is slowly changing. Western economies are no longer setting the agenda, as Asian economies are gaining momentum and eagerly waiting for the opportunity to lead the world economically, potentially even creating a different world order. What has led to this change? It has been the combination of a central idea from an ideology as well as the practitioners of that central idea that put into practice the core values of Confucianism.

Thus, we need to understand some of the ideals, virtues, and concepts of Confucianism in relation to the economic and political development of these Asian entities. Many observers have attributed the success of Confucian countries (China, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong) to their common cultural values, such as respect for authority, loyalty to good leaders, a preference for order, hard work, careful spending and an emphasis on education. These attributes are all cornerstones of the ideology.
11.1 Overview of the ideology

DR. LOGAN MASILAMANI

As the term Confucianism indicates, this ideology originated with Confucius, an ancient Chinese scholar. The resurgence of Confucianism in China and the rest of Asia is a phenomenon worthy of discussion and reflection. Confucianism was the primary cultural tradition of the Chinese civilization for more than 2,000 years.

Confucius (551–479 BC) was a philosopher, teacher, and politician who predated many of the Greek philosophers that initiated Western philosophy and political thought. The Confucian school of thought, or Confucianism, takes its name from him. Confucius wanted to restore the order of the past by encouraging incumbent kings to follow the example of ancient sage kings. Confucius is not the only prominent philosopher in the Confucian tradition. His ideas were further developed by Mencius (c. 372–289 BC), Xunzi (ca. 310–235 BC), and many other brilliant scholars and politicians throughout subsequent Chinese history. Not only is Confucianism a major system of thought in China, as it is also one of the most influential ideologies in the world and provides profound insights into human nature and human conduct. Confucius valued learning and devoted his life to education and teaching.

Confucius had many ideas about the individual and how society should function for the greater good. Unlike other ideologies, Confucianism is optimistic about the individual and his/her relationship to society. This optimism can be seen in many of the writings and quotes from his time. Further, simple observations about human nature are central to this ideology. As we will see, most of Confucius’s ideas and teachings were simple to understand and largely practical.

The most ancient source of Confucianism is the golden rule in the Analects, a collection of sayings attributed to Confucius and other disciples. The Analects also contain brief dialogues between Confucius and his students. Character achievement is the dominant concern in the Analects, and Confucius openly remarks on his own deficiencies, his progress, and the qualities he securely possesses. He was an excellent teacher of what values should be taken into greater consideration.

During the rule of Mao Zedong, Confucianism was not a prominent ideology and was banned in China. Mao was attracted to the Communist ideology and eventually created a sub-strand of Communism called Maoism. Throughout much of Chinese history the role of Confucianism, like Buddhism and Taoism, has been marginalized. Religion was unnecessary under the Communist rule of Mao. Mao was fully immersed in Communism, and he undervalued the importance of Confucianism in China. This was a significant mistake on the part of Mao, as the failures of the Great Leap Forward Movement and the Cultural Revolution were largely due to Mao’s emphasis on Communism/Maoism. Millions of Chinese deaths could be blamed on this adherence to Maoism during this time. Maoism failed to industrialize or unite the people of China. Mao’s constant political campaigns and insensitivity to the needs of his people created widespread devastation in China.

Confucianism re-emerged as a dominant ideological force with the dynamic economic and political development of the eventual Four Dragons/Tigers and then with the rule of Deng Xiaoping of China in the late 1970s. Deng was more of a forward thinker than Mao. Mao had imprisoned Deng Xiaoping and wanted him to be indoctrinated with Maoist ideals. Deng, on the other hand, believed that there was a way to industrialize China without a strong dependence on Communism/Maoist ideology. Deng understood that if China did not change economically as soon as possible, it would become a failed country, similar to what eventually happened to the former Soviet Union. Deng studied what could be used to restart the Chinese economic and political engine to bring greater industrialization as soon as possible for
China. To do so, he cultivated a period of significant economic growth for China based on a philosophy of Communism combined with Chinese characteristics. Deng visited Southeast Asia when he became the leader of China and concluded that there was significant value in revisiting Confucianism as an ideology for his own country. One of the countries that Deng was attracted to was Singapore. Singapore became independent in 1965 even though it was a backward ex-colonial country with few or no economic resources. Luckily for that tiny country it had a forward-looking leader that used some of the tenets of Confucianism to create an economic miracle. Singapore's first prime minister, Lee Kwan Yew, an overseas Chinese, was a strong supporter of Confucianism as an economic and political ideology. Lee managed to embed some of the main principles of Confucianism into Singapore’s economic and political blueprint. Some of Lee’s core ideas and values can still be seen in Singapore at the present time.

Deng was impressed with the Singapore’s economic growth, which had occurred within only a decade from its independence. Therefore, he mirrored some of the social and economic values that had brought such economic and political growth to Singapore. The adoption of these values marked the re-establishment of Confucianism as the main ideology in the People's Republic of China. Confucianism seemed compatible with the remnants of Communist/Maoist values in China. Deng invited Singapore’s investment companies to invest in special economic zones in China to show the Chinese how to industrialize. Some scholars have argued that this was the spark that has led to the immense economic success that China enjoys today. Strangely, the pre-emergence of Confucianism in China had to take an indirect route by traveling to another country and then returning to its place of origin.

As we will see in the next few sections of this chapter, Confucianism can be seen as a social, political and economic doctrine. It is an encompassing ideology that has moral and ethical implications to the individual and society. Confucius, like many other scholars, studied the relationship between nature and humans. Some of the main ideals of Confucianism have deep roots in the natural elements of society. Let us take a deeper look into different facets of Confucianism from the past and how it relates to the present time.
Confucianism has many social and political components. This section will discuss some of the main tenets of the ideology from the individual's perspective. Then, the individual's perspective will be related to the entire society. The study of an individual's ego was central to Confucius and his strong belief that the ego is at the heart of many issues for the individual and society as a whole. In this section, we will examine some of the core tenets of Confucianism based on theory and practice over time. This will not be an exhausting exploration of all aspects of the ideology but will bring to the forefront some of the most significant aspects of Confucianism and how it relates to a society and its economy.

A clear sense of the golden rule can be gained from the following dialogue. Tzu-kung asked, “Is there one word which can serve as the guiding principle for conduct throughout one’s life?” Confucius said, “It is the word ‘altruism’ (shu). Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you.” (Analects 15.23) This is similar to the main tenets of other religions, but Confucius was primarily concerned with the relationship between the individual's actions and society. Confucianism, like many other ideologies, has had different variants and influences. There have been many contributors to the main ideology, and it has had many manifestations.

Like other ideologies, Confucianism believes that the core to change is human nature. But unlike other ideologies, Confucianism lingers longer on the core values of human nature. The individual good is strongly related to the collective good. Here, Confucianism can be seen as a set of religious doctrines that encourage the individual to become better not only for himself/herself but for the greater community.
11.2.1 The Ideal of the Commonwealth/Collective Good

DR. LOGAN MASILAMANI

One of the main ideals of Confucianism is the notion of the collective good. This tenet prevails in all aspects of society; it is somewhat similar to Communism, but also different in nature, as it extends the concepts of core familial ties to the entire society. The welfare of the society is more important than one singular individual in that society.

One of Confucianism's most important texts, the Book of Rites (Legge, 1967, pp. 364–66), describes the ideal of commonwealth under the rule of a benevolent king as follows:

> When the Great Way prevails, the world is shared by all. The virtuous and competent are elected to serve the public. Mutual confidence is fostered, and good neighborliness cultivated. Hence, people do not regard as parents only their own parents, nor do they treat as children only their own children. Provision is secured for the aged till death, employment for the adults, and development for the young.... Therefore, people don't engage in intrigue or trickery, nor do they engage in robbery, theft and rebellion.... This is called the age of commonwealth.

There are three different periods in this ideology: the turbulent age, the prosperous age, and the peaceful age. Confucius lived in the turbulent age. Therefore, he believed that through economic and political development a society will arrive to the peaceful age based on the understanding and belief of the collective being more essential than the individual good. This is a central disparity between many Western ideologies and Confucianism.

However, the ideal of commonwealth can be achieved only in a peaceful age when everyone loves everyone else as his own family and political power is always exercised by the virtuous and the competent rather than the heirs of the royal family. Here, we see that common individual needs are imbued with ideal morals to create a peaceful age. The virtuous individual is more important than the virtues of the ruling class.

The collective good was extremely important for Confucius and his thinking. In societies such as South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, such norms have created a working class with high levels of communal understanding and productivity. Individuals in these societies have been taught since a young age that the greater good is more important than the good of the individual. This has created a working class that is highly productive and very efficient, thereby creating economies that have high levels of efficiency and a cohesive working class.

Further, this notion of the collective good can be seen in the economic and social spheres in the Four Dragons through an extremely high savings rate. The high personal savings rates in these entities have steadily increased for the last five decades. Economic experts have maintained that such high savings rates have been a contributing factor to the greater economic development of these societies.
11.2.2 Benevolent Government

DR. LOGAN MASILAMANI

This leads us to Confucius’s advocacy for the concept of benevolence and benevolent government. He defines “benevolence” in many ways, but the most famous definition states the need “to return to the observance of the rites through overcoming” (Analects 12:1). This is again a reference to overlooking the needs of the individual in favor of the needs of the collective.

Thus, the individual ethical value of goodness creates a commonwealth that produces collective good. As a result, there is benevolence on the part of both the governed and the government. The nature of this tenet is highly important, as it is the foundation of Confucianism and its implications for society. A good and benevolent society fosters mutual trust between the individual and government.

Like the Greek philosophers, Confucius had to grapple with the issue of good governance and what was its role. His answer was the concept of benevolence. The point of departure from the Greeks was that Confucius believed that both the governed and the government should have the same type of morals and/or ethics. No special class was born to lead. The government comes from the people. The regimented Greek categories of rulers and the ruled are not present in Confucianism. Benevolence is not only the moral relationship of the family, but also the political relationships among society. Benevolence emphasized that in any social structure people should love others from the bottom of their hearts instead of relying on external force.

The teachings of Confucius regarding the virtue of benevolence influenced many Eastern and Western philosophers. Confucianism became a source of inspiration particularly among the philosophers of the Enlightenment (e.g., Voltaire) and the Chinese Hui Muslims. It also influenced modern Chinese movements such as the New Life Movement as well as martial arts culture in China.

Confucius also taught that cultivating benevolence helps when facing hardship and distress, e.g., living in material poverty for a long time. Similarly, people who do not cultivate benevolence cannot achieve a peaceful life for a long time. On the other hand, those who are guided by benevolence regard it as the greatest source of happiness in life. According to Confucius teachings, a wise person views benevolence as the most beneficial life norm.
11.2.3 The Rule of Virtue

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This main tenet of virtue within the ideology can be seen to correlate with the notion of a greater propensity for authoritarianism or the more stringent control of a central government. Confucius believed that to ensure stability and control within a society, a strong sense of virtue is needed. Although each individual has his own way of doing things, Confucius believed that as long as each individual undertakes a virtuous path, it will result in the common good for the whole society. According to Confucius, the notion of “tao” is translated to the way. Virtue is the core value that encompasses an individual. An individual that is virtuous will find the “tao” or way to create happiness and prosperity not only for himself or herself but for their entire community. That is the responsibility of the virtuous individual. “If a man is [virtuously] correct in his own person, then there will be obedience without orders being given” (Analects 13:6).

Confucius believed that a virtuous person could transform others to also be virtuous in society. Family and filial piety are also important concepts within this ideology. The family is the core organizational unit within this ideology together with the concept of filial piety. Confucius believed that individuals should look after the aged within the family unit. According to him, this is virtuous behaviour and is a basic moral and core obligation of relationships within the family unit. It has to be stressed that this core value is translated into a moral obligation today in many of the countries that profess to use Confucianism as a guiding principle. Another cornerstone that can extend from the notion of filial piety is respect for elders. This is one of the central beliefs of this ideology. In a typical Chinese society, the elders would lead with the respect of the younger generation. This is a common observation in most Asian societies. The right to lead is not only guaranteed by age, but also by virtue, wisdom and benevolence. Confucius also believed in the notion of good behaviour of an individual.
11.2.4 The Practice of Meritocracy

DR. LOGAN MASILAMANI

In ancient China, people who wanted to serve as officials had to pass a civil service examination, which was a complex but fair system of competition. Meritocracy is another fundamental attribute of Confucianism. Merit versus the notion of patronage has been an issue in a multitude of societies. The examinations focused on Confucian classics, poetry, literature, calligraphy, and policy argument. Variance in the curriculum existed in different periods, but it was generally believed that individuals in good command of Confucian classics (especially the Four Books) would be virtuous and incorruptible officials. This demonstrates the emphasis on an individual's capacity to understand and practice proper concepts as initiated by Confucius. Confucius strongly believed that to undertake the moral and practical obligation of steering a society, and individual would have to understand the ethical and moral obligations of his ideology.

In the Confucian view, rulers, as individuals, should strive to become outstanding individuals of the good life for other people to follow. Governments must be appropriately institutionalized to formulate proper policies and conduct suitable administrations to promote people’s well-being. Accordingly, the Confucian view of government can fit into the formal definition of a political meritocracy.

Rather than patronage, this ideology believes in the high moral standards of merit. This reflects how many of the countries in East Asia and Southeast Asia employ stringent tests and examinations in all parts of their citizens' lives. Singapore, for example, still employs standardized examinations for grade three students onwards. This aims to create a well-disciplined individual that is used to the concept of merit rather than the notion of patronage to achieve a higher standard of living for the individual and also the collective society.

Singapore's merit system is also part of the political system. A special brand of individual comprises the core government officials in Singapore who create policies. Based on merit, these individuals become “technocrats” who are trained to become leaders. This is a contemporary example of the Confucian practice of meritocracy. Western scholars have also actively looked at this concept of merit and the political system (for more on meritocracy, see chapter 3 on liberalism in this textbook).

The by-product of relying on merit is an attempt to eradicate the systemic and visible corruption in a society. To a great extent, a strong belief in patronage in some societies can lead to the development of corrupted institutions and processes. Thus, a strong adherence to a system fundamentally built on the notion of merit can eradicate corruption and the economic and political inefficiencies that come along with it.
11.3 Confucianism today and the future of the ideology

DR. LOGAN MASILAMANI

The main driver of present-day Confucianism has been the economic prosperity it has delivered to China, the Four Dragons/Tigers and other countries in Southeast Asia and East Asia. These countries have had very successful modern economies. Further, such economic development strategies have been emulated by other countries in the region. Although they do not subscribe to some of the fundamental elements of Confucianism, these other countries have used some of its secondary economic tenets to prosper. Being successful on the economic side of things highlights the fact that these societies have welcomed and embraced a form of Confucianism in many ways.

Thus, it seems that Confucianism has a bright future for many centuries to come. The advocates of New Confucianism are confident in the superiority of Confucianism to Western moral philosophy, but they are also ready to acknowledge the value of Western democracy as a political institution. They are thus attempting to combine Confucianism and democracy in a creative way so that the blended formula can preserve Confucian ethics and democratize politics at the same time.

A practical question that is often asked is whether there a place for this ideology in the modern world. The answer should be a resounding yes. The Asian century could not have taken place without relying on Confucianism as an ideology either in part or whole. The economic blossoming of the Four Dragons/Tigers and China did not take place accidentally; it occurred because of the use of some of the main tenets of Confucianism. I think a more interesting question would be whether Confucianism can co-exist with Western thought and ideals. Scholars in various countries are currently asking this question as well.

Confucian values have become synonymous with Asian values. Thus, there seems to great practical use of the main tenets of the ideology. I would also mention that the foundational notion of various Asian religions makes it easier to accommodate the tenets of Confucianism. In Singapore, political leaders have cautioned Singaporeans against assimilating alien values and becoming a pseudo-Western society. They have called for a set of national principles based on Asian values to guide Singaporeans into the next century.

Confucianism has a significant place compared with other ideologies of the past and the future. It is based on good human values and extends to building a good society. It has been used by societies to build cohesive entities that emphasize greater economic and social well-being. These ideas and concepts are simple in nature and easy to adopt, but like other ideologies the implementation of such ideas is the most important aspect. Thus, in the case of Confucianism, the leaders of the ideology have convinced the masses of the benefits of following Confucian ideals and practicing them day to day. Via campaigns, like in Singapore, to policies, as is the case in China, Confucianism has become entrenched in many of the countries in the Asian region. It has been so well executed in these countries that other countries are trying to establish their own well-being and economic prosperity based on Confucianism.

Further, the ideas and concepts professed by Confucius have been used by various Eastern and Western scholars. Concepts such as virtue, merit, good governance and benevolence can be seen within the ideologies of many other scholars. This demonstrates how this ancient ideology has tremendous relevance in the present day. Either directly or indirectly, Confucianism has a place in the modern world and should be studied from multiple perspectives. Confucius's simple ideas can be connected to real life through contemporary examples.

Here is a short video on Confucius and Confucianism:
Discussion Questions

1. Can China find a form of sustainable governance other than either the current authoritarian order or Western democratic institutions?
2. Is Confucianism the ultimate solution for the political, social, and moral problems China faces today?
3. What would be the best scheme for combining Confucianism and liberal democracy if their reconciliation is inevitable?
4. How can China avoid the shortcomings of Western democracy if it is to undergo democratization?
5. Can Confucianism contribute to Western democracy and world politics? And if so, in what way?
References


Learning Objectives

At the end of the chapter, you will be able to:

- Explain what is the green theory;
- Critically define climate change;
- Assess the various threats climate change poses;
- Discuss the best course of action to deal with the climate crisis.
The Environment: Theory and Human Security

DR. ROSS PINK

In this chapter, we turn to one of the greatest crisis of our times, the climate crisis. First, we will look at green theory and what it means to put nature at the centre of analysis. Then, we will look into details at the climate change and its impact on human security. This section will look at various threats that come with climate change: economic, health, political and many others. Finally, it will be pondered what is the way forward.
12.1 The basics of green theory

The basics of green theory has been adapted by Valérie Vézina from Green Theory by Hugh C. Dyer, a chapter in International Relations Theory and is licensed under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license, except where otherwise noted.

In the 1960s there was public recognition of the global environmental crisis arising from the ‘tragedy of the commons’, which is the idea that as self-interested individuals, humans will overuse shared resources such as land, fresh water and fish. In the 1970s the first United Nations conference on the subject was held and by the 1980s green political parties and public policies had emerged. This coincided with a demand for a green theory to help explain and understand these political issues. By the 1990s, global politics had come to recognize the natural environment as an increasingly significant source of questions for the discipline, requiring theoretical as well as practical attention – especially in the wake of mounting evidence that human actions were significantly changing our global climate and presenting security problems as well as ecological ones. Ecological thought addresses the interests of nature itself rather than only the interests of humanity in nature. Green theory captures this orientation in political terms of value and agency (Goodin, 1992) – what is to be valued, by whom and how to get it. Green theory belongs to the critical theory tradition, in the sense that environmental issues evoke questions about relations between and among ourselves and others in the context of community and collective decision-making. In turn this has always raised the question of where the boundaries of political community are. For environmental problems, which transcend boundaries, these questions take the form of asking at what level of political community we should seek a solution. For green theorists, the answers are found in alternative ideas about political association based on our ecological relationships.

Typically, environmental issues are buried in political texts under other headings and with little acknowledgement of their unique theoretical significance. Environmentalism-themed scholarship is generally accepting of the existing framework of political, social and economic structures of world politics. While there are of course established forms of critical thought, these address relations within and between human communities, rather than human relations with the non-human environment. For example, liberalism emphasises individual rights of choice and consumption but is not fundamentally concerned with the environmental consequences of that consumption. Consequently, most forms of environmentalism seek to establish theoretical positions and practical solutions through existing structures, or in line with existing critiques of such structures. An environmentalist perspective, while identifying environmental change as an issue, attempts to find room for the environment among our existing categories of other concerns, rather than considering it to be definitionally or transformational.

Those frustrated by the lack of recognition of the environmental challenge in international relations turned to the interdisciplinary science of ecology. Political ecology has allowed both an ecological perspective to inform political thought and a political understanding of our environmental circumstances. In particular, our circumstances have long been determined by a particular developmental path that depends on the over-consumption of natural resources. Specifically, our political-economic practices of production, distribution and consumption are intended to meet our immediate human needs and desires. However, these practices are reflected in a growth-dependent global market economy that is not designed to achieve environmental sustainability or recognize ecological limits. This economy has provided material development of a kind, but with such uneven benefits and widespread collateral damage – including to the environment – that it has not provided human development in an ecological context. From an ecological perspective, there has been a general criticism of development and even apparently progressive sustainable development practices. The well-known model of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968), in which our short-term, individual, rational choices destroy our environmental resources, has thus been applied to the planet as a whole. It is tragic because we can see it coming but seem unable or unwilling to do anything about it. That inability is more than a practical problem; it is a profound theoretical challenge. Hardin pointed out that such issues cannot be solved by technical means, but require a change in human values.
Moving beyond environmentalism and political ecology, green theory more radically challenges existing political, social and economic structures. In particular, it challenges mainstream liberal political and economic assumptions, including those extending beyond the boundaries of existing political communities (or, what is conventionally known as states). Goodin (1992) suggests that a distinguishing feature of green theory is its reference to a coherent moral vision – a “green theory of value” – which operates independently of a theory of practices or political agency. For example, a green morality might suggest that human material development should be curtailed in the interest of preserving non-human nature. This would limit our freedom to consume however much we can acquire. The need to put some limits on traditional liberties suggests an approach that puts nature before people. Green theory, in this sense, is ecocentric.

Ecocentrism (ecology-centred thought) stands against anthropocentrism (human-centred thought). This is not because ecocentrism ignores human needs and desires, but rather because it includes those within a wider ecological perspective. Ecocentrism prioritises healthy ecosystems because they are a prerequisite to human health and wellbeing. In contrast, anthropocentrism sees only the short-term instrumental value of nature to humans. This ecocentric/anthropocentric distinction is at the heart of green theory. The holistic ecocentric perspective implies a rejection of the split between domestic and international politics, given that arbitrary boundaries between nations do not coincide with ecosystems. For example, air and water pollution can cross a border and climate change cuts across all borders and populations. Simply, human populations are ecologically interconnected. This impacts on how we understand and deal with transboundary and global environmental issues collectively, setting aside national self-interest.

The traditional concern with the state, in an international system of states, is a challenge to thinking about environmental issues. As a central feature of the historical Westphalian model of sovereign (self-determining) nation-states, the concept of sovereignty (ultimate authority) has been particularly troubling. Sovereignty neither describes the modern reality of political control nor offers a reliable basis for human identity or wellbeing. Global environmental problems require global solutions. This requires that we develop our understanding of the ‘global’ as an alternative organizing principle and perhaps look to green social movements rather than states for theoretical insights. This gives rise to the question of whether we need to give up on the idea of countries with borders as still being relevant to people’s lives, or recast them in some more ecologically appropriate way with reference to how people live in relation to their environment. This will likely entail a more global than local kind of ethics. In part this hinges on our view of the need for political structures (big government, small government or no government) and the level or extent of their development. For example, we could promote centralized global political structures, such as an institution for governing environmental issues (Bierrmann, 2001), or allow a variety of decentralized, even anarchical, interconnected local structures to emerge as circumstances require (Dyer, 2014).

Decentralization, or the transfer of authority and decision-making from central to local bodies, has certain attractive features, such as self-determination and democratic accountability. Ecologically there seem to be advantages as well, since small communities may depend more on immediate local resources and so be more likely to care for their environment. Local communities are more likely to conceive of the natural environment and their relationship to it in less instrumental terms, viewing it more as their home, thus addressing one of the key reasons for the environmental crisis.

For example, the concept of ‘bioregionalism’, where human society is organized within ecological rather than political boundaries, raises intriguing issues of knowledge, science, history, culture, space and place in an ecological context (McGinnis, 1999). For instance, our sense of identity might derive more from familiar environmental surroundings than from the idea of nationality, such that we have greater inherited knowledge and understanding of our local environment than of our political location. However, there are also a number of objections to decentralisation, or greater localisation of decision-making. These include the concern that it would not promote cross-community cooperation as it is too
parochial (too exclusively local), and this would mean little chance of developing effective mechanisms to deal with global problems. In effect, it might just reproduce a troublesome sovereign-state model of politics on a smaller scale.

Whether or not green theory can become central as an ideology for world politics remains to be seen, however, the climate crisis and its threats to human security cannot be ignored.
12.2 The climate crisis

DR. ROSS PINK

In the long journey of human history, people have marveled at nature and depended upon it for survival. Yet, today, the ability of billions of citizens to live safe and healthy lives is increasingly threatened by climate change. Each year, millions of citizens helplessly watch as livelihoods based upon the environment such as fishing and farming are threatened. Climate change is a result of anthropogenic activity. Over 90% of the climate crisis is caused by human action, yet ironically this crisis can also be mitigated by human-generated solutions and innovations. Consider the fact that in 1000 AD the global population was a mere 295 million, 1 billion in 1800, 7.5 billion in 2021 and projected to reach 9.5 billion in 2050. Two factors are propelling climate change: the exponential increase in the global population and the accelerated effects of the Industrial Revolution. Today, 800 million people are without clean water in their home, village or community, and billions are impacted by the devastating human and environmental damages rendered by climate change. In addressing this phenomenon, theory provides an important foundation for understanding and cogent analysis.

As Voltaire aptly noted, it is important to define one’s terms before embarking upon discourse. Accordingly, this chapter will provide a definition of climate change and address the United Nations Development Program landmark theory and paradigm, Human Security, as a strong analytical foundation for understanding climate change and the environment.
12.2.1 Climate Change: Definition and Impacts

DR. ROSS PINK

Climate change is not a new phenomenon; it is an environmental reality that has affected human populations and the natural world for hundreds of thousands of years. What is new and troubling is the extreme rate of climate change and the fact that billions of global citizens are now affected by it. Island nations are sinking rapidly, sea level rise is forcing communities to migrate, extreme heat is turning arable land into desert, there are severe water shortages in India and northern China, and extreme weather events such as the Nok-Ten storm in Thailand that left 65 of the nation’s 77 provinces declared disaster zones are becoming more frequent; these and other environmental events are among the impacts of climate change.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “There are many indicators of climate change. These include physical responses such as changes in the following: surface temperature, atmospheric water vapour, precipitation, severe events, glaciers, ocean and land ice, and sea level.” (Cubasch & al., 2013).

One study noted the ‘severe’ climate impacts that are possible scenarios in the 21st century:

1. By 2040, the average global temperature could rise 2.6°C (4.7°F) above 1990 levels.
2. The global sea level could rise by 0.52 m (1.7 ft).
3. Water availability could decrease significantly in the most affected regions at lower altitudes (dry tropics and subtropics), thereby affecting 2 billion people.
4. Developing nations at lower altitudes will be affected most severely because of their climate sensitivity and low adaptive capacity. Industrialized nations to the north, meanwhile, will experience clear net harm and must divert greater proportions of their wealth to combat climate change at home. (Gulledge, 2008)

A range of potentially destructive climate impacts have been described in scientific studies:

“Hazard: The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced physical event or trend or physical impact that may cause loss of life, injury, or other health impacts, as well as damage and loss to property, infrastructure, livelihoods, service provision, ecosystems and environmental resources.

Exposure: The presence of people, livelihoods, species or ecosystems, environmental functions, services and resources, infrastructure, or economic, social, or cultural assets in places and settings that could be adversely affected.

Vulnerability: The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected. Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts and elements including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt.

Impacts: Effects on natural and human systems. The impacts of climate change on geophysical systems, including floods, droughts and sea level rise, are a subset of impacts called physical impacts.

Risk: The potential for consequences where something of value is at stake and where the outcome is uncertain, recognizing the diversity of values. Risk is often represented as probability of occurrence of hazardous events or trends multiplied by the impacts if these events or trends occur.

Adaption: The process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In human systems, adaption seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities.

Resilience: The capacity of social, economic and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event or trend or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential function, identity and structure, while also maintaining the capacity for adaption, learning, and transformation.” (IPCC, 2014).

Climate change projections for the 21st century are dramatic and irrefutable. Although variances will occur in terms of intensity in some regions, the general climate prognosis is certain with reference to weather extremes, sea level rise, rising heat levels, desertification, ocean acidification, human health threats, damage to habitat and species extinction. Another alarming trend noted by the United Nations and other authoritative bodies is the huge projected rise in climate...
refugee populations that governments will largely be unprepared to control or mitigate. The U.N. has cited an estimate that there will be 200 million climate change refugees by 2050.
12.3 Human Security

DR. ROSS PINK

In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme articulated a landmark theory or paradigm known as Human Security to provide the global community with a more progressive interpretation of human rights. Indeed, Human Security is described as ‘people centered’ and serves as a valid and needed contrast to realism, which is a dominant theory in international political discourse. Although realism has been a functional operating principle in international relations for centuries, it was popularized in recent years by the academic Hans Morgenthau in the well-known book *Politics Among Nations*. In this book, two central arguments are advanced: first, political leaders act according to the ‘national interest’ and, second, moral or human rights considerations cannot be applied to the actions of states. Accordingly, realism is often seen in Machiavellian terms as a doctrine of cold calculation and the harsh projection of national interests in the international community.

The United Nations Commission on Human Security provides the following definition of human security: “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment”. Human security requires the protection of fundamental freedoms or freedoms that are essential to life. This includes protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations (The United Nations Commission on Human Security, 2003). The human security doctrine provides clarity on the enumeration of human rights threats and the most urgent areas for action and identifies “seven specific threats to human security: economic, food-related, health, environmental, personal (including violence and abuse), community, and political.” (The United Nations Development Programme, 1994).

According to United Nations officials, academics and human rights experts, human security is a people-centered approach to human development and protection. In sharp contrast to realism, which emphasizes national power and interests, human security seeks to embrace the individual and respond with humanism to the seven specific threats. Moreover, human security is also an activist theoretical approach that is a call to action for responsive and people-centered humanitarian policies. To address the monumental environmental challenges facing global citizens in the 21st century, valuable insights can be gained by examining these issues through the prism of human security.
12.3.1 Community Threats

DR. ROSS PINK

A massive threat to human rights and populations is the climate change-induced impact of climate change refugees. This is a problem that is increasing exponentially and will eventually overwhelm national governments and the U.N.'s capacity to respond. A stark example of community threats is the growing climate change refugee crisis. The United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention addressed the issue of political refugees and the problem of persecution. An IOM report noted that “migration can result from different environmental factors, among them gradual environmental degradation (including desertification, soil and coastal erosion) and natural disasters (such as earthquakes, floods or tropical storms).” (Laczko & Aghazarm, 2009). Climate change is dramatically increasing migration pressure. Indeed, associated extreme weather events resulting in drought, floods, and disease are projected to increase the number of sudden humanitarian crises and disasters in areas that are the least able to cope, such as those already mired in poverty or prone to conflict (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2007: 5).

The 2015 Paris Agreement, which is designed to reduce global warming, set forth ambitious goals to forestall global warming and related climate change threats. Yet, many of the nations that signed the agreement have utterly failed to take action on the gravest humanitarian crisis to confront humanity in the 21st century, namely, climate change refugees. Indeed, many global experts estimate that the climate refugee population will far exceed projections rendered by the United Nations. Dr. Mehmood Ul-Hassan, head of Capacity Development at the World Agroforestry Center, stated that, “I foresee between 500 million and 1 billion climate refugees by 2050. The world isn’t ready to tackle even fewer than 100 million due to current wars in the Middle East.” (as quoted in Pink, 2018).

A human security perspective requires a global focus and humanitarian intervention to address the looming crisis. Moreover, when international regimes, such as the Paris Agreement, omit the refugee issue, it is a sign that the world community is still insufficiently addressing core human rights principles as defined in human security. A human security approach to the climate refugee issue would place the crisis at the forefront of the coordinated humanitarian policy of international regimes such as the United Nations and Paris Agreement signatories.
An example of an economic threat can be seen in the climate change threat facing the people of Nunavut in the Canadian Arctic region. Nunavut, which has a population 35,000, is an Inuit territory with a historic tradition and culture that is dominated by the environment and respect for nature. The reality of climate change is increasingly impacting the people of this Arctic region. The main threats are sea level rise and the resultant loss of permafrost due to global warming. Culture, community and traditional ways of life in Nunavut are increasingly threatened.

A report by the territorial government of Nunavut stated some of the pronounced climate change effects, which include: “Decreasing sea ice thickness and distribution, which is changing wildlife habitat and affecting and impacting hunters' ability to harvest wildlife; permafrost degradation, changes in ice conditions, rainfall and snow quantity, drainage patterns, temperatures, and extreme weather events can all have implications for existing infrastructure, such as roads and buildings, all of which was designed around a permanently frozen soil regime...” (Government of Nunavut, 2011).

Peter Taptuna, former premier of Nunavut, described some of the issues confronting Nunavut. “The government of Nunavut has been heavily involved in climate change and environmental protection. In November 2016, the government of Nunavut announced the creation of the Climate Change Secretariat, which is responsible for managing climate change adaptation and mitigation programs and policies for the government of Nunavut. Last year, we also worked with the World Wildlife Fund to host an Arctic Renewable Energy Summit. In addition, we stood with our fellow provinces and territories in signing the Pan-Canadian Framework for Clean Growth and Climate Change in December 2016. As part of this, we are now working with Canada towards introducing a made-in-Nunavut carbon pricing scheme that recognizes our territory's unique circumstances. We absolutely need Canada to help invest in clean technology and facilitate adaption and mitigation on multiple fronts, as we do not have the resources.” (Pink, 2018).

From a human security perspective, the economic threat facing the people of Nunavut is severe. A community way of life is endangered, which will result in a loss of employment and income. Moreover, the building economy, which is based upon permafrost, will be threatened by unstable ground, a shifting terrain and billions of dollars in replacement costs for homes, schools, hospitals and businesses. Additional costs are associated with infrastructure reinforcement, and in many cases the replacement required will be substantial. These are costs that the small economy of Nunavut cannot realistically meet. Thus, it is imperative that a coordinated Canadian federal response in concert with multiple partners from business and civil society be launched in the coming years. The crisis facing Nunavut is both economic and cultural. A realist perspective would look at the situation in Nunavut as regrettable and unsustainable in terms of mitigation. The human security view, on the other hand, would focus upon a broader ‘people-centered’ approach that recognizes the economic threat and prioritizes a humanitarian response to protect Nunavut's culture and economy.
12.3.3 Environmental Threats

DR. ROSS PINK

Human security is a modern paradigm that addresses current global crises such as environmental threats. One significant threat is sea level rise, which has been widely reported on in government, academic and scientific studies. Worldwide, there are approximately 800 million people living in large and small coastal communities who are directly threatened by sea level rise. The IPCC has projected sea level rise of one meter by 2100. Such a rise is sufficient to flood many communities and cities, threaten human life, damage property, disrupt infrastructure such as water pipes and bridges and force millions of citizens into migration internally or abroad.

A country that will be dramatically impacted by sea level rise is India, which has a shoreline of 7517 km. Large cities including Calcutta and Mumbai as well as hundreds of smaller communities are located on the coast. Mumbai has an average elevation of only 14m (46 feet). A study of 136 port cities showed that the population exposed to flooding linked with a 1-in-100-year event is likely to rise dramatically from 40 million currently to 150 million by 2070 (Nicholls, 2008). Mumbai, which is a highly populated city and home to numerous slums, is highly vulnerable to flooding. “The value of global assets exposed to flooding is estimated to rise to USD 35 trillion, up from USD 3 trillion today.” (The World Bank, 2010)
12.3.4 Food Threats

DR. ROSS PINK

Climate change–related food threats are associated with extreme heat, drought and desertification. As the global population increases from 7.5 billion in 2021 to a projected 9.5 billion in 2050, food security will become a prime global development concern. Food threats are recognized by the human security paradigm because the absence of a proper diet and nutrition can lead to a range of serious health and developmental challenges. Moreover, the victim is exposed to higher risk factors in general and related problems such as lower employment or school attendance. As noted by Sen in his brilliant treatise on capability deprivation, data on income levels do not fully capture the complete picture of a person's health, opportunities or living conditions.

Egypt is threatened by water scarcity, increasing drought, extreme heat and desertification. Consequently, the nation will be increasingly confronted by food insecurity. A study by the Egyptian Society for Migration Studies noted that, “the decline in agriculture activities due to temperature increases is expected to range from 10% to 60%. The production of the strategic crops will achieve significant reduction by the middle of the century (2050) as the following: Production of wheat will reduce by 18%; Production of rice will reduce by 11%; Production of maize will reduce by 19%. Egypt is among the high potential countries/regions for food crisis during the coming 40 years.” (Hassan, 2013).

The United Nations, the Food and Agriculture Organization and numerous NGOs have already sounded dire warnings about the immense food security challenges confronting developing nations in the 21st century.
12.3.5 Health Threats

DR. ROSS PINK

Canada is a top-15 economy in the world, it passed a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, it is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, and it is a substantial contributor to United Nations’ peacekeeping missions and refugee relief. Yet, with respect to First Nations communities in Canada, successive governments have been condemned by the United Nations and human rights observers for the deplorable living conditions on numerous First Nations reserves and the absence of water security and safe drinking water.

Human rights laws, no matter how nobly they are worded, are inadequate unless there is proper and verifiable enforcement. A devastating example of health threats under the human security paradigm is found in the water security crisis faced by multiple Canadian First Nations reserves. Specifically, one could posit that the Charter articles 7, life, liberty and the security of the person and 15, equality are violated in this context.

In October 2020, about 250 members of the Ontario Neskantaga First Nations were evacuated to Thunder Bay after oil and contaminants were detected in the water supply. High levels of hydrocarbons were also found in the water supply. The people in this community have been living under a boil water advisory for 26 years, the longest such advisory in Canadian history. Boiling water removes bacteria but not toxic metal from the water. In December 2020, the federal government released a statement announcing that 22 long-term boil water advisories would continue until at least March of 2021. This date was targeted by the Trudeau administration as the point at which boil water advisories would no longer be needed. The United Nations, of which Canada is a member, declared in a General Assembly in July 2010 resolution that water is recognized as a human right. Yet, Canada continues to fail First Nations' communities on one of the most pressing and urgent human rights, that of safe drinking water. Critics of the Canadian government note that the First Nations' water crisis is partially due to systemic discrimination and vestiges of an unequal and oppressive power structure in Canada. The human security paradigm would address this crisis in the context of the Canadian government's failure to provide a 'people-centered' approach to water security for First Nations citizens.
12.3.6 Personal Threats

DR. ROSS PINK

A recent study on the water supply in Jakarta noted that “Jakarta’s population includes a significant number that live in wretched, unsanitary conditions with no access to clean water services. In these conditions people are forced to choose either to draw water from heavily polluted rivers, contaminated and often saline aquifers, or when no mains water is available, purchase it from private pushcart vendors at the price of US $0.15 per 20-liter jerry can or US $7.50 per m3, which is more than 70 times the price of mains water if it were available.” (Fournier, Folliasson, Martin et al., 2013).

Water from the Jatiluhur Reservoir is not safe to consume, and its consumption has led to multiple incidents of waterborne disease. “The water flows through agricultural fields to reach Jakarta via a 33 km open canal. Along the way, some water is drawn illegally by farmers for irrigation use and water is also contaminated from people defecating into the canal and from rudimentary toilets that pour untreated waste into the canal. By the time the water reaches Jakarta, it is of poor quality.” (Ibid.)

One of the primary concerns among development experts and the United Nations is the commodification of water. All people are water-dependent irrespective of income. Yet, billions of global citizens are deprived of safe and adequate water consumption due to water-pricing schemes that are a violation of fundamental human rights. As climate change intensifies and the population in developing countries grows, the alarming rate of water insecurity will increase dramatically.
12.3.7 Political Threats

DR. ROSS PINK

Climate change mitigation is beyond the financial scope of many developing countries. A global strategy for assistance and development must be expanded significantly and should involve the G20, United Nations, European Union, World Bank, Asia Development Bank and African Development Bank. There are multiple situations in which a government has seen the erosion of popular support and legitimacy due to corruption, (Venezuela), dictatorship (Myanmar), or massive human rights violations (Syria). In the case of climate change, there is a new phenomenon to consider, which is the loss of government legitimacy as a result of the failure to protect citizens from the harsh impacts of climate change. This new form of political illegitimacy and political ‘threat’ will become extreme in the coming decades. Governments in many cases will be financially unable to mitigate climate change impacts or be predictive in terms of climate change events. Examples include the rise in cases of malaria in Laos, the eroding coastlines in Bangladesh and water crises in India. Each crisis tests and threatens the political legitimacy of these countries’ governments. Moreover, governments that have squandered public funds through corruption and mismanagement will be confronted by widespread protests and dysfunction when the severe impacts of climate change strike the population.
Human security has been embraced by responsive and progressive governments worldwide. It is a paradigm that has been upheld as a model of justice by the global human rights community, civil society and the United Nations. Human security offers hope for a beleaguered world. It is a model that great thinkers like Kant, who championed a noble world in his doctrine on cosmopolitanism, would eagerly pay homage to. As the global culture of human rights moves forward, it is within reason to conclude that in the 21st century, human security will replace realism as the global standard for national conduct and international development.

Discussion Questions

1. Why would a green theorist see climate change as human induced?
2. Can you describe a modern community threat related to climate change? Be as precise as possible.
3. What would be effective steps by the United Nations, Global Leaders and the World Community to address and reduce the hardships that confront climate change refugees?
4. Should the United Nations amend the 1951 Refugee Convention to include Climate Change Refugees? Why or why not?
References


PART XIII
A LATE MODERN TYPOLOGY OF DEMOCRATIZING FEMINISMS

Learning Objectives

At the end of this chapter, you will be able to:

• Explain the role of feminism in politics;
• Critically discuss the typology of feminisms;
• Assess what can be done to make institutions more intersectionally inclusive.
A Late Modern Typology of Democratizing Feminisms

JACKIE F. STEELE

Although the bulk of dominant Western political philosophy has been focused on the realization and conditions of equal citizenship, justice, and the ideal society, most of these conversations historically have focused on abstract concerns relating to the rights and freedoms of the individual or the primacy of the community. Much of the classic literature remained silent on or inadequately dealt with the kinds of exclusions that pertain to the diverse complexities of differences constitutive of a given bodyspolitik, be they related to conceptions of sex/gender, heterosexuality, race/ethnocultural identity, indigeneity, nationality, age or physical/mental ability, to name just a few. Over the past three hundred years, critical feminist theorists have explored and theorized the boundaries of equality and difference, with increasing attention being given to the multiple contexts, meanings and influences complicating their conceptual and practical relationships as well as their intersection with issues of identity, subjectivity, representation, and democratic citizenship as a concept and as a practice that plays out through democratic institutions and other public bodies.

In this chapter, I will trace a typology of the different variants of critical feminist theories of emancipation, feminisms plural, or what I understand to be the pivotal expression and intellectual contributions throughout history of women’s democratic thought leadership. I begin by introducing Squires’ (1999) typology of feminist thought and then build upon this framework to offer an extended typology that augments our conceptualization to take into account a more nuanced differentiation of key variants of contemporary feminisms. Distinct from post-modern forms of diversity feminism that reject and abandon political and legal categories as oppressive, I add a fourth variant of what I call “intersectional feminisms” that aim to displace outdated status-based categories through the reconstruction of new emancipatory legal norms and democratic practices. Further, a fifth variant of civil republican intersectional feminism aim at a displacement of liberal individualism itself and the impoverished framing of “liberty” in late modern times. Rather, this last variant aims for a holistic reconstruction of the interdependence of public and personal liberty through the emancipatory promise of self-government and radically representative democratic politics. These latter, intersectional feminisms bring a renewed faith in the ethical promise of self-government, the rule of law and self-government as a system of government, as well as representative democratic citizenship as an emancipatory system of freedom and intersectionally diverse self-determination capable of sustaining democratic equality for all components parts of the political community.
Making a central contribution to political theory, in *Gender and Political Theory* (1999), Judith Squires develops three archetypal approaches to the question of subjectivity that have emerged in response to the persistent blind spots within mainstream political theory. Squires' typology situates feminist theory within three core approaches and assumptions that guide the knowledge claims of political theory itself: objectivity, interpretation, and genealogy. From the perspective of objectivity, the project of political theory would be 'the elaboration of abstract universal values.' If we follow the interpretative frame, the goal of the political theorist is to 'uncover and interpret the values which already exist within concrete communities'. The third approach sees the goal of political theory as 'deconstructing meaning claims in order to look for the modes of power they carry and to force open a space for the emergence of counter-meanings' (Ferguson, quoted in Squires, 1999, p. 81).

In short, Squires' typology helps us make sense of the varying currents of feminism, their ideological foundations and the tactics of intervention each strand privileges in the pursuit of social transformation through tactical strategies of change agency in their practitioner iterations across various parts of society. Squires sees these three approaches as having distinct orientations to the concept of subjectivity, and she specifically argues that these three feminist projects or worldviews can be mapped onto a logic of 1) an *equality politics* aimed at inclusion through the presumed neutrality of the universal subject, 2) a *difference politics* aimed at reversing patriarchal values through affirmations of the feminine, and 3) a *diversity politics* aimed at deconstructing traditional categories of analysis so as to displace the male/female binary underpinning the false dichotomies of modernist thinking.

Each of these families of feminist theorizing has problematized the “equality/difference” debate from varying perspectives. An important consequence of their different epistemological foundations lies in the kinds of feminist strategies prescribed in the pursuit of emancipatory social transformation. Bock and James (1992, p. 4) note the confusion that can emerge from situations wherein “women's liberation has been seen sometimes as the right to be equal, sometimes as the right to be different”. In her exploration of these themes, British theorist Phillips (1993, pp.55-56) notes the increasing “feminist impatience with abstract universals of the Enlightenment tradition” whereby equality is reduced to mean equality as sameness to Man; they argue that “feminism contained within itself a double impetus towards both equality and difference” that leads to a productive emphasis on “heterogeneity, diversity and difference.”

Before continuing, it is important to comment on the various competing significations of the concepts of equality, difference and diversity in light of the national and historical contexts of the societies within which feminist theorizing occurs. All of women's thought leadership towards democratization has been placed within a specific historical and ethnocultural context. The core concepts within feminist theory likewise reference different legacies of democratic struggle. For example, the formalistic notion of “equality” is associated with Squires' first family of American feminist theory, but it stands in stark contrast to the conception of “equality” advanced by neighbouring Canadian and Québécois movements from the late 1970s to the present.

Typologies are always schematic. Squires herself acknowledges this, and she also stresses the possibility of all three strands of feminism existing together within the same society. There is no presumption that an “equality politics” would evolve into a “difference politics” and ultimately progress into a “diversity politics” as a natural progression. Indeed, the past few decades of neo-liberal revisionism have resulted in a contemporary form of neo-liberal “equality politics” defended by neo-conservative women within Canada[1], Québec and the United States.
Neoliberalism is grounded upon the idea that less government interference in the free market is the "central goal" of democratic politics. By “neoliberal revisionism”, we mean to critique the erasure of the ethical value of modern forms of “liberal democracy,” and which aim merely at “less government interference”, and fail to aspire to realize the emancipatory and liberty-enhancing promise of democracy as a form of collective socio-economic cooperation and self-government.

[1] The role of women within the Conservative government and within R.E.A.L. Women of Canada, women within the Action démocratique du Québec and, notably, key women within Republican Party are one such manifestation.
13.1.1 Equality Politics through Liberal Feminisms

JACKIE F. STEELE

The first theoretical orientation within Squires' typology of feminist theory has centred on a strategy of equality that seeks the inclusion of women within the existing political structures, which were understood to be neutral to sexual differences and ought to continue to be indifferent to sexual differences. The goal was not to transform existing structures, which were taken to be legitimate in their neutrality. Rather, early feminist theory problematized biological determinism that assumed that sex determined one's destiny, social and cultural characteristics or roles. Distinguishing between sex and gender, the first important advance within feminist theory flowed from social constructivist approaches of “equality feminism” that sought to construct gender as a cultural product so as to locate the sources of women’s oppression in sex-specific social practices rather than in their biology per se.

Following the insights of Simone de Beauvoir, much of Anglo-American equality feminism asserted that, regardless of their “sex”, women could also behave in ways that were rational, individualistic, and competitive in a manner similar to men, but that they had been socially conditioned into inferior roles and attributes through culture. Squires (1999, p. 117) suggests that this strategy resulted in an “equality politics” that accepted the universal ideal of neutrality as well as a conception of individuals as rational and autonomous. In this view, gender difference is seen as an effect of sexism used to legitimate inequality between the sexes, not a foundational difference. Strategies that emerged out of this equality politics assumed that in order for inclusion to be achieved, female differences coded as inferior ought to be transcended through the creation of a political sphere that is gender-neutral, thus restoring women’s common equivalence and human value to be seen on par with that of men.

The project of inclusion aimed to assert that gender should not be politically relevant. Despite these attempts to distinguish between the facticity of sex differences and the construction of male supremacist gender differences, the logic of sex/gender was comforted and mapped onto dualist thinking of the mind/body duality. This led to a hierarchical structure that positioned the mind (masculine) in a position of superior, rationalist control over the emotions and body (feminine) and was infused in the symbolic hierarchical ordering of male/female and masculine/feminine. In fact, the strategy of gender neutrality ended up looking a lot like male dominance in practice.
13.1.2 Difference Politics through Maternal/Radical Feminisms

JACKIE F. STEELE

Given the unequal status and disparate enjoyment of citizenship that women continued to experience despite the arrival of formal equality, the second family of feminist theorists identified by Squires renounced the strategy of gender-neutrality. Moving towards a relational structuring of power between men and women, the second variant of feminism located women's subordination in cultural attitudes about sex/gender and nature/nurture rationalist logic as well as in macro-level practices that structured women's positioning as inferior to their male counterparts throughout the public and private spheres of society.

Rejecting the notion that gender neutrality as a forced assimilation of women into the male model of individuality could ever be possible, let alone empowering in practice, the second family of feminist theorizing mobilized around strategic affirmations of the feminine and female ways of being or doing and around the celebration of women's differences. Taking what had historically been coded as weakness, inferiority, vulnerability and the source of subordination, the objective of maternal feminism was to oppose and reverse patriarchal values that denigrated women's differences from men; rather, these traits associated with women as “nurturing, peace-loving, intuitive and emotional” would be actively celebrated as a strength (Squires, 1999, p. 118).

These theorists, described as radical feminism, maternal feminism and/or cultural feminists, aimed to protect, or at least ensure, a re-valuing of the distinct perspectives of male and female gendered identities, regardless of whether their origins were grounded in biological, structural and/or socially constructed differences (Bock & James, 1992, p.1-16). They argued for the need to affirm not only women's characteristics, but also their social roles, and to encourage all of humanity to equally value both feminine and masculine traits for their unique contributions to society. Seen as a duality that is complementary, by affirming the equal value of womanhood to manhood, and the particular value to society that women's differences make, difference feminism sought to restore the realm of affectivity, emotions, connectedness, an ethic of care, and those activities or characteristics aligned with the feminine. This strategy of values reversal aimed to unleash a reconfiguration and even a re-ordering of the political sphere to make it more open to women and perhaps even positively aligned with the superior qualities flowing from the gendered specificity of women's experiences. Rather than resulting in an inclusive public and private sphere grounded upon the dual contributions of the feminine and masculine, the legacy of the patriarchal ordering of sex/gender and the ongoing persistence of male supremacy has meant that efforts to value the symbolically stereotypical notion of the feminine have only reinscribed and inadvertently comforted the maintenance of traditional divisions of labour along gender lines. This has not ultimately led to the restoration of women's bodies to a common equivalence to men's bodies, nor has it led to the human value of the feminine being seen and honoured on par with that of the masculine in practice.
13.1.3 Diversity Politics through Postmodern Feminisms

JACKIE F. STEELE

Contemporary debates over the paradoxical nature of equality and difference have been re-articulated to unleash a third current within feminist theory mobilized behind a normative commitment to diversity that moves strategically beyond the duality and tired binary logic of sex/gender altogether. Focused on complicating the circular debates around equality and vs difference, this current postmodern feminism invokes a strategy of displacement of the categories of sex/gender as the foundation of human intelligibility. This strategy aims to unleash the inherent diversity of humanity that is masked by hegemonic understandings of sex/gender as a natural and foundational element of the bodies of women and men.

Whereas equality and difference feminist constructivism look to understand how men and women become masculine and feminine subjects, deconstructivist feminism invokes the Foucauldian notion of discourse. This approach within feminist theorizing is interested in the relational construction and deconstruction of gender through power, language or discourse and situates sex/gender in a relational dialogue with a broader mapping of diverse corporeality. In this logic, gender is both “the material effect of the way in which power takes hold of the body and an ideological effect of the way power ‘conditions’ the mind” (Squires, 1999, p.64). In this context, “gender becomes a fundamentally political category” (Squires, 1999, p.60) that no longer presumes sex to be foundational, nor posits a causal connection between sex and gender, however culturally elaborated.

If the meaning of femininity or masculinity are empty of any set meaning, they need not be restricted to the material bodies of the female or male sex. They only exist in relation to our ideas about binary assumptions about femininity/masculinity. The argument follows that female/male, feminine/masculine take on meaning within a specific historical context, society, and linguistic naming within that history/culture. This opens up the possibility for those ideas to be changed and deconstructed to allow for a different idea to emerge. For those pursuing a diversity politics through postmodern deconstructivist feminism, the preferred strategy is one of displacement of the hegemonic “norm” against which minoritized bodies have been defined. The goal is to deconstruct the discursive regimes that work to gender (race, disable, other, subjuge, colonize, etc.) subjects as a means of legitimating their exclusion from symbolic cultural positioning in normalcy, respectability, authority, and excellence. For example, Kristeva argues that femininity has no substantive content and is simply “that which is marginalized by the patriarchal symbolic order” (Kristeva, 1997, p. 248).
13.1.4 Diversity Politics through Reconstructivist Intersectional Feminisms

JACKIE F. STEELE

As we have seen above, equality feminism and difference feminism sought to problematize the sex/gender distinction and the hegemonic logic that suggested that men were the standard to which women must evolve. Critiques from women on the margins of feminist theory, feminist movements, and legal court proceedings sought to problematize the raced and classed assumptions that implicitly positioned middle-class white women as the standard for all women, all the while mobilizing around a supposedly shared experience of womanhood. The assumed commonality of women's oppression and the assumed universality of women's experiences, as distinct from the commonly shared realities of man, were challenged in immigrant-receiving, colonial/white-settler societies such as Canada and the United States, where national experiences and minority nations and indigenous peoples were internally diverse even at the point of national founding.

Furthermore, the widespread adoption of multiculturalism and acknowledgements of women's diverse sexualities and disabilities further deconstructed the assumed "universality" of womanhood as a political and legal category around which to mobilize. Over the past 40 years, mainstream equality feminism and diversity feminisms were exposed for their own internal exclusions of women of various backgrounds, be they black/women of colour (hooks, 1981; Lorde, 1984; Abu-Laban, 1998; Razack, 1998), aboriginal women/indigenous feminists (Green, 2007; Monture-Angus; Two-Axe Early), Québécois feminists (de Sève, 2000, Lamoureux, 2000), queer and lesbian feminists (Butler, 2006; Majury, 1994; Rich, 1981), or women with disabilities (Peters, 1995; 2003), to name just a few.

In practice, there are many different forms of intersectional feminisms. I will offer conceptual clarity about the necessary delineations between the postmodern deconstructivist feminism associated with Butler's thinking, which led to a rejection of the concept of 'women' as a political category around which to mobilize, and the kind of reconstructivist intersectional feminisms driving the projects of 'intersectional diversity politics' as a tactic for the intentional reconstruction of intersectionally diversified political-legal categories as the complex subject of many contemporary feminisms.
Emerging from a different strand of feminist thought grounded in the disciplinary thinking about anti-discrimination doctrine as it relates to legal rights enshrined in law, constitutionalism, and court precedents, rather than within political philosophy, feminist intersectional analysis or intersectional feminist strategies emerged from the dialogue between feminist legal theory, feminist critical race theory, and feminist law reform movements working to overturn narrow legal interpretations of diverse women’s rights, notably in the United States and Canada. As coined by American scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw in her 1989 article “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,” the term “intersectionality” was launched to give a name to the multiple intersections of women’s exclusion. In the same year, in Looking White People in the Eye: Gender, Race, and Culture in Courtrooms and Classrooms, Canadian feminist critical race scholar Sherene Razack (1998) further problematized the logic of intersectionality with her concept of “interlocking systems of oppression” informing women’s subjectivities and experiences of race, class, colonialism, mother tongue, sexual orientation, and/or disability (See also: Carastathis, 2008).

Within practitioner spaces, signaling the complex forms of marginalization and denigration of women, feminist legal and political theorists as well as feminist research and social justice movements (Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women [CRIAW], 2006; Grillo, 1995) have continued to probe the concept of intersectionality over the last two decades. Sharing Canadian scholarly and practitioner applications of intersectionality in Japan for over two decades, I offer literacy tools in English and Japanese, as well as executive workshops on “Intersectional Thinking” for corporate and public policy leaders.

Postmodern (deconstructive) diversity feminism chose the rejection of the concept of “women” and all legal categories as monolithically oppressive. By contrast, intersectional reconstructivist feminisms opted for an explicit displacement of white, middle-upper-class women as the “norm” of feminist theory-activism, and a re-centring and reconstruction of diverse womxn’s intersectional experiences of inequality as the political and legal category around which intersectional feminist organizes. Be it through feminist research methods, feminist institutionalism, feminist legal analysis and policy activism or feminist law reform movements, all have worked to realize an intersectional coalition politics in favour of democratic equality and freedom for diverse womxn and more recently, in explicit solidarity with diverse men as well.
Womxn: a woman. A term used within intersectional feminism, as an alternative spelling to avoid the suggestion of sexism perceived in the sequences m-a-n and m-e-n, and to also signal the recognition of diverse gendered identities and the normative inclusion of trans-women and individual women who identify as nonbinary.

Through this contestation of diverse women's thought leadership and variants of democratizing feminist change agency, and with this robust competition of ideas seeking the realization of the promise of democratic equality for all women, the binary concept of sex/gender has been blown open, *squarely displaced* and then normatively reconstructed around the concept of intersectional privileges and oppressions/inequalities as the new “normative lens” through which to structure all citizen-subjects within the democratic community. This has made conceptual and discursive space for the necessary recognition of the complex diversities of all women's, men's and non-binary individualities and for the fuller range of experiences of complex inequality due to multiple, intersecting fault lines of historic power and oppression, liberty and disenfranchisement.
13.1.4.2 Displacement through Feminist Reconstruction of Diverse Parliaments

JACKIE F. STEELE

The tactic of displacement through feminist reconstruction of diverse parliaments has been led by diverse scholars and practitioner-activists who aim to displace and *decentre the fictional abstract political representative* underpinning modern representative democracy by forcing, through the use of various electoral gender quota designs for candidates and elected officials, new practices of power-sharing across gender, but also other pertinent fault lines of politicized identity generating social exclusion. Within the women/politics and gender/politics political science communities, some of these feminist scholars are best situated within an “equality politics” strategy that still aims primarily for the “inclusion of women in parliaments.” Others within these feminist political science and feminist practitioner communities are more disruptively working towards a “displacement strategy” that aims to overturn the symbolic political power and authority invested in hegemonic male/patriarchal “bodies,” among other marginalized social groups, by legally forcing or voluntaristically nudging political parties towards a diversification of elected officials (Childs, 2016; Childs and Celis, 2020; Hughes, 2011; Mansbridge, 1999; Philips, 1993; Steele, 2006; Williams, 1998; Young, 2000). Depending on the technical build out, these electoral systems designs can ensure more egalitarian power-sharing and a sustainable performance of gender-balanced voice and seats held in parliament that will once and for all displace patriarchal practices of male homo social gatekeeping, clientelism, and nepotism (Bjarnegard, 2013). The idea is to see parliaments and representative institutions yield more diverse political leadership and thereby ensure more responsive legislation and policies that generate substantive equality and greater equity for an intersectionally diverse population.

While these legal and legislation-focused iterations of intersectional feminisms seek a displacement of oppressive hierarchies that structure the legal norms regulating public policy, and the symbolic legislators for the political community, the focus on law reform advocacy and the role of parliamentarians as lawmakers stops just shy of a full displacement of what our final variant sees as the problem, namely liberal individualism’s impoverished reading of political liberty itself.
13.1.5 Civic Republican Intersectional Feminism

JACKIE F. STEELE

Through a cross-pollination of diversity feminisms, intersectional feminisms, and civic republican understandings of liberty and the role of law and representative democratic institutions this variant of feminist contestation aims to reconstruct the normative value of representative democracy itself (Steele, 2009; 2014a). In allegiance with the civic republican revival (Pettit, 1997; Pocock, 1975; Skinner, 1998; Viroli, 2002), this variant of democratizing intersectional feminism aims to recentre the very praxis of liberty as it is materially institutionalized through political representation as a public-facing, ethical speech-act of power-sharing. These speech-acts constitute and reconstitute the conditions of personal and public liberty of all intersectionally diverse corporealities sharing a fate of togetherness within the political community.

Our current practices of political and parliamentary representation are not in fact unleashing and supporting the ongoing work of self-determination for all peoples, nations, social groups, bodies, and corporealities. Rather, the anti-egalitarian power relations constitutive of pre-democratic status-based distinctions are still informally regulating the inner workings of who gains access to political representation. In Machiavellian terms, this ongoing “corruption” of our representative democratic institutions is what must be displaced, deconstructed, and then reconstructed using the democratizing power of the law and representative democratic institutions. In its place, we would seek the ethical and political legitimate, democratic reconstruction of personal and public liberty as a relational praxis and political good that is constituted in and through the very praxis of political power-sharing through collective and co-authoritative self-representation (Steele, 2009; 2014b).

The end goal of this last iteration of a civic republican intersectional feminism is to displace the hyper-individualist reading of political liberty qua self-government as the aggregate output of abstract individuals devoid of any pre-democratic relational power differentials. Rather, by restoring and reconstructing a collectively-practiced concept and iteration of democratic liberty as a system of collective self-government and self-determination of all of the intersectional diversities constitutive of the population, the primary aim is to displace liberal individualism’s reductive view of liberty as merely an “absence of government interference” (Pettit, 1997), and to restore the ethical power-distributing and power-sharing role of representative democratic institutions as the co-authoritative praxis dynamically constituting an intersectionally diverse yet co-equal citizenry. This reframes political representation and all representative institutions as the constitutive symbols of the collective freedom of the self-determining peoples, nations, social groups and individuals regulated by the democratic rules of the political community and who are structurally positioned under its jurisdiction of care.
13.2 Displacement of Individualist Liberty through Feminist Republican Reconstruction of Intersectional Political Liberty

JACKIE F. STEELE

This Roman republican form of intersectional feminism proposes a rejection of the hyper-individualist liberal interpretation of liberty towards a holistic eco-system approach for designing a praxis of co-authoritative, and radically representative self-determination of and by an intersectionally diverse political community. In so doing, representative democratic institutions from local to national would be seen as the symbolic performative evidence of the ethos and praxis of democratic liberty and self-government. Distinct from most gender/politics scholars (Mansbridge, 1999; Mouffe, 1993, 2005; Philips, 1998; Williams, 1998; Young, 1998) who prefer the use of voluntary quotas, I argue in favour of legal power-sharing mechanisms as the proscriptive solution with democratic legitimacy to ethically institutionalize egalitarian power-sharing relations as a means of reconstructing an ethical use and praxis of personal and public liberty in service to the political community and its constituent parts (Steele, 2009; 2014b).

Grounded upon democratic foundations favouring the fair and equal access of all core stakeholder groups to contribute to the competition of ideas generating our public policies and our holistic rules of togetherness, I suggest that the rule of law can and must be used to intentionally break up the corruption, collusion, and nepotistic hegemonies that hold our public offices and our parliaments hostage to pre-democratic status-privileges. The use of intersectional, power-distributing legal quotas mechanisms is the democratic solution we have avoided, I suggest, due to liberal assumptions that political liberty was “present” if there was “less government interference” (Steele, 2009). This has left our most sacred political competitions largely unregulated by democratic law. Advocacy of this “deregulated space” has been defended by political party leaders who would prefer to retain complete and selfish license to choose not from the full intersectional diversity of human excellence and experience present within the population, but from the narrow and nepotistic social affinity groups who support the private agendas and partisan control of existing party elites over the levers governance.

This is an untenable position that Machiavelli would describe as “corrupt” because allowing “private interests” to take precedence over the ethical role of electoral offices being used in the service of public liberty, and therefore of parliamentary institutions being taken hostage in ways that prevents open and free competition of ideas sourced from all constituent and co-authoritative parts of the political community as co-equal and co-authoritative voices of liberty. Through intersectional feminist electoral systems designs, we can implement a legally-binding diversification strategy that intentionally displaces anti-democratic manifestations of informal social power that cannibalize the sanctity of our political parties and our parliamentary institutions. As the intermediaries of electoral democracy, this radical democratization of democratic institutions and of the political parties gatekeeping access to political representation as a site of public liberty would pave the way for a radically self-representative democratic politics.

In its place, we would instead begin to see public performances of intersectional power-sharing, self-advocacy, and self-representation as a sacred practice of liberty that is both personal and publicly constituted. In the realization of this model of intersectional feminist republican liberty as self-government, the vigorous competition of ideas that animates elections every 4–5 years would no longer be exceptional. It would be the mere continuation of the robust and agonic competition of ideas animating all self-determining decision-making bodies and spaces across heterogeneous publics as a matter of general practice of relational, civic liberty. These very practices of co-authoritative self-determination would continue until the point at which the old anti-democratic norms will have lost all meaning against the reconstructive practices of substantive co-authority, co-equal voice, and political liberty invested anew in all types of diverse bodies, in all previously disenfranchised social groups, and all forms of corporeal liberty constitutive of the political community.

All types of diverse corporealities would be “normalized” as having ethical, legal, and moral standing as “the good
representative” (Dovi, 2012) within such a political community. As a displacement politics that radically constitutes political equality through public practices of co-authoritative self-representation, this feminist republican reconstruction of relational political liberty would normalize power-sharing modalities of political representation as the regulated, democratic praxis of self-determination and public liberty. This praxis of relational and intersectional political liberty would become supported in all power-sharing modalities of self-representation, within all levels of electoral competition, from local to national, as well as within all heterogeneous publics and deliberative decision-making bodies. It would discursively and materially displace the purchase of liberal-individualist “liberty” by offering a democratically dynamic and substantively emancipatory process of de/reconstructive late modern representative democratic politics.
13.3 Conclusion

JACKIE F. STEELE

In the previous pages, I have mapped the contours of the evolution of multiple variants of feminisms, feminist political and legal philosophies, and what I invite us to think of and describe as the historic contributions of women’s democratic thought leadership. While Squires’ typological discussion of liberal feminism, radical feminism, and postmodern feminism offers the interpretative frames with which to make sense of the first core herstories of feminisms around ‘equality politics’, ‘difference politics’ and ‘displacement politics’, the last three decades in particular have seen a fourth and fifth variant of feminist thought leadership that moves beyond Butler’s hyper-individualist view of the rule of law.

What I describe above as a current of reconstructivist intersectional feminisms have shown themselves to be productively investing in the democratic displacement of the universal, abstract citizen-subject in law and policy on the one hand, and in the democratic displacement of the universal, abstract elected representative as the authentic and ethical agent of collective self-government on the other. By virtue of these last two variants of contemporary feminisms, and through this updated typology, I propose to shed light on the different strategies of displacement working towards displacement of anti-democratic legal norms through legal battles and law reform, or that are working to diversify the “usual suspects” animating political parties and parliaments by innovating and advocating for electoral reforms that force greater power-sharing and diversification of our political representatives.

Finally, the last variant, of which I am an advocate, combines feminist intersectional electoral systems designs with critical democratic theory and philosophical engagement with forgotten forms of relational liberty, such as that defended from within republican revival. This latest variant aims for a more fundamental displacement of liberal-individualism’s disempowering monopoly over the social imaginary of what might constitute a meaningful enjoyment of public liberty itself. It seeks a more ethical and emancipatory reconstruction of a deeply relational form of political liberty that might serve as the foundation of a radically representative democratic politics grounded upon power-sharing, co-authority and intersectional self-determination.

Discussion Questions

1. How can we design a political community or country wherein all forms of individuality have equal opportunity and influence to contribute to our society?
2. Why are “equality politics” and “difference politics” caught within the same binary paradigm?
3. Why and how does intersectional feminism make the gender binary obsolete?
4. What is the role of law within democratic self-government and who should decide the rules regulating electoral competition?
5. How is individualistic liberty ethically different from relational liberty?
References


At the end of this chapter, you will be able to:

- Discuss factors that will influence ideologies in the future;
- Critically assess the effects of globalization on political ideologies and worldviews;
- Evaluate the changes that occur within the international system.
Concluding remarks: Ideology in the Globalized Future

JOHN WRIGHT

In this chapter, we are going to look at four important factors in the contemporary world to see what they may have to say about the future of ideologies and, by inference, the future of politics. Those factors are:

- A brief recap of ideology and its operationalization
- The central nature of the state in the international system
- The international system as currently comprised through globalization
- Other factors that might also apply: these factors may be endogenous (from within the system) or exogenous (from outside the system)

The general argument to be made is that ideology is developed and operationalized as a means of rhetorical power—that power is vested in its highest form of authority through the apparatus of the state. States are affected internally through domestic politics but, critically, also through the actions of other states and how they are constituted in the international system. There also exist at a global level some factors independent of states that also have the potential to greatly affect human affairs and therefore states, politics and ideology. By looking at all these elements, we can gather some understanding of how contemporary developments may affect ideological development in the future.
14.1 Introduction

JOHN WRIGHT

Prognostication is a mug's game, particularly in the world of human affairs. There are numerous variables – which social scientists like to define as specific factors that affect outcomes. Many of these variables are at best fuzzy and ill-defined and are often hard to grasp and even harder to measure. Even more difficult to grasp is how these variables interact with each other to determine outcomes. Is one variable dependent on, independent from, or co-dependent with other variables? To what extent does a variable affect or effect an outcome? In short, human affairs are quixotic, and we have a hard time pointing to any one cause for a particular outcome.

But this does not mean that looking at something analytically will not have explanatory or even predictive power. There are patterns and structures to human behaviour in the aggregate that allow us to examine with some confidence the broad picture of human affairs at a given time.

The astute reader will notice that the title of this chapter actually conflates two issues that can act separately as well as together to affect – and to effect – ideological development. These two issues are 'globalization' and 'the future.' What the title is asking of us, colloquially, is the most basic of human questions: “Where do we go from here?” And in looking at the trajectory of individuals and human institutions in the contemporary world, how people conceive and construct their current reality today rests on the interaction of local, national and international political structures.

Put another way, many of the big questions that face us today – including on ideology – revolve around the interconnectedness of the world and our agency within it. For example:

- How do we understand and handle climate change, which respects no national – or provincial – boundaries?
- (How) Do we regulate the flow of capital and goods around the world through investment, free trade, taxation, etc.? And how does this affect what we do domestically?
- (How) Do we handle the flow of labour (people) around the world?
- Can we establish international norms (standards and definitions) that countries will abide by based on common interpretations?

Exercises

Conduct a search of local media sources to find examples that write on the following:

- Which political parties and which geographical regions in Canada support or oppose implementing policies based on the belief that man-made climate change is real and an existential threat?
- Is it (more) important that India or Canada adhere to carbon emission limits?
- How should Canada react to an “America First” economic policy?
- What rules should Canada make on immigration and on refugees seeking residency?
- How should your country react to the situation of the Uighur people in China?

All these questions come with profound moral, social, and economic consequences. These consequences challenge our belief systems about what our state and/or nation is (and therefore who you, the reader, and me, the author, identify)
while imposing a constrained reality on our material well-being that demands compromise, yet also provides hope and a vision for a resolved future.

These brief examples inform us that globalization and the future, like ideology itself, are conceptually nebulous. They include terms that are used in different contexts to mean different things all the time. Equally as important: they are weighed by each individual differently and inconsistently. Sometimes one thing is more important, sometimes another [see Moy on inconsistent voting patterns (Moy, 2008)]. So how can we consider all of this uncertainty and complexity and then try to assess how ideology will develop from this point on?

But as we stated above, concepts, even fuzzy concepts, can be approached methodologically in order to understand what aspects we are actually discussing. Or, as political scientists love to say, we can unpack these ideas.
14.2 Ideology

JOHN WRIGHT

We are going to take ideology itself as a given in this exploration. We have already explored in various chapters in this text the problems with identifying what an ideology is and examples of specific ideologies themselves. There always remains an element of “I can't define it exactly, but I know it when I see it” to all discussions on ideology. However, in general we can say that ideology is an admixture of political and socio-economic beliefs, values and symbolism that provides explanatory coherence: a focal lens through which people filter political narratives. Furthermore, we have seen that ideology is operationalized. This is to say, ideology is used to accrue and wield power in politics along a continuum from rhetoric and persuasion through to physical force and violence.
14.3 The International System and Globalization

JOHN WRIGHT

One of the primary characteristics of the contemporary world is 'globalization.' But what does this mean?

At its most basic, the term globalization summarizes a situation in which there exists a much greater interconnectedness of actors and political-economic structures around the world and also that these connections are much more immediate in transmission and in effect. Given this, how would these elements affect developments regarding ideology?

To understand how power, and therefore ideology, is operationalized within the international system and with globalization, we need to start first with the levels of analysis issue, which defines the basic parameters of the international system.

Exercises

Look up definitions of globalization in different available disciplinary scholarly reference works: political science, economics, sociology, communications.
14.3.1 Levels of Analysis

JOHN WRIGHT

The levels of analysis issue in international relations theory hypothesises that power is exercised at three basic levels: the individual (or sub-state, or group) level, the state level, and the international level. At the sub-state level of analysis, political actors can be individuals exercising their own interests, or they can be an aggregate of people via an institutional arrangement or mechanism: for example, as political leaders, as voters, as municipalities, as provinces, or as interest groups. At the state level of analysis, we look at states as unitary actors exercising state self-interests. At the international – or systemic level – we talk of the interaction between states and the structure of the system as a whole.
14.3.2 The International System, Sovereignty and the State

JOHN WRIGHT

The defining aspects of the international system are predicated on the relationship between states: literally international. States remain the highest order of sovereign agency – the largest autonomous aggregate unit of human activity – in political affairs. It is states that make and enforce laws. In a simple example: the laws of the United States do not apply in Canada, nor vice versa. For American law to apply in Canada, Canada would have to pass a law recognizing the application of American law, thereby making it Canadian law.

The power of this absolute norm can be seen in the equality of status, inviolability, and independence given to such disparate entities as Luxembourg, the United States, Togo, or India. Iceland, an island country of 350,000 people – the size of London Ontario – with a GDP of $24 billion, is the sovereign equal of Japan, an island country of 126 million people and a GDP of $5 trillion (World Bank, 2021).

Critically for international relations, it is the state that filters all activities on the international stage. This means that the structures of internationalization, and therefore of globalization, rest directly or indirectly on agreements between states and/or on what is required to cross state boundaries. A few examples can quickly illustrate this:

• International law comprises agreements between states – treaties – that rely on states to enforce them within their jurisdictions.
• Multinational corporations must abide by the domestic laws of countries within which they operate.
• Social media are subject to domestic censorship and regulation.

States retain the ultimate power of sovereignty regardless of international norms or treaties: the ability to wage war, to invade, to blockade, to define laws and rights and to tax (or to refute international levies).

Exercises

• Look up examples on regulation or censorship of social media from around the world
• Compare the status of nations that are not states to those that are: How comparatively autonomous are Tibet, Palestine, Greenland, or perhaps more interestingly – Taiwan? In Canada, what is the autonomy and jurisdiction of Quebec – a province that claims nationhood – compared to a treaty First Nation?

But there are limits to sovereignty. And there are different expressions of sovereignty. Individual states, even the most powerful, do not get everything their own way based on raw power, size or military force. States that isolate themselves entirely from abroad are most likely to suffer, perhaps even to the point of collapse.

Nor is the world simply an anarchic and brutal competition between states jostling for dominance. States can, and obviously do, come together cooperatively to further mutual goals. These can range from basic protection and cooperation on borders and boundaries to deep collaboration for the improvement of citizen well-being. And, of course, states also collaborate to further shared ideas or goals, things that might include ideologies, concepts and worldviews.
At one end of the continuum rests isolationist states such as North Korea and on the other the deep collaboration and mutual integration of the European Union.

This discussion also informs us that the state and the international system define each other: states create the international system, and the international system imposes limitations, order and boundaries on states. A state itself is only a state in the fullest sense when it is recognized by other states in our international system. Therefore, a change in one affects a change in the other. This is something to bear in mind as we look at the state itself.
If we drop down to the level of the state, things suddenly look very different. There is no longer a unitary actor speaking with a single voice. Instead, we tend to discuss the state as a set of institutions and interests that come together to create policy. So, where in the international setting we tend to say states have interests, at the domestic level we tend to discuss the various interests that go into forming foreign policy. Considering this, what counts as the state suddenly becomes problematic.

For example: Are the German Chancellor’s interests and Germany’s interests the same thing? One would say obviously not, but then to what extent does German policy reflect the Chancellor’s interests? Which priorities, issues or outcomes are determined by the preferences of the current political leadership, and which are defined more by Germany’s long-standing relationships and geopolitical position? How does the situation of the German Chancellor compare with, say, that of the Brazilian president?

We can see then that the form and structure of the state is important in predicting and predating policy. How does power flow, and how is it exercised? What type of legal system does a state have? Is it unitary or federal? Is it democratic or authoritarian? Is it a constitutional state or a charismatic one? And, of course, how (much) does the ideological positioning of the leadership affect political developments.

Exercises

- Examine the role of the president and the US Congress in the making of American foreign policy
- Look at a federal state (for example, India, Germany, Switzerland, Australia, The United States, Belgium) and see what jurisdictions its provinces or states are responsible for
14.3.4 Globalization – the 4th level

JOHN WRIGHT

So far, we have examined the international system in terms of levels, and these levels have centred on the fact of the state. However, there are obviously many other actors on today's global stage: international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multi-national corporations, epistemic communities (knowledge-based networks that can be formal or informal), religious organizations, various forms of media, and many others, all of which have a huge influence on globalization and the international system. In addition to actors, there are also widely understood norms, such as human rights, norms on property, contracts, capitalism for economic affairs, and even the common use of English as a diplomatic language. These actors and norms also exercise boundaries and exert influence on state behaviour.

And because the international system is codified through states, these actors and norms also exist and operate at the state and sub-state levels of analysis. An example that quickly comes to mind is the multinational corporation: it exists as a sub-state actor in more than one state and yet it has a coherent interest that transcends national boundaries. Multinationals deal with municipalities to site and operate locally, they lobby national governments on issues in their jurisdiction, and they try to impact policy at the international level through international fora through influencing state foreign policy interests. Other non-state actors such as issue-based non-governmental organizations or religious organizations operate similarly.

There are other less evident non-state actors who exercise power differently, such as epistemic communities (knowledge-based communities). These are groups that range from scientists engaged in common collaboration to formal, large professional organizations that set international standards for their membership and/or activities.

What we see then, rather than three discrete levels of analysis, each with its own actors within them, is a complex web of interactions between and across these analytical levels. These interactions are between actors that look and behave differently at each level.

The density of this web of interactions, the numerous agents and outcomes that operate within it, and the outcomes they produce, comprise the true measure of the intensity and effects of globalization. With this analytical toolkit we can start to look at how ideology is operationalized in the international system and how it may develop from this point forward.
In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a widely read and influential article was published called “The End of History” (Fukuyama, 1989). It asserted that the Soviet collapse affirmed the ‘victory’ of 400 years of liberalism in the face of ideological challengers. It was not that history – the cause of events – was over, but rather the permanent entrenchment of liberalism as the end point in the history of political ideology was proven. The ideals of the Enlightenment had triumphed. American and allied foreign policy could focus on what would be the inevitable “democratization” and ‘normalization’ of former and current authoritarian states, notably those of Eastern Europe and Russia. Those that were not yet democratic ultimately would be. The era of ideological challenges was de facto over.

Fast-forward to 2021 and things look very different. America faces a new challenge to its dominant world position: China. Russia remains an authoritarian, disruptive and powerful military state. At home, consensus on the nature and meaning of American democracy seems polarized, perhaps paralyzed, by the politics of Donald Trump. The European Union, a bastion of liberal democratic cooperation and economic integration, has lost Britain to nationalist-xenophobic political sentiment and faces similar challenges in Poland and Hungary.

So, what happened? By looking at the trajectory of international affairs from 1945 to the present, we can identify some systemic elements that provide some answers and may give clues to future developments.
The international system we currently occupy was founded in 1945. The dominant military, economic and cultural power was (and remains) the United States. The principles and institutions of this system were laid out in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 in response to German and Japanese war aims and were further refined and developed as an antithesis to the Axis Powers and to the causes of WWI that culminated in 1945 in the codification of norms and principles established through international treaties and institutions. The key institutions were the United Nations and the economic institutions of the Bretton-Woods Agreement: The World Bank and the IMF. Economic relations were further codified in 1947 through the GATT (now the WTO). This was a triumph of what came to be called liberal internationalism and reflected the international projection of liberalism and capitalism through American power.

America arranged the world militarily through a series of mutual defence military treaties: NATO being the primary trans-Atlantic alliance of the core Western powers. Its economic arrangements through the Bretton-Woods institutions entrenched American-preferred rules for trade, investment and foreign aid, all of which was backstopped by American funding. America had created a hegemony.

However, challenging American dominance was the Soviet Union, whose political worldview was antithetical to America's, being based on Bolshevism – a specific interpretation of Communism based on Russia's global position. The Soviet Union was militarily and economically weaker than America. The Soviet Union's participation was defensive: it wanted stability and a post-war bargain that would legitimize its position as a great power – an equal to the major capitalist states. It was exhausted and depleted from the war against Germany in a way the Western powers were not. It needed to consolidate its hold on the buffer states of Eastern Europe it occupied. It needed to rebuild its economy and society: The Soviet Union had been invaded and occupied, while America had not. The second most powerful military state in the world, the Soviet Union, acceded to the post-war order from a position of weakness vis-à-vis America.

The final factor in the Cold War was the development of nuclear weapons and rockets to deliver them across the world. With these new weapons, any military conflict had the potential to become an extinction event for humanity. This very literal existential threat focused more importance on the use of international institutions to ensure diplomatic solutions on core disputes, however frosty and terse that diplomacy might be.

This bipolar system therefore comprised two states on which international stability ultimately relied. But they were exceptionalist, revolutionary states. Each was founded on a revolutionary myth married overtly to an ideology. These ideologies developed from the Enlightenment and the subsequent history of Western thought: Liberalism and Communism. Both ideologies came with a teleology culminating in their being the end state of political development, and these end states were linked to providing very different visions of freedom, individual happiness, and peace. They were inimically hostile. Communication, the flow of ideas, trade: all interactions between the two superpowers were minimal and closely directed by the state.

Conflict therefore shifted to other expressions of power that mainly fell to the ideological realm. The Cold War increasingly became a propaganda war in which the stakes were whether Communism (as interpreted by the Soviet Union) or liberal capitalism (as primarily interpreted by the United States) better expressed people's basic rights and material wants. The forms of the state become contestable grounds for definitions of things such as freedom, democracy, human rights, wealth, health and well-being, property, and economic and technological progress. The targets for ideological influence were mainly the former colonies of the now dissolved empires of Europe in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The international system was locked between two superpowers, with contestation only at the margins in places unfortunate to be the sites of devastating proxy wars in a tragic global game of chess.
Exercises

1. Compare and contrast Soviet and American definitions of rights
2. Consider the nature of regimes propped up by American and Soviet military power. Did they violate international norms? Did they pass the test in ‘proving’ their ideologies?
   - Possible examples for the United States include but are not limited to, interventions in Guatemala, Vietnam, Chile, Nicaragua, Grenada.
   - Possible examples for the Soviet Union include but are not limited to, interventions in: Angola, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, Cuba.

Quite rapidly, between 1989 and 1991, the Soviet Union and its allied Soviet regimes collapsed. The reasons were multifold but can be crudely summarized as a failed legitimacy of the Soviet state to be a sufficient economic and societal alternative to liberal capitalism, in combination with the increasing costs of military and economic competition with America. This collapse – the ‘End of History’ moment, indicated that the international system had changed. But had it?
14.4.2 The Evolution of Liberal Internationalism at Home and Abroad

JOHN WRIGHT

If we look at the elements of the international system from 1945 to today, we can see that the superficial structural rigidity of the Cold War masked other more substantive changes happening in the international system. And we can also see that today, most of the elements of the 1945 post-war settlement remain in place and may be even more robustly developed. We can also see that these changes have had profound consequences for how we view 'liberalism'.

First, we can see that economic growth has become the key measure of power and success in competition between states. Military power is still vital but less exercisable, and it is seen as dependent on economic growth. The third factor to look at is the growing change, and rate of change, in interdependence and economic power. This was facilitated in large part by the deregulation of capital and currency flows since the 1970s. This deregulation was itself largely caused by the needs of the United States to sell bonds to fund Cold War armaments and proxy wars. By the 1990s, industrial production for the core western economies was increasingly shipped abroad, with only the administrative and design elements remaining at home. Corporations had moved production 'off-shore' in order to cut labour costs. To further economic competitiveness, large-scale free trade deals were negotiated to allow products to more easily ship back and forth across national boundaries, with NAFTA being the signature free trade deal for Canada.

For the international system, the key point on these deals is that while capital flowed freely, labour remained constrained to national boundaries. While foreign corporations were given equality status in law and access, individual rights and privileges were not. This resulted in the loss of jobs and industrial production in core western economies. And while it increased general wealth in recipient countries, it did not necessarily translate to a greater share of intellectual property by countries outside the core Western states. Nor for that matter did it automatically promote liberal-democratic values.

Second, this economic growth has ironically undermined the power of the western political liberal democracy. The wealth and growth of non-state economic actors has come to hold huge sway on domestic political calculations and to influence domestic and sub-state policies.

Third, the nature of liberalism has changed. There have been internal changes in the belief systems and consequently the normative practices – the ideologies – of key western states. Shrinking the role of the state became acceptable grounds for political contestation based on a mix of ideas now commonly referred to as 'neoliberalism' – a variant of classical liberalism defined by smaller government, less taxation, deregulation, and greater individual choice. These things have all been equated to liberty – above all economic liberty – in the face of an oppressive state. These ideas were developed in reaction to Soviet communism and to the growth of the liberal-welfare state in the West through the Great Depression, the Second World War, and the Cold War itself. Reducing the narrative of liberty and rights to the narrower scope of individual freedom and ownership of property in the face of an overarching, bureaucratic government won political victories for Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1970s and 1980s. It has set the parameters for political discourse in the United States and consequently for many other Western states ever since.

The combination of a reframed liberalism based on individual wants and rights, along with an increasing number of claims on the state's role in society, led over time to a much more polarized, fractious political climate in western liberal democracies. Prioritization among competing interests has become more difficult. Partisanship and the overt use of majoritarian political power has become a more frequent phenomenon.

These three factors have combined to create a new constellation of actors and institutions based on the principles of the post-war settlement. The core organizations remain, but increasingly other transnational and international organizations have created other channels to increase the dense web of international, multilateral organizations such as the EU, TPP, NAFTA, and G7.

Within the state, the combination of a reframed liberalism based on individual wants and rights, along with an
increasing number of claims on the state's role in society, has led over time to a much more polarized, fractious political climate in western liberal democracies. Prioritization among competing interests has become more difficult. Partisanship, and with it the overt use of majoritarian political power to consolidate systemic partisan advantage, has become a more frequent phenomenon. The influence of wealthy interests in domestic political affairs – lobbying and spending in political contests – has become if not greater, then more overt.
Finally, two other systemic factors have been introduced into the system. They were created in large part by the post-war order – changes arising out of the nature of the system itself – and have now become new and increasingly influential factors in international affairs and in the role and nature of the state at home and abroad: information technology and climate change.

The information revolution has turned out to be no less significant in overturning the course of human affairs than the Industrial Revolution that preceded it some 150 years previous. Like the Industrial Revolution, the IT revolution has fundamentally transformed not only the fundamentals of economic and social interaction but also accelerated the pace of that change. Most of the backbone of the contemporary economy and society did not exist 30 years ago: the internet, social media, artificial intelligence and machine learning, and robotics. All these things arose from the military and economic competition of the Cold War, much of it directly from military research and development. But it was the spread and development of IT for civilian applications that truly transformed the international system by changing the relationship between the state and sub-state actors and by transcending the state as the gatekeeper for sub-state actors in the international system.

Domestically, computational power and robotics transformed the nature of work and the mainstays of the economy. Industrial jobs were displaced by digital ones. Services (including such things as industrial design, software development, sales, entertainment, banking, insurance, marketing, administration, logistics, and legal) became the dominant sectors in developed Western economies, while the production of consumer durables became the mainstay of developing economies. Financial capitalism overtook productive capitalism as the main generator of wealth. This exacerbated the already-problematic economic challenge facing states: that capital is free to move, whereas people are not, especially as people and property are the primary tax base – the revenue – of the contemporary state. Capital flight and hiding revenue have become significant challenges to the economic viability of the state.

Internationally, the growth of IT has challenged the modern state-system through its capacity to instantly connect people to create new communities of interest as well as to strengthen existing epistemic and other communities. We have seen, for example, the power of Facebook and Twitter to frame political debate and to aggregate opinions and influences in a way that defies national borders. What happens in one place can now have immediate effects somewhere else. Individuals and sub-state actors are no longer reliant on state-provided or traditional corporate media sources of information. Real-time videos of political events such as the Arab Spring, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and coups and countercoups in Myanmar galvanize interest groups internationally to put pressure on their respective states to react. The message can no longer be as easily controlled at home or abroad.

Also, political leadership having immediate and unmediated access to millions of individuals facilitates their ability to talk directly to audiences, bypassing previously established mechanisms and norms of social and political control: the role of a trusted gatekeeper has been severely attenuated in the face of direct populism. This is the era of “fake news” and false equivalencies, where claims and counter claims are reduced to rhetorical volume over substance, where “do your own research” has challenged the role of the expert, and where emotional arguments hold as much sway as rational ones.

Finally, IT challenges our assumed worldviews though its ability to measure and create new patterns of understanding: big data. For political movements, the capability to inexpensively gather and process large amounts of data has greatly increased their ability to present evidence to back their arguments. Nor are they solely reliant on state-produced data (the collection and promulgation of data used to require a scale of labour only available to the largest organizations). It is becoming easier and easier to gather and present nuanced opinion polling or data on outcomes for marginalized groups and to feed this information into public policy discourse.
Data patterns sometimes create completely new understandings by connecting things that have never been
connected before. This might be something as trivial and innocuous as a fashion trend, a cultural phenomenon, or a
global following for a professional soccer club. But sometimes profound understandings of our globalized world also
emerge. No better example of this exists than man-made climate change.

Quite simply, without the huge amount of data and computational power developed over the past, the overwhelming
evidence that man-made climate change is happening, and that we can project it to be an existential threat in the near
future, would not be possible. The scale and complexity of the task would have precluded it. Furthermore, this evidence
and theorization were furthered by international research and shared resources facilitated in a qualitatively and
quantitatively different way than was previously possible. And finally, the ability to disseminate this information widely
to individuals and non-state actors furthered the attention political leadership received on this matter – accentuating it
as a national and international priority.

Climate change has gone from a niche area of study to the dominant organizing principle of state and international-
systemic policy over the course of 20 years. The understanding that we need to change the underlying structures of
human activity that are predicated on the Industrial Revolution now informs most decision making at the national and
international level. In essence, the creation and advancement of an equally new “green” ideology is underway.

Systemically, climate change has added a new layer of multinational, institutional, inter-state cooperation to the
existing international system that is codified and underpinned by the UN-sponsored Paris Accords. This new layer of
cooperation and understanding has reinforced the international-institutional state-system. Enforcing the mechanisms
needed to deal with climate change requires individual sovereign states to enact climate change solutions, often at the
expense of economic competitiveness or key sectors and interests in their own economy. So, while this is individually a
challenge for many states, it is collectively the means by which states reclaim power and leadership from non-state and
sub-state actors in the international system.

The final point to recognize about the IT revolution is that the enormous amounts of data readily available from
the information systems people use also provide the capacity to target very precise points of information, be they
geographical or various other criteria. Cross-matching multiple data sets makes it even more possible to focus in on
very precise data, even identifiable individuals, anonymized or not. This has changed the balance of power not only
between the individual and the state, but also of the individual with regard to non-state actors: insurance and finance
companies, medical corporations, and political interest groups. The very nature of what it means to be an individual in
society and the boundaries of your person as an economic actor, a political actor or an actor in any other context, have
been perforated. This can affect how people think in terms of their ideological orientation, perhaps shaping a shifting
set of preferences depending on each contextualization, which would, ultimately, break down ideological cohesion on
social and public choice issues.
14.4.4 The Problematization of China: a case study in systemic change

JOHN WRIGHT

In examining China in the international system, we can see how all of the above-discussed topics come together to show the trajectory of change in the international system. China is now the world's leading exporter and second largest importer. Its foreign aid and outward investment have grown significantly. Its economic growth has given it the capacity to increase its military and become more assertive in projecting its regional strategic and military interests. Nor does it shy away from using its economic power as leverage against other states.

As of 2021, the crude ranking of state power in the international system looks radically different than in 1945. The American share of global production has slipped from its historic 1945 high to a more normal, yet still dominant 24%: one country still produces one-quarter of the world's output. But China now accounts for 15% of global GDP. Japan is 6%, Germany 5%, and India 3.25%. Other newcomers include South Korea, Indonesia and Brazil, which all have approximately the same GDP as Canada at just over 2%. Russia's economy now accounts for just under 2% of global GDP. More importantly, these numbers are based in large part on intra-industry trade: flows of production and services within the same corporation, but across national boundaries, for example, the integrated supply chain of auto parts and vehicle production between Canada and the United States. In 2014, 60% of US trade and 60% of European trade was intra-industry trade (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2021).

Note that the projection of raw force has completely disappeared. While harder to gauge than economic power, the more traditional ranking of military power lists the top military powers in order as: United States, Russia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea. In terms of military spending, it is: United States, China, India, Russia, and United Kingdom. But with an expenditure of $778 billion, the United States easily surpasses the military spending of the next six countries combined (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2021). The US remain the only military superpower.

What this says is that compared to 1945, or even 1991, the balance of power – of influence – in the international system has become more complex and has shifted to a global spread rather than being North-Atlantic based. And while the US faces no global military threat, it faces rising regional powers, many of which are locked with it in economic interdependence. Most notably is China, which has shown the potential to become a challenger to America's global position.

And China presents a specific, disruptive threat to the ideology of liberal internationalism and America's reliance on liberalism to underpin its self-appointed moral leadership. The lesson from China is that democracy and capitalism are not mutually dependent. Far from it: China has succeeded as a nationalist, illiberal state. China has maintained strong state intervention and ownership in its economy; it has shown no compunction in violating what liberal democracies would call individual and property rights. The treatment of individuals and of ethnic minorities violate international agreements. The Chinese state has censored – in essence localized – social media platforms such as Facebook. It has created the world's largest and deepest surveillance apparatus in order to promote what it considers order and harmony. China has taken on the challenge of climate change seriously because it sees economic advantage as well as survival in addressing the challenge. So far, nothing about being “green” has subverted China's general success in state control
and the direction of its society and economy. In short: within the current rules of international trade and state-based cooperation, China has directed a state-led economy to achieve national goals as set by authoritarian leadership.

Other states can look at China and see a model that allows them to reject political reforms while accepting economic and technological advances. As long as they present no existential threat to general systemic stability, they can participate in and benefit from international economic institutionalization while rejecting political liberalization as irrelevant or culturally inappropriate. So far, only states or actors that have threatened great power interests and international stability in very specific ways have been subject to attempts at 'regime-change': Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan, and the quasi-state Islamic jihadi movements such as Al-Qaeda.

What this implies for other states is that nationalist and/or authoritarian development models are not only viable but successful development models. The implications – and they are at this point merely implications – for the global influence of political liberalism are ominous. For developing countries, China overtly holds out its model, and its foreign assistance, to non-democratic states.

Which leads us to the very recent examples of President Trump in the US and Brexit in the UK. As we have seen above, in western liberal-democratic states, job displacement, wealth inequality, stagnating incomes, and the erosion of government services have placed great strains on domestic politics. This discontent has been used by populist politicians to target external groups to blame for these overlapping crises. In America, we saw the rise of Trump and a reformulated Republican Party come to power through attacking 'corrupt elites' who game the system and send jobs away from America. While in power, Trump attacked immigrants and refugees, distanced America from its traditional treaty partners and imposed trade barriers and tariffs that violated international agreements. He also arbitrarily lent legitimacy to other states with 'strongman' political leaders that disrupted the norms of the international system: Russia, North Korea, and Brazil.

In Britain, it was UKIP (the UK Independence Party) and elements of the ruling Conservative Party that fanned the flames of anti-EU sentiment and xenophobia against EU workers in Britain to the same effect. Both parties, when in power, challenged and/or rewrote the democratic norms of governance to impose their political programs.

Critically, the obvious self-harm to these countries' international influence and their economic wealth did not seem to dent their support or their path towards ever-increasing populist-authoritarian policies. In the UK, even the prospect of national dissolution in the wake of Brexit has not decreased the popularity of the Conservative government.

Elsewhere, we see similar disturbing patterns in governments in Poland and Hungary. Nationalist-populist elements carry serious oppositional strength in many if not most European countries. Although it is far too soon to claim that this is happening, if leading states of the international-democratic order, including those that lay claim to the foundation of liberal-democracy itself, are prone to ideological disruption caused by the structure of the contemporary international system, what does this say about the inevitability of post-Enlightenment liberal democracy?
Examining the history of the past 70 years – less than the average Canadians' lifespan – reveals that significant changes in the international system and changes in ideological influence have occurred. The general trajectory of the change has been away from a system of competition between two competing 19th-century ideologies based on the Industrial Revolution to one that has multiple loci of influence that are dependent on participation in a globalized economy and a greater awareness of shared concerns.

Paradoxically, the liberal international ideal of a rules-based, global, capitalist order has become, if anything, more greatly entrenched while at the same time the liberal political values on which it was predicated seem to have become more attenuated. That attenuation can be directly correlated with the relative decline of American power abroad and the decline in ideological homogeneity within core western states (notably again within the United States). Global political stability and trade – not democracy, nor military might – has become the most valued norm for the states-based system. Co-operation on existential threats, be they the escalation of regional conflicts or systemic threats like climate change, will only further the desire to maintain a sustainable order or states.

The current international system has the potential to long outlast the superpower that instituted it in 1945. This is a significant departure from the ideological underpinnings that formed the international system in 1945 and even from those proposed in 'The End of History' in 1991.

Absent any real threat to, or inability to manage, global international capitalism of some form or another, states will continue to derive legitimacy from the international system through their ability to effectively cooperate internationally to create wealth and the economic resources to support sovereignty and state and/or citizen ambitions. However, the exact character of the system will depend on the key states – the large powers – within the system. And to some extent it will depend on some non-state actors' abilities to affect state forms and decision making. The rise of illiberal ideologies, such as populist authoritarianism or state nationalism, as perceived solutions to intractable problems is not only likely but expected given that international cooperation seems to be effectively divorced from international liberalism. However, such ideologies as yet make no global claims to political domination or revolutionary systemic change; rather, ideological settlement for now seems to reside within the purview of the state.

Based on this trajectory then, a guessing person would say that ideological challenges to the globalized world order will remain secondary as long as it is in the vested interests of states and their key economic stakeholders.

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**Discussion Questions**

1. Given that North America comprises federal states that are increasingly integrated across national boundaries, could regional affiliations between sub-state actors such as Canadian Provinces and American States create new interests and identities that could overcome national identities and ideologies in America and Canada?

2. The author has asserted that the most reasonable assumption is that ideological challenges to the globalized world order will remain secondary to states interest in keeping the current system. Do you agree? If not, why?

3. This article has cited 2 examples of unforeseen changes to international politics that have occurred since the current system came to be. Can you think of potential changes that might occur that would
4. The UK has left the European Union in a decision known as “Brexit.” This contravenes the general trend of states engaging in a deeper and broader web of bilateral and multilateral agreements.
   ◦ Do you think the UK’s quest for sovereignty on its own terms will succeed?
   ◦ Do you think the UK’s Brexit is the precursor to other states abandoning the current form of globalization?

5. The current global system was broadly established by American economic and military power and based on an American interpretation of liberalism? If the United States declines sufficiently in power, or if the United States becomes and illiberal state, will that change the nature of globalization and the international system? How might it affect future ideological developments?
References


About the Editor

Valérie Vézina, Kwantlen Polytechnic University
valerie.vezina@kpu.ca

Valérie Vézina (PhD, Université du Québec à Montréal) is a faculty member in the department of political science at Kwantlen Polytechnic University (KPU), since September 2018. Her research focuses on the intersection between nationalism studies and island studies. She specialises in comparative studies. Her book “Une île, une nation?” [One island, one nation?] was a finalist for the prix francophone (the Francophone prize) of the Canadian political science association in 2020.

Dr. Valérie Vézina became a proponent of Open education and open sources since her arrival at KPU. She teaches ideologies and politics on a regular basis and wanted to develop an open source for students; this is how this project was first born.

When not teaching and researching, Dr. Vézina enjoys trail running, yoga and swimming.
List of contributors

Francis Kofi Abiew, Kwantlen Polytechnic University
francis.abiew@kpu.ca
Francis Kofi Abiew, LL.B (Hons) (University of Ghana, 1985), BL (Ghana School of Law, 1987), LL.M (University of Alberta, 1991), MA (University of Alberta, 1993), Ph.D. (University of Alberta, 1997). Prior to joining KPU, he taught at the University of Alberta, Royal Military College of Canada (Graduate Program in War Studies, Canadian Forces Base, Edmonton), University of Windsor, and Carleton University (where he was also Strategic Defence Forum Post-Doctoral Fellow and Coordinator, Centre for Security and Defence Studies, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs). He is an internationally recognized expert on Humanitarian Intervention, and Peace Operations. Francis also regularly serves as a reviewer for numerous leading journals and publishers in the field of International Relations and Security.

Jennifer Anaquod, Kwantlen Polytechnic University
jennifer.anaquod@kpu.ca
Jennifer is a member of the Muscowpetung Saulteaux First Nation in Saskatchewan, a heritage that informs her work and research. Currently a PhD candidate in Curriculum Studies at UBC, her academic research relates to identity and personal history, and the substantial role an individual’s narrative plays in place-based education. Her research informs her curricula at both Native Education College and Kwantlen Polytechnic University, where she is an instructor in Indigenous education.

Tyler Chamberlain, Simon Fraser University, Kwantlen Polytechnic University
tyler.chamberlain@kpu.ca
Tyler Chamberlain lectures in political science at numerous universities including Kwantlen Polytechnic University and Simon Fraser University, teaching courses in political theory, international relations and Canadian politics. His primary research interests are early modern political theory and Canadian political thought. He earned his Ph.D in Political Science from Carleton University.

Frédérick Guillaume Dufour, Université du Québec à Montréal
dufour.frederick_guillaume@uqam.ca
Frédérick Guillaume Dufour is a professor of Political Sociology at Université du Québec à Montréal. He has written extensively on nationalism in Québec, Canada and Germany, historical sociology, populism and comparative historical methods. He is the author of La sociologie du nationalisme. Relations, cognition, comparaisons et processus (2019) and La sociologie historique. Traditions, trajectoires et débats (2015), both of which were published by the Presses de l’Université du Québec.

Serdar Kaya, Simon Fraser University, Kwantlen Polytechnic University
serdar.kaya@kpu.ca
Serdar Kaya, Ph.D., is a comparative political scientist with specializations in migration and diversity. His research and teaching revolves around multiculturalism, majority-minority relations, and Muslims in Western democracies.

Conrad King, Kwantlen Polytechnic University
conrad.king@kpu.ca
Conrad King (PhD, University of British Columbia) is a Faculty member in the department of political science at Kwantlen Polytechnic University, where he teaches comparative politics, Canadian politics and political theory. Conrad’s research interests have included the European Union, comparative public policy, and education politics.

Logan Masilamani, Simon Fraser University, Kwantlen Polytechnic University
logan.masilamani@kpu.ca
Logan Masilamani is a Lecturer in SFU’s School of International Studies and also at Kwantlen’s Department of Political Science. Originally from Singapore, he has made Canada home since the 1980s. He obtained his bachelor’s and master’s
degrees at SFU, going on to complete his doctorate in international relations at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. Logan has been teaching at Simon Fraser University and various other educational institutions for the past two decades. He specializes in international relations, concentrating on conflict resolution in Southeast Asia. His past and current research focuses on constructive engagement in ASEAN and Burma, human security, the military industrial complex in the Southeast Asian region, South Asian politics, and the political development of Southeast Asian countries.

**Gregory Millard, Kwantlen Polytechnic University**

greg.millard@kpu.ca

Gregory Millard (Ph.D., Queen's University) specializes in political thought and Canadian politics, and has served as Instructor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Kwantlen Polytechnic University. He is currently one of the Associate Dean of Arts.

**Ross Michael Pink, Kwantlen Polytechnic University**

ross.pink@kpu.ca

Ross Michael Pink teaches Politics, Environment and Human Rights at Kwantlen Polytechnic University and serves as Chair of the Political Science Department. His recent books include, *Water Rights in Southeast Asia and India* (2016) and *The Climate Change Crisis* (2018) both published by Palgrave Macmillan. Dr. Pink is Co-Founder of the educational NGO, Global Water Rights, [www.globalwaterrights.com](http://www.globalwaterrights.com)

**Dave Poitras, Université de Montréal**

dave.poitras@umontreal.ca

Dave Poitras is an adjunct professor of Sociology at Université de Montréal and a scientific advisor in public health at the Institut national de santé publique du Québec. Focusing on Quebec, Belgium and the Netherlands, his expertise encompasses nationalism studies, radicalization, qualitative and ethnographic methods as well as the prevention of violence. In 2019, he published the book *Nationhood at Work: An Ethnography of Workplaces in Montreal and Brussels*.

**Étienne Schmitt, Concordia University**

etienne.schmitt@concordia.ca

Étienne Schmitt is an assistant professor (LTA) at Concordia University. His research focuses on ideologies and the construction of political representations in a minority context. He obtained a PhD from the Université du Québec à Montréal and he was postdoctoral fellow at the Université de Corse Pascal Paoli. He is currently working about the construction of autonomism and regionalism in Canada, France and Germany.

**Jackie F. Steele, Graduate School of Global Environmental Studies, Sophia University**

jfs@en-jo.com

Dr. Jackie F. Steele is a trilingual, Canadian political scientist, feminist philosopher, and Japan scholar. She has taught at leading universities in Canada and Japan, is a lecturer on risk governance for the Graduate School of Global Environmental Studies, Sophia University, and she is the CEO of enjoi Diversity & Innovation Japan. For over 20 years Dr. Steele has shared expertise on diverse citizenship, inclusive decision-making, diversity in public policy and diverse talent mobilization strategy. She has been guiding grassroots organizations and public/private sector policy leaders in the creation of policy solutions that place intersectional diversity, gender equality, and inclusive innovation at the heart of organizational culture and inclusive ecosystem design.

**Arjun Tremblay, University of Regina**

arjun.tremblay@uregina.ca

Arjun Tremblay is Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Regina specializing in comparative politics. He obtained his PhD in Political Science from the University of Toronto in 2017 and was a postdoctoral fellow with the Canada Research Chair in Québec and Canadian Studies (CREQC) at the Université du Québec à Montréal (2017–2018). He is the author of *Diversity in Decline? The Rise of the Political Rights and the Fate of Multiculturalism* (2018, Palgrave Macmillan) and co-editor (with Alain-G. Gagnon) of *Federalism and National Diversity in the 21st Century* (2020, Palgrave Macmillan).

**Serbulent Turan, University of British Columbia**

serbulent.turan@ubc.ca

Serbulent Turan is a political theorist with a primary research interest in the constitution of the modern state,
and specifically in revolutions, uprisings, and how states engender obedience in their subjects through institutional, structural, and normative means. Dr. Turan teaches Political Science at the University of British Columbia (UBC), where he is also the Public Scholarship Coordinator, running UBC’s flagship scholarship program Public Scholars Initiative.

**Valérie Vézina, Kwantlen Polytechnic University**

valerie.vezina@kpu.ca

Valérie Vézina (PhD, Université du Québec à Montréal) is a faculty member in the department of political science at Kwantlen Polytechnic University, since September 2018. Her research focuses on the intersection between nationalism studies and island studies. She specialises in comparative studies. Her book “Une île, une nation?” [One island, one nation?] was a finalist for the prix francophone (the Francophone prize) of the Canadian political science association in 2020.

**John Wright, University of Calgary**

john.wright@ucalgary.ca

John Wright is the Director of the Business Library and Political Science and Public Policy Librarian at the University of Calgary. Prior to that he was a Policy Advisor at Natural Resources Canada and Elections Canada; and a Policy Analyst for International Relations, Political Science and Procedures and House Affairs for the Parliament of Canada, serving on several House and Senate committees. He holds a BA in History, and MA in Russian and East European Studies and an MLIS. He did his graduate work and PhD candidacy on post-Soviet Democratization and the International System.

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